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Recent research has shown that from the early beginnin0. Abstractg of development, children 
selectively form new beliefs by monitoring the competence and reliability of social sources of 
information (e.g., Harris, 2012). Successful learning strategies, however, do not just rely on 
testimony of others but rather need to be selective both as a function of the quality of supplied 
information and one’s own informational quality. So far, little is known about the development of 
selective revision of existing beliefs in response to socially conveyed information. In contrast, 
such selective social belief revison has been extensively studied by social psychologists in the 
context of advice-taking. Findings of this research show that adults revise their judgments 
taking into account advice in a selective and systematical fashion; and thus benefit from these 
revisions by increasing the accuracy of their judgments (e.g., Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). From a 
developmental point of view, the fundamental question is how such advice-taking or social 
belief revision evolves. As part of this dissertation, three studies have been conducted to 
address children’s willingness and competence to revise beliefs as a function of their own and 
the advisor’s state of knowledge, their sensitivity toward advice justification, and their ability to 
solve decision problems collectively. 
In Study 1 4- to 6-year-old children and adults solved a perceptual judgment task, 
received advice, and subsequently made final decisions. The informational access (perceptual 
quality) of participants and advisor were experimentally manipulated. Adults revised their 
judgments systematically as a function of both their own and the advisor’s informational access 
while children based their adjustments only on their own informational access. Two follow-up 
experiments suggest, however, that this pattern of results in children reflected performance 
rather than competence limitations: In suitably modified tasks, children did consider both their 
own information and that of the advisor in their selective social belief revision. 
Study 2 was designed to investigate whether preschoolers are sensitive to advice 
justified by arguments differing in quality, and the effect of this justification on subsequent 
advice utilization. To this end advisors supported their judgment by giving a reason for why they 
want the final judgment to be consistent with the advice. Results revealed the following: Firstly, 
children weigh information as a function of argument quality, however, only if cues of argument 
quality are unambiguous. And secondly, arguments phrased similarly were endorsed differently 
as a function of context. This support children’s ability to judge arguments based on the 






In Study 3 4- to 6-year-old children and adults worked in dyads and jointly solved the 
perceptual judgment task. In a first step participants judged a stimulus individually, then 
discussed their individual judgments and agreed on a joint decision. Dyads mainly trusted the 
information supported by the strongest evidence. However, children differed in the 
successfulness of their joint decisions as a function of meta-talk strategies. Results suggest 
that preschoolers can reason with one another appropriately, and in particular reflect on 
individual informational access. However, more advanced meta-talk strategies identifying 
causal relationships between the informational access and the quality of an individual judgment 
may develop in an explicit form not before school age.  
Taken together, the findings of this dissertation indicate that 4- to 6-year-old children are 
willing and able to revise existing beliefs as a function of the quality of both their own and 
socially supplied information. This competence was shown in different forms of social 
interaction: firstly, when information is presented as mere judgment of an advisor, secondly, 
when advice is supported by arguments and thirdly, when information is reviewed in the 











1. General introduction 
Children are being born into a complex world. In order to successfully navigate through this 
world children have to accumulate enormous amounts of knowledge and skills during their first 
years of life and subsequent development. Much of what children as well as adults know, they 
learn from testimony of others. People rely on reports of others for scientific discoveries, 
historical facts, names of objects, and even their own date of birth. This information is varying in 
quality and, thus not worth considering to the same extent. Testimony can disguise reality, 
whether due to ignorance, verbal inaccuracy, or bad intentions. Research on developing 
selective trust has documented remarkable early capacities of preschool children to perceive 
variation among informants in knowledge and reliability (e.g., Harris, 2012). This line of 
research has focused on the acquisition of new information, however, in many relevant real-life 
situations, we do not act fully ignorant in search of completely novel information. Rather, we 
start out with pre-existing beliefs and judgments and the fundamental challenge is to flexibly 
and selectively update and revise beliefs in the light of new social information.  
Such social revision of beliefs has been the focus of advice-taking behavior in adults 
and extensively been studied in social psychology. Findings of this research show that adults 
do heed advice in a sensible, yet not perfectly rational fashion. Adults’ advice-taking falls short 
of perfect rationality since, for example, adults weight advice insufficiently and overweigh their 
own initial judgments. On the other hand it is considered functional because adults revise their 
judgments taking into account advice in a selective and systematical way; and thus benefit from 
these revisions by increasing the accuracy of their judgments (for reviews, see Bonaccio & 
Dalal, 2006; Rader, Soll, & Larrick, 2017). For developmental psychologists the question is: 
when does such abilities arise and what trajectories do they follow? To date, however,  
research on advice-taking in developmental contexts applying to children is still scarce. In 
particular, little is known about whether the possibility to adjust judgments in fine-grained 
continuous ways influences children’s willingness to revise beliefs in the first place. In addition, 
it is unclear whether children’s ability to select informants as a function of competence – as 
documented in the selective trust research – extends to their selection of advisors; and how 
much the level of children’s own knowledge influences their decision-making.  
Also so far it has not been investigated whether children’s advice-taking is sensitive to 
argumentation, in particular, the presentation of arguments differing in quality, and the effect of 
such justification on subsequent advice utilization. The pure aggregation of individual 
judgments, such as studied in social psychology, ignores relevant characteristics of advice-
 





taking as form of social interaction between two or more people. In real-life advice is most often 
provided with the intent of helping someone to improve individual decisions. Advisors presented 
their opinions generated as piece of information suitable for the specific judge in a specific 
situation. Advice is then most often: firstly presented justified by arguments and secondly, 
discussed in form of a social dialog between judge and advisor. Thus, it represents a situation 
in which judges individually aggregate two judgments to transform into a joint decision. This 
happens as a result of discussions when evidence for individual judgment is collectively 
weighted for it’s reliability. 
The aim of this dissertation is to acquire a more detailed understanding of how social 
belief revision develops. In particularly, the focus lies on how children develop the ability to 
weigh advice as a function of their own and the advisor’s state of knowledge, whether advice 
justification affects advice-taking, and how children reach joint decisions when allowed to 
discuss evidence supporting individual judgments. In the following chapters I will present 
theoretical background on social learning, belief revision, argumentation, and collective 













2. Social learning 
2.1. The role of social learning in humans 
The acquisition of socially supplied information is essential for humans to successfully navigate 
throughout the complex world that they live in. Even small task in our daily life would become 
unmanageable if being restricted to self-acquired information alone. Assuming serving an 
exotic dinner for friends including food that one never had prepared before. The availability of 
geographical and cultural information supplied by other people in the first place makes the 
knowledge about exotic food and appropriate recipes possible. Deprived of testimony of others 
our spatial and temporal horizon would alone be restricted to facts we are able to perceive 
within our own direct environment. Consequently, we would be unaware of the existence of 
exotic fruits and vegetables as well as the wide variety of countries worldwide and historical 
events happening generations in the past. Being born into a specific culture and surrounded by 
adults who all speak a specific language makes effective learning important from early on in 
life. In order to become part of their family, community, and society children have to acquire 
cultural knowledge and learn the complicated structure of an abstract language. Human social 
organization is argued to be unique in the animal kingdom (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 
1993). Although there are many social species, human cultures with their material artifacts, 
social institutions, behavioral traditions, and languages are incomparable. Powerful forms of 
social cognition and learning are necessary to prevent information loss (ratchet) and thus, to 
pool knowledge and skills across generations (Tomasello et al., 1993). The learning 
mechanism allowing such cumulative culture to develop and persist is called imitation. In order 
to be considered as imitation, all three sources of information (goal, action, and result of the 
model) have to be copied by the imitator (Call & Carpenter, 2002), thus, requiring the 
understanding of the intentional state of the model concerning its behavior. This sophisticated 
form of social learning has so far not been proven convincingly in non-human species. 
From early on in life children observe their social surroundings and acquire behaviors by 
imitating what others demonstrate. Meltzoff and colleagues claim that already infants at an age 
between 12 and 21 days are able to imitate both facial expressions and manual gestures and 
thus, adjust their own unseen behaviors by what they have observed themselves in others 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; see Meltzoff & Moore, 1983 for a methodological review and 
Oostenbroek et al, 2016 for a critical position). Infants have been decribed as imitative 
generalists, meaning that they copy actions on objects as well as basic body movements. The 
ability to defer imitation is crucial in situations, in which infants are not allowed to act on an 
 





object immediately after the adult’s demonstration has occured. This ability is challenging since 
infants have to capture, remember and reproduce actions on a sufficient level. The capacity of 
deferred imitation across a 24-hour-delay or a one-week-delay was demonstrated in infants 
youngest at the age of nine months (Meltzoff, 1988b) or at the age of 14 months, respectively 
(Meltzoff, 1988a). Children’s coping fidelity increases with age leading into cases of 3- to 5-
years-old children who even overimitate models (Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan, Whiten, 
Flynn, & Horner, 2007). They copy action sequences that are causally irrelevant to achieve 
desired outcomes and employ imitation in situations, in which alternative social learning 
strategies may be more efficient (Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello, 1993). Overimitation has been 
shown to be a universal human trait and reflects an evolutionary adaptation that is fundamental 
to the development and transistion of human culture. One important aspect of cultural 
knowledge is the way things are done, not what gets done (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). 
Relating back to the idea of sharing an exotic dinner with friends and knowing that Indians, for 
example, eat chicken provides only limited information. More importantly, one needs to know 
how the chicken has to be cooked and what spices need to be added in order to make it an 
Indian dish. 
Imitation is a form of observational learning but not all knowledge can be learned by 
observation. Abstract facts about the world, opposed to actions, are often not visible. The same 
ist valid for events that happend in the past and need to be passed on via verbal or written 
documentation. Language acquisition begins early in life. Children start speaking words around 
their first birthday but know the meaning of several common words already at the age of six 
months (Bergelson & Swingley, 2012). The ability to communicate about what is not 
perceptually present is cognitively more demanding, since new information need to be 
incorporated into own representations of absent objects and was shown by infants at 14 
months of age (Ganea, 2005). This ability allows humans to learn from testimony about a near 
infinite number of topic and to overcome the bounderies of their own spatial and temporal 
perceptions. In fact, before the end of their second year of age infants make use of this 
achievement and update representations of absent objects based on testimony of others 










2.2. Epistemic vigilance 
Humans depend heavily on learning from others. But not all information presented is of the 
same quality and worth considering to the same extent. Testemony can transfer imprecise or 
even wrong information. Thus, social learning, besides all its benefits, bears the risk of 
becoming accidentally or intentionally misinforming. For communication to stabilize and allow 
the exchange of information in the first place costs and benefits of both communication partners 
need to be balanced. On one side, the communicator invests effort by performing the 
communicative act and in return hopes to produce the intended effect in the addressee. On the 
other side, the addressee needs to process the offered information mentally and benefits by 
acqiring information that is true and relevant. While strength of interest and degree of honesty 
often overlap for partners communicating in pleasant ways they rarely coincide exactly. 
Mechanisms of epistemic vigilance allow to controll for balanced costs and benefits of 
communication partners and thus, are indispensable if communication itself is to remain 
advantageous and stabilize continuously. 
Humans are not just unique in the animal kingdom because of their communication. In 
addition they hold an exceptional richness and strength of cognitive abilities. The skills of 
communication and cognition are linked and most likely evolved in parallel phylogenetically and 
ontogenetically. Communication advanced enough to transfer complex knowledge builts upon 
advanced cognitive abilities, in particular language and mindreading. These complex abilities in 
return can not be elaborated individually but rather rely on cognitive skills, conceptual tools, and 
background knowledge acquired from others. Promising models to acquire knowledge arise 
from uniting good intentions and high competences. If epistemic vigilance developed to 
deminish the risk of misinformation, as argued by Sperber and colleagues (2010), it requires 
the capacity to select models as a function of their epistemic status and intentions. This 
includes false belief attribution and the ability to identify the intention to induce false belief in 
addressees. Such attributions require recipients to be sophisticated mindreaders: 
understanding that A is trying to deceive B - as opposed to unintentionally misinforming B - 
involves attributing to A’s intention to cause B to form a false belief. The liar’s intention being 
metarepresentational, the attribution of such an intention is itself a second-order 
metarepresentation (Sperber, 2000). False belief tasks are classically used to evaluate 
mindreading capacities and indicate developmental trajectories. Research in both epistemic 
vigilance and false belief understanding point towards a striking developmental stage at around 
four years of age. Firstly, at this age the ability to represent the relationship between two or 
 





more persons’ epistemic stages emerges and becomes established (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) 
and secondly, epistemic vigilance towards dishonesty (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009) and 
incompetence increased tremendously (Call & Tomasello, 1999).   
Children at the age of four years start to acknowledge differences in epistemic quality 
and selectively accept information as a function of quality. Two aspects of presented 
information might differ in quality: firstly, the content of the testimony – what is being said, thus, 
the information itself - and secondly, the source of testimony – who is providing the information. 
Both aspects do not have to coincide. Characteristicly, A can be more or less convincing 
independent on characteristic B. Some information communicated is intrinsically believable or 
absurd independet on the apparent reliability of the informant itself. Imagine a drunk person at 
a party, representing an unconvincing source of information generally, tells someone that 
German is her/his first language speaking grammatically correct German without any accent. In 
this situation one can rely on the truth of this information because it was evidenced sufficiently 
by the act of communication itself, even though it was given by an unreliable source. Other 
testimony might be intrinsically unbelievable because it has been proven wrong by the own 
immediate perception. For example, a person at the height of approximately 1,60 m claims by 
telling to be 1,90 m instead. In particular, when new information can be acquired by perception 
it is quite sound to rely on own perceptions more than on testimony of others. Perception has 
evolved evolutionarily to provide individuals with reliable information about their living 
environment. One mechanism of epistemic vigilance checks whether testimony of others is 
consistent with immediate situational knowledge. In the case of inconsistency, one should trust 
in own perceptions, since they are, presuming everything else being equal, more likely to be 
reliable (Mercier, 2017). However, in many cases it is more demanding to review information 
provided by others concerning it’s quality. Believability of information can be determined by a 
multitude of factors like factual knowledge, past experiences, or domain specific competences. 
Even balancing of visual information might be complex when visual access is provided with 
some uncertainty. 
Thrustworthiness of the source of information is another important aspect of judgement 
when gathering knowledge from others. Those judgments need to consider the competence 
and benevolence of informants and may result in trusting an informant generally or in 
calibrating trust context or domain specifically. Such precise calibrations of trust are cognitively 
demanding leading people to rely on general impressions of the informant’s trustworthiness. 
However, general impression formation of trustworthiness bears the risk of misjudging 
 





someone as generally trustworthy or not trustworthy. In this respect a phenomenon known as 
commiting a fundamental attribution error was described by Ross (1977) as follows: people 
base their predictions of someone’s future behavior on an experience with this person in a 
specific situation in the past, commonly overestimating psychological dispositions, and 
underestimating situational factors. However, the fact that social learning plays a tremendous 
role in human life and allows enormous accumulation of knowledge suggests that humans are 
able to calibrate their trust well enough to make it advantageous phylo- and ontogenetically. 
The next section will discuss how and under which circumstances skills of selective social 
learning develop ontogenetically. 
 
2.3. Selective social learning 
Young children have long been described as trusting desciples with blind credulity (e.g., Reid, 
2000). Indeed, several studies support strong claims on undiscriminate credulity in children. 
When informed about simple matters of fact they follow social leads, even if proven false 
repeatedly. A strong bias to trust testimony (via pointing or words) about the location of an 
object was shown in a study with 3-year-old children who continued searching for a sticker in 
the wrong location when being encouraged by deceptive testimony (Jaswal, Croft, Setia, & 
Cole, 2010). Moreover, the abilities to understand the falsity of lies presented by an informant 
exposed as a liar or to recognize lies of an informant introduced as intending to lie do not 
demonstrate before the age of four years whereas younger children conform to these kinds of 
misinformation (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). Children of two to three years of age trust 
testimony that conflicts with their own previous experience, even, if they had an incentive to 
ignore this testimony (Jaswel, 2010). Young children also endorse from demonstrations they 
have no possibility to check for themselves and treat new pratices as generalized norms 
instead of context-specific rules (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008). They incorporate  
information about hidden properties of the world, for example, scientific or religious matters, 
into their own judgments and verifications (Harris & Koenig, 2006).  
Besides all the risk of misinformation discussed earlier credulity represents an effective 
strategy to acquire new knowledge for young children. They rarely encounter informants who 
aim to misinform them about matters of the world or human life in general. Children are most 
often provided with true information due to the fact that parents and caregivers purposely 
provide knowledge in most cases with the good intention to educate children in an honest 
 





fashion. The acquisition of language, for example, was debated as case of primitive trust where 
children have to accept word-object links instinctively to be able to join the linguistic 
communities (Burge, 1993). Furthermore, Dawkins (2006) emphasised the advantages of 
credulity from an evolutionary point of view, where during the process of natural selection 
selective pressures act on individual fitness: “Theoretically, children could learn from personal 
experience, for example, by not approaching a very near cliff edge, not eating untried berries, 
or not swiming in crocodile-infested waters. However, there will be a selective advantage to the 
child’s brain that possess the rule of thumb: believe without questioning whatever adulds tell 
you.” Nonetheless, blind trust in everything being told would not be a successful trait 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005) neither evolutionarily nor ontogenetically. In fact, what emerges from 
current research on selective social learning is a more elaborated vision of children’s attitude 
toward testimony. Even at a very young age, children do not indiscriminately accept information 
coming from testimony.  
Research on children’s selective social learning, also referred to as selective trust, 
traditionally has adopted variations of a basic two-informant paradigm (e.g., Koenig, Clément, & 
Harris, 2004): A familiarization phase is used to etablish in children a differing profile of 
epistemic history for two informants. In four trials children usually are introduced to two 
unfamiliar informants (adults, children, or puppets) who consistently provide accurate or 
inaccurate information in a context revisable for children. Most often these two informants name 
common objects, for example, a ball is placed on a table and the reliable informant calls it a 
‘‘ball‘‘, whereas the unreliable informant calls it a ‘‘shoe‘‘. The two informants offer conflicting 
testimony on a matter unfamiliar to the children, for example, differing names for an unknown 
object. Subsequently, in test trials children are being examined about their marked preference 
in terms of informant’s testimony endorsement.  
Research on selective trust indicate that preschoolers do not learn inflexibly from any 
source alike, but instead review a variety of different characteristics of a potential source (for 
reviews see Harris, 2007; 2012; Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Robinson & Einav, 2014): When 
learning novel words, children at the age of four years monitor variables of competence and 
prefer knowledgable over ignorant (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001), accurate over inaccurate (e.g., 
König & Harris, 2005), and confident over unconfident informants (e.g., Jaswal & Malone, 2007; 
Birch, Akmal, & Frampton, 2010). While often tested with word learning task this selective trust 
is not restricted to the verbal domain only but also shown for factual information (Clement, 
Koenig, & Harris, 2004). Sensitivity extends to more subtle differences of informants reliability, 
 





an attenuated contrast of 75 % correct versus 75 % wrong or non-committal remarks will be 
monitored and trusted, respectively (Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). Children 
rather prefer to trust competent models even one week after exposure to competence 
information (Harris & Corriveau, 2011). Children capitalize on cues of benevolence to select 
informants, in this respect they prefer nice versus mean models (Landrum, Mills, & Johnston, 
2013), models of high versus low reputation (Fusaro & Harris, 2008), honest versus dishonest 
models (e.g., Li, Heyman, Xu & Lee, 2014) and even select for attractiveness (Bascandziev & 
Harris, 2014). Moreover, children are affected in their model choice by age, familiarity, and 
group membership. When presented with unfamiliar models 4-year-old children expect that an 
adult but not necessarily a child knows the meaning of specific words (Taylor, Cartwright, & 
Bowden, 1991). In respect of familiarity a study showed that children are more receptive to 
information offered by a familiar compared to an unfamiliar caregiver (Corriveau & Harris, 
2009). A preference for familiarity was also found at a group level: children demonstrate 
selective trust in native‐ accented speakers over non-native speakers independently on 
semantic content. (Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011).  
Furthermore, preschoolers do not just review cues for reliability independently, if 
accessible they weigh various cues against each over and rely on the ones most relevant in a 
specific learning context. Children at the age of four years prefer to learn from adults rather 
than from peers by default. However, they show the reverse learning pattern when the topic is 
likely to be more familiar to peers (e.g., toys) or when the adult has previously proven to be less 
reliable than the peer (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). Four- and 5-year-old children prefer to believe 
information provided by a confident rather than hesitant individual, however, when confidence 
conflicted with accuracy, preschoolers increasingly favored information from the previously 
accurate but hesitant individual (Brosseau-Liard, Cassels, & Birch, 2014). Finally, it has been 
shown that infants select informants by age as a function of whether they presented novel or 
familiar actions (Zmyj, Daum, Prinz, Nielsen, & Aschersleben, 2012). 
Studies applying a single-informant paradigm to investigate selective trust provide 
evidence that children are generally willing to learn from unreliable informats when no other 
competing testimony existed (Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Kim, Paulus, & Kalish, 2017). For 
example, a direct comparison of both paradigms, two-informants versus single-informant, 
revealed that 3- and 4-year-old children would endorse a previously inaccurate informant for an 
unfamiliar object’s label as long as there was no other informant who proposed an alternative 
(Vanderbilt, Heyman, & Liu, 2014). These results correspond to other studies showing a 
 





general bias to initially accepted social information prior to examining it and possibly rejecting it 
thereafter (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). 
Research studies on developing selective trust report about remarkable early capacities 
of selective trust. The capacities under investigation in this research, however, are restricted to 
the acquisition of new information. In typical test situations used in this research, the child is 
faced with a question being ignorant about (e.g., “What is this novel object called?”, “what is 
this novel tool used for?”, etc.). It is then provided with competing answers by different models 
to choose from. This research, thus, investigates on the development of selective social belief 
formation rather than selective social belief revision. However, in many relevant real-life 
situations humans do not act completely ignorant in search of completely novel information. 
Instead, pre-existing beliefs and judgments affect this process. The fundamental challenge 
consists of flexibly and selectively updating and revising beliefs according to new social 
information. In the next section approaches used in Social- and Developmental psychology to 
investigate belief revision in adults and children will be specified and main findings of these two 












3. Social belief revision 
Testimony offered by informants differs in quality. Similarly, own knowledge depends on the 
specific situation. Sound own knowledge often is involved in decision-making processes or at 
least such feeling exists. The quality of someone’s knowledge is topic dependent, which is 
especially true for children. They are already experts in certain domains, know something about 
others and never heared of numerous domains. Nevertheless, it would be disadvantageous to 
constantly disregard own knowledge and blindly trust others’s testimony when being presented 
with conflicting claims. Instead of that, the ability to correctly discriminate the degree of credulity 
as a function of own knowledge in relation to the quality of the social information seems most 
promising. Such social revision of beliefs has been extensively studied in social psychology 
under the rubric of advice-taking. When faced with important decision makings in life people 
often consult colleagues, parents, and specific experts for advice. Major motivations for seeking 
advice include the hope to improve decision accuracy (Yaniv, 2004), enhanced justifiability of 
someone’s final decision (Kennedy, Kleinmuntz, & Peecher, 1997), or shared responsibility with 
others in terms of the outcome of a decision (Harvey & Fischer, 1997). The focus of this 
research regarding advice-taking lies on modeling such decision structures under various 
conditions. From a developmental point of view, the fundamental question is how such advice-
taking or social belief revision develops. However, until today, other than in adult social 
psychology, systematic research on belief revision in developmental context is still scarce. The 
following section will give an overview about paradigms, main questions, and findings of this 
research. 
 
3.1. Social psychology research 
3.1.1. The judge-advisor-system 
The standard method used in advice-taking research is the „judge-advisor-system“ (JAS; 
Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). This method is constructed perfectly to investigate the interplay of 
various judgments. The paradigm allows to calculate the weight of an advice given by a 
participant in relation to an own initial judgment (Harvey & Fischer, 1997). In a JAS two 
participants are assigned to the role of the “judge” (the decision-maker) or the “advisor” and 
both are informed about the decision task. Firstly, the judge is asked to make an initial 
judgment under some uncertainty (e.g. “How big is Ecuador?”), the judge then receives advice 
from another informant (the advisor), and lastly is asked to make a final judgment. Participants 
 





may also be asked to express a level of confidence regarding the accuracy of their judgments. 
It is up to the judge whether to take the advice into consideration at all and, if so, how much 
weight to attribute to the advice. The judge’s final decision is then often evaluated in terms of 
functionality, explaining to what extent the consideration of the advice increases the accuracy 
of the judgment.  
The crucial measure is the degree of advice-taking (AT), thus, how much the initial 
advice has been adjusted by the judge in light of the advice (e.g., Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), 
defined by Harvey and Fischer (1997) as [(final judgment – initial judgment)/(advice – initial 
judgment)]   100 %. In case the judge fully endorses the advice, AT would be 100 %. When 
judgment and advice are equally weighted, AT would count for  50 %, whereas, without any 
consideration of the advice AT would equal 0 %. Other AT scores between 0 % and 100 % 
represent partial shifts from the initial judgment towards the advice. These percentages 
correspond with revision strategies thematized in the advice-taking literature (e.g., Larrick & 
Soll, 2006; Soll & Mannes, 2011).  
People tend to use two basic strategies: the choosing strategy in which judges choose 
between own initial judgment and the advise and the averaging strategy that aggregates both 
judgments by averaging them. It was shown that some strategies are more prevalent among 
judges than others (Soll & Larrick, 2009). More precisely, regarding the choosing strategy in 
approximately 40 % of their decision making cases judges retain their initial estimate whereas 
in approximately 10 % of all cases judges switch to the advisor’s estimate. The averaging 
strategy is the least preferred strategy used by judges in only 20 % of all cases. In the 
remaining 30 % of decision-makings judges combine both estimates with varying weights of 
each but often tend to place more weight on their own estimate. However, people’s preference 
for the choosing strategy seems not to be the most favorable since the averaging strategy has 
been proven to be more effective across a wide range of commonly encountered situations. 
However, the averaging strategy can only be applied in a JAS using contineous response 
formats compared to decision tasks that rely on a selection of disjuct alternatives. The 
distinction of categorical and contineous response formats was introduced by Hastie (1986) 
and defined accordingly as decisions versus judgments. Decision tasks require selecting one of 
two or more options whereas judgment tasks require locating a target along a continuum 
(Stasser & Dietz-Uhler, 2001). For example, selecting a specific flavor of ice cream out of 
numerous other kinds would be a decision task, while estimating the distance between Berlin 
and Paris would represent a judgment task. When given a decision task judges decide by an 
all-or-nothing-heuristic, thus, either accepting the advice to 100 % or ignoring the advice 
 





completely. In contrast, judgment tasks allow a more fine-grained investigation of judge’s 
adjustments of their initial estimates towards the advice. Accordingly, most studies investigating 
advice-taking in adults use continuous response formats. 
3.1.2. Functionality of advice-taking behavior 
One central finding of studies investigating advice-taking in various tasks and contexts is that 
adults heed advice in a functional way. In general, using advice has been proven to increase 
decision accuracy (e.g., Sniezek, Schrah & Dalal, 2004). Combining estimates reduces random 
errors tied to individuals estimates and this leads to more accurate final judgments (Yaniv, 
2004). Accuracy should increase even if advice were slightly to be inaccurate because heeding 
advice decreases decision processes in their overall complexity (Brehmer & Hagafors, 1986). 
In particular, the accuracy of final decisions is related to the amount of information available to 
the advisor, the average advice accuracy, and the advice-taking itself, thus, the weight a judge 
allocates to the advice (e.g., Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, Hedlund, Major & Phillips, 1995). 
Furthermore, task-relevant experience that improves the accuracy of the advisor’s 
recommendations and feedback have been linked to increased decision accuracy. Various 
types of feedback have been shown to be beneficial, for example, feedback on accuracy of the 
judge’s initial and final judgment (Fischer & Harvey, 1999).  
Adults revise their judgments considering advice in selective and systematical ways (for 
reviews, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Rader, Soll, & Larrick, 2017). They rely on cues about 
advice accuracy and prefer advisors with a promising epistemic history (Feng & Mac George, 
2006), better access to information (e.g., Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995), 
or more experienced (Harvey & Fischer, 1997) and accomplished ones (Yaniv, 2004). 
Moreover, adults use advice more likely when their expertise is limited (Yaniv, 2004) or the task 
is difficult (Gino & Moore, 2007). In generally, judges are motivated to evaluate their trust in 
advisors and, therefore, prefer trusted advisors (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001).  
These findings are robust even though that feelings and emotions unrelated to the 
decision task may distort trust in a way that gratitude enhances and anger diminishes trust 
(Gino & Schweitzer, 2008). Similarly, confidence has been found to moderate advice-taking 
behavior. A judge’s pre-advice confidence and the advisor’s confidence integrate into the 
judge’s decision-making process, resulting in the judge’s post-advice confidence. The 
confidence heuristic postulates that judges use the advisor’s confidence as an indicator for 
expertise, knowledge or accuracy (Price & Stone, 2004). Accordingly, it has been found that 
 





judges weigh advices more given by confident advisors versus less confident advisors (e.g., 
Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). Judges’ own confidence in the form of pre- and post-advice 
confidence has also been studied. Judges take less advice the more confident they are (Gino & 
Moore, 2007). However, confidence is affected by emotions. In this respect confidence 
enhances by feeling powerful (e.g., Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012) and diminishes by anxiety 
(Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012). Post-advice confidence increases as advisors become 
more accurate (Budescu, Rantilla, Yu, & Karelitz, 2003), have better access to information, and 
when recommendations of multiple advisors overlap greatly (Budescu & Rantilla, 2000). Finally, 
judges increase their confidence during the advice-taking process and end up with higher post- 
than pre-advice confidence (Savadori, Van Swol & Sniezek, 2001).  
3.1.3. Egocentric advice discounting 
Results of research on advice-taking show that adults heed advice in a sensible but not 
perfectly rational way. Adults’ advice-taking lacks perfect rationality due to the fact that adults, 
for example, weigh advice insufficiently and overweigh their own initial judgments, a 
phenomenon called egocentric advice discounting (EAD; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 
2004). Principally, there are no standard criteria for rationally weighing strategies of advices. 
The concept of EAD relies on a plausibility model predicting optimal decisions when judge’s 
and advisor’s estimates are each weighted 50 %, however, the model assumes both partners 
being equally competent. Accordingly, advice given by advisors being more competent than the 
judge need to be weighted exceeding 50 % thereas, advice provided by less competent 
advisors need to be weighted less than 50 %. Thus, in cases of EAD an equally competent 
advisor is weighted less than 50 % and a more competent advisor is weighted 50 % or less. 
Empirical studies on advice-taking showed that judges do not follow recommondations enough 
to conform to such assumptions of plausibility. Competence levels being equal, they shift 
towards the advice only by 20 – 30 % (e.g., Soll & Larrick, 2009). Adults discount  advice even 
when it is based on perfect knowledge (Gardner & Berry, 1995). These findings coincide with 
studies investigating the judges decision-making as a function of feedback. Despite the fact that 
advice was more accurate than own judgments adults did not increase their advice-taking 
(Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). 
Several attempts to explain these findings exist. Firstly, one approach explains EAD in 
terms of metacognitive processes. The underlying basic claim emphasizes that adults hold on 
to their own judgment due to greater insight into their own reasons and reasoning compared to 
the advisor’s (Privacy of thoughts; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Secondly, the anchoring and 
 





adjustment strategy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) proposes that judge’s initial judgment may 
serve as an anchor that gets (insufficiently) adjusted to the advice (Lim & O'Connor, 1995). 
Thirdly, Krueger (2003) argued that EAD may occur because of an egocentric bias. People rely 
more on their own judgments and opinions because they value them stronger than those of 
others, for example, an advisor. Krueger supports this theory referring to judges showing an 
egocentric bias even when they are unable to rely on their own supporting evidence for a 
position (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996) or in the absence of an initial decision to serve as an 
‘‘anchor’’ (Clement & Krueger, 2000). Finally, one approach proposes the mere ownership 
effect (Beggan, 1992) as a mechanism underlying EAD. According to this, adults see opinions 
as intellectual property, which increases the subjective value of one’s own ideas (Abelson & 
Prentice, 1989). Advice might thus be perceived as devaluing one’s own ideas and be 
discounted consequently. So far, JAS researchers disagree on one specific explanation that 
can be uncritically supported empirically and theoretically. 
 
3.2. Developmental psychology research 
Up to today, no systematic research as in adult Social psychology exists in Developmental 
psychology. Some research approaches, however, investigated precursors of, or phenomena 
similar to advice-taking. 
At first sight, studies on conformity in children may show social belief revision. 
Conformity was decribed as tendency of individuals to forgo their own knowledge or 
preferences in order to endorse judgments and behavioral strategies of a majority (Haun, Van 
Leeuwen, & Edelson, 2013). Adults show conformity across a wide set of cultural contexts with 
it’s frequency and strength varying due to situational factors (Bond & Smith, 1996; Bond, 2005). 
Most studies investigating conformity in children are modeled on the classical Asch paradigm 
(Asch, 1956) and showed that children as young as four years of age conform to a majority of 
same-age peers (Walker & Andrade, 1996). In such experiments subjects are asked to make a 
judgment about an obvious matter (e.g. which of several sticks is the longest, when it is visually 
very clear what the correct answer is, e.g. “stick A”) in light of a majority of other children who 
give an incorrect answer (e.g. “stick B”). Under these conditions, many children (just like adults) 
go along with the wrong group judgment (“stick B”). Empirical data on conformity in children is 
still limited, however, the general assumption exists that this phenomenon seems to follow the 
same structure found in studies including adults. Furthermore, control tasks clearly revealed 
that in public children do not necessarily express a judgment or belief, but just pay lip-service 
 





(Corriveau, 2010; Haun & Tomasello, 2011). In other words, these studies merely tap 
normative rather than informational social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), also termed 
compliance versus conversion (Jaswal, Lima, & Small, 2009). Normative conformity is a social 
strategy, individuals adopt a majority position the gain social benefits by conforming to others 
(Haun & Over, 2015). In contrast, informational conformity is a strategy to optimize individual 
decision outcomes. Individuals adopt the majority position because they believe it to be more 
reliable than own judgments and accordingly follow an epistemic motive - to increase final 
judgments in accuracy. 
Other research has shown that children are sensitive to the opinion of others when their 
own perceptual evidence is ambiguous (Jaswal & Markman, 2007; Jaswal, 2004). In these 
studies children were asked, for example, to judge what was depicted in the picture of a hybrid 
animal (an animal looking slightly more like a cat than a dog). Children who solely based their 
categorisation on visual characteristics (e.g. “cat”) and children who heard an adult categorise 
this animal differently (e.g., “dog”) followed this assertion. Jaswal and colleagues demonstrated 
that children as young as 24 months of age are receptive to category labels  even if testimony 
conflicted with their own expectations and used these new labels as basis for inferences. In 
terms of belief revision, however, these studies are difficult to interpret since children did not 
anounce an initial judgment. This makes it difficult to quantify the degree of belief revision or to 
prove that there actually existed a belief that could have been revised. 
Other researchers attempted to study belief revision more directly and used already a 
JAS-like paradigm – children started with an initial judgment, received advice and formed a final 
judgment. One series of studies used tasks in which subjects were asked to perceptually 
identify objects based on two established procedures: the picture game (based on O‘Neill et al., 
1992) and the tunnel game (Whitecomb & Robinson, 2000). In the picture game the task was to 
identify an object portrayed on a picture. While one player (child or experimenter) saw only an 
uninformative excerpt of a picture, the other player saw the whole picture. For example, in the 
role of the less informed judge one only pictures a yellow spot, whereas in the role of the better 
informed judge the whole lemon was seen. In the tunnel game a cardboard tunnel with a 
window cut in one side for seeing through and end openings for feeling is used. An object is 
secretly moved into the tunnel and judges are asked to specify the characteristic “color” (e.g., 
red versus blue) or the characteristic “softness” (e.g., hard versus soft) while one judge was 
allowed to look through the window side of the tunnel and the other to feel into the opening of 
the tunnel. Accordingly, children in the role of the less informed judge had to base their initial 
judgment on insufficient perceptual access, such as looking at an uninformative excerpt of a 
 





picture or tactile information when asked about an object’s color. Results showed that children 
only changed their own judgment when the contradicting informant was better informed.  
While all decribed studies so far investigated categorical belief revision, shifting entirely 
from one belief to the other (e.g., banana versus lemon, or red versus green), Rakoczy and 
colleagues (Rakoczy, Ehrling, Harris, & Schultze, 2015) investigated fine-grained belief revision 
and allowed participants to partially adapt their intial judgments. Their procedure allowed 
participants to select one out of two advice-taking strategies, averaging both judgments, or 
choosing between the two judgments (Soll & Larrick, 2009). Advisors were introduced as 
differing in competence ranging from ignorant (not knowing the name of an animal) over 
knowledgeable at basic level (knowing the category name of an animal, e.g., “fish”) to 
knowledgeable at expert level (knowing the full name of the specific species, e.g., “humphead 
wrasse”). Participants revised their judgment systematically as a function of their advisor’s 
expertise, taking more advice from informants that were introduced as more knowledgeable. 
However, children generally placed high weight on advice. They weigthed advice more than 
their own judgments even when the advisor was clearly ignorant and thus, likely to be less 
competent in the feeding game than the child. This result indicates quantitative differences in 
advice-taking behavior between children and adults since adults overweight own judgment 
even though the advisor is introduced as being more competent at the judgment task (Bonaccio 
& Dalal, 2006). In terms of advice-taking strategies this study showed that children are both 
similar to and different from adults. Similar to adults children preferred the choosing strategy 
over the averaging strategy but crucially and different to adults children chose the advice over 
their own judgment while in contrast adults are known to overweigh own judgments. 
One limitation of these studies, however, is the uncertainty whether children’s initial 
assumptions were only uninformed guesses. In test situations, children did not see the whole 
picture, they did not have the right perceptual access, or did not know the animal in question. 
Hence, it remains unclear whether children express initial judgments rather than just guesses; 
and correspondingly, whether these studies really investigate belief revision rather than guess 
revision. In summary, so far it is known that: children selectively acquire new beliefs on the 
basis of social information; children at an early age show susceptibility to normative social 
influence; and there is some indirect evidence for precursors of selective social belief revision. 









4.1. Advice-taking and argumentation 
Within the last 30 years advice-taking research focused increasingly on empirical studies about 
decision-making. As a result certain undstanding about why people utilize specific advice 
messages differently in specific situations was revealed. Research findings showed that several 
independent variables might determine the weight judges allocate to provided advice. People 
use advice differently depending on what about it was given, for example, topics might include 
science, business, or sport (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv & Foster, 1997). Furthermore, it has 
been shown that advice utilization depends on by whom the advice is given, for example, 
friends versus strangers or experts versus novices (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Feng & 
MacGeorge, 2006), to whom it is given, for example, experts versus novices or men versus 
women (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Feng & MacGeorge, 2006), and the content of the advice, for 
example, the presentation of alternatives (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006).  
However, so far it has mainly been ignored whether advice can be supported by 
arguments. In particular, the question remains as to whether the advice may be justified by 
arguments differing in quality and the effect of the justification on subsequent advice utilization. 
This lack of information might be a result of the focus set and the method used in advice-taking 
research. Social psychologists study how individuals aggregate opinions, often their own 
(judges) and that of others (advisors). From the perspective of socially interacting with other 
people the majority of these studies do not deal with advice in the sense of it’s daily use 
because it is presented merely as the judgment of another person rather than as opinion 
generated as piece of advice suitable for the specific judge in a specific situation. However, in 
real life advice is most often provided with the intent of helping someone make an improved 
decision or judgment. Advice is than: Firstly, presented justified by arguments and secondly, 
discussed in combination with a potential final decision in form of a social dialog between judge 
and advisor. 
The most robust finding in advice research is the “egocentric discounting effect” (EAD; 
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Judges overweigh their own opinions relative to that of their 
advisors (Harvey & Fischer, 1997). Within the epistemic vigilance framework, a mechanism to 
overcome such conservatism is argumentation. Advisors can offer arguments in defense of 
their views. If judges considered arguments sufficiently strong enough, they were able to 







because judges have access to their own underlying justifications and due to the strength of the 
arguments that support their decisions. In contrast, they do not have access to their advisors’ 
thoughts, experiences, and qualifications, consequently, they have no access to evidence 
advisors base their opinions on. This could imply that providing arguments to support advice 
would benefit advice-taking behavior because a decision maker will have more sufficient insight 
into the underlying justification for the given advice. In fact, when adding a reason to a request 
it increases it’s compliance even if the reason conveyed no information (Langer, Blank, & 
Chanowitz, 1978). However, intuitively one would assume that an argument presented to 
support advice is processed for accuracy by the advisee, just like other cues in the advice-
taking context are processed to assess the quality of the advice (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). 
Depending on the judge’s evaluation of the advisor’s argumentation, one might expect a 
different effect on the degree of advice-taking.  
In social psychology research there is only one study known that investigated advice-
taking (the percentage rate a judge shifts own initial judgment toward the judgment of the 
advisor) using a classical JAS paradigm (Tzioti, Wierenga, & van Osselaer, 2014). This study 
paid attention to how justification of advice, in particularly, advice justified by intuition (“my gut 
tells me so”) or by analysis (sales figures of the last years), affects the weight judges allocate to 
the advice. Participants took on the role of a junior product manager in a company. They were 
asked to decide on the percentage (0 – 100 %) to which they would recommend the top 
management to invest in a specific product. After defining their initial judgment, judges received 
advice either given by a junior or senior manager and were then subsequently asked for a final 
judgment. Findings differed as a function of condition in terms of justification type and seniority 
status: Firstly, presented with an advisor at the same level of seniority as the decision-maker 
advice justified by intuition was discounted completely. Moreover, it was even followed 
significantly less than in the absence of advice justification (control group). In contrast, analytic 
justifications caused judges to significantly shift their opinion toward the direction of the advice. 
Secondly, when the advice was given by a senior advisor no significant difference in advice 
utilization existed between an intuitively versus an analytically justified advice. Accordingly, 
participants judged varying types of justifications in a way they best fit the situation in which the 
advice was given: Thus, a similar argument increased or decreased advice-taking depending 
on the specific test condition. Participants seemed to assess the quality of the advice as a 








4.2. Reasoning and argumentation 
The question arises as to how people assess the quality of arguments. Argumentation - simple 
or complex, implicit or explicit - results from reasoning. The term reasoning refers to different 
meanings in psychological research. Two main concepts in the literature are known: firstly, 
reasoning in a broader sense as a synonym of inference (in particular in developmental and 
comparative psychology). Inference is understood as a cognitive process that takes a 
representation as input, processes it, and delivers a modified (ideally enriched) representation 
as output. These inferences are drawn intuitively without their inputs or mechanisms being 
represented as reasons or arguments. For example, someone enters a cafeteria at lunchtime 
and sees a crowd of people there. This might imply that all these people appeared at the 
cafeteria to have lunch. Such conclusion is drawn spontaneously without realizing that the 
judgment formed was based on specific information related to the present situation (cafeteria, 
lunchtime) and to general knowledge about people (hungry at lunchtime). Although being 
sophisticated, people are most likely not aware of the reasons supporting such inferences.  
The second concept contrarily argues that reasoning can refer to a form of inference 
which attends to these reasons and reflects on them before accepting a subsequent 
conclusion. Regarding the cafeteria scenario, reflective inferences may go further by thinking 
about a group of older men being dressed in workwear and standing among the people in the 
cafeteria. Questions arise whether these men take a lunch break from work (done somewhere 
in the university) or whether the same men currently do some repair work in the cafeteria 
building. All this may support both hypotheses, thus the given piece of evidence in this case is 
inconclusive. Further observations on the group’s subsequent behavior might provide more 
sufficient insight: another man arrives at the group and the group moves toward the buffet to 
stand in line waiting for food servings at the lunch counter. Now the conclusion can easily be 
drawn and supported by the given evidence. Reflective inferences are concerned with such 
evidential or logical relationships among representations as to how far a given representation 
(initial judgment) is a good reason for accepting another representation (final judgment).  
The Argumentative Theory of Reasoning, proposed by Mercier (Mercier, 2011; Mercier 
& Sperber, 2011; Mercier, 2016), claims that exactly this form of reflectively infering is the true 
meaning of reasoning and that the main function of reasoning is argumentation. This entails the 
ability of producing arguments in order to convince others and to evaluate others’ arguments 
appropriately. Consequently, reasoning becomes a tool for epistemic vigilance and vigilant 







and able to judge arguments regarding their sufficient quality in order to avoid being deceived 
by poor arguments. This is especially true when own beliefs are asked to be revised. However, 
people need to be objective enough to accept verified information, even if the arguments 
challenge their views or come from untrustworthy sources. Skilled argumentation benefits joint 
decision-making as well as simple cases of testimony. In case someone does not like biking 
this person generally will not be convinced by a collegue to ride the bike to a busines meeting 
held today afternoon. In contrast, the same person may change plans to take the bus when 
being confronted with the argument that public transportation is on strike today. From an 
evolutionary perspective communication is difficult to maintain: senders usually benefit from 
deceiving and manipulating receivers. If receivers are not motivated to communicate, they stop 
receiving, thereby communication collapses. Argumentation can stabilize communication 
allowing messages to be transmitted even in the absence of sufficient trust. Accordingly, 
arguing is beneficial: those who produce arguments are more likely to get their messages 
across than if they would rely only on trust and those who receive arguments can accept 
verified information they might otherwise have rejected.  
Classically, reasoning has been discussed as having emerged for individual cognition. 
In this framework, reasoning was proposed as a mechanism that allows humans to go beyond 
spontaneous inferences and to make more advanced judgments and decisions (Kahneman, 
2003). However, Mercier and Sperber argued that reasoning is not an effective tool for 
individual cognition because it fails in solving logical problems (Evans, 2002), leads toward bad 
decision-makings (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993), and causes poor epistemic outcomes 
(Kunda, 1990). In combination with it’s high operating costs it seems rather unlikely that 
reasoning developed as a tool for individual cognition. Reasoning used in solitary thinking and 
belief revision is rather an adapted application of reasoning skills incorporated into the concept 
of epistemic vigilance towards communicated information. Reasoners, in fact, image to discuss 
potential solutions with others (themselves) and alternate among different judgments as a 
function of evidence and good arguments supporting specific judgments. 
 
4.3. Informal fallacies 
Research has shown that adults are motivated and qualified to evaluate arguments (e.g., Hahn 







Rips, 2002). Arguments perceived strong enough can lead people to revise their beliefs even 
without the possibility to discuss evidence with the source of information (Tzioti et al., 2014).  
An interesting fact in argumentation research is the study of informal reasoning fallacies 
(Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 1996), i.e., arguments that are “psychologically 
persuasive but logically incorrect; that do as a matter of fact persuade but, given certain 
argumentative standards, shouldn’t” (Copi & Burgess-Jackson, 1996, p. 97). Formal fallacies 
can be detected by examining the form of the argument, for example, in domains such as 
mathematics, logic, or statistics. In the case of informal fallacies, contrarily, arguments need to 
be evaluated either regarding their context (e.g., the specific situation in which the argument is 
presented) or their content (e.g., the meaning or vagueness of words).  
Three classical forms of informal reasoning fallacies include: Firstly, the argument from 
ignorance (argumentum ad ignorantium), meaning a conclusion is assumed to be true because 
it is not known to be false (e.g., Walton, 1999). Secondly, circularity (petitio principii or begging 
the question) whereby the conclusion is already contained in the premises (Rips, 2002), for 
example, “tomorrow it will snow because it will snow”. And thirdly, slippery slope arguments that 
recommend a course of action on basis of their perceived consequences. However, these 
specific consequences will result only from a series of intervening future steps currently not 
proven to occur (Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2006). Several studies showed that adults detect 
and most often reject poor arguments. Argumentative fallacies, however, are perceived as 
differentially strong depending on their content (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). Circular arguments, 
for example, are not always poor arguments but in some cases they rather may be the best 
arguments among all. As suggested by Bayesian analysis acceptance is determined by the 
probability of alternative explanations. Many textbook examples of these arguments are not 
fallacious due to their structure but rather, because they occupy the extreme weak end of the 
argument strength spectrum given the probabilistic quantities involved. Furthermore important, 
besides content, is people’s sensitivity to the context in which fallacies are presented. 
Rationally, arguments should be evaluated based on their soundness and strength, however, 
participants’ ability to identify informal fallacies is influenced by several factors such as the truth 
value of the argument’s premises (Neuman, Glasner, & Weinstock, 2004), familiarity with 
norms of argumentation (Weinstock, Neuman, & Tabak, 2004), the degree of involvement in 
the argument (Johnson & Eagly, 1990), or whether being presented in a reasoned dialog or not 








4.4. Children’s understanding and evaluation of arguments 
So far, no studies have investigated whether children are sensitive to arguments in classical 
advice-taking scenarios used in social psychology (for one study in adults see Tzioti et al., 
2014; also described above). Developmental work has studied, firstly the understanding and 
evaluation of arguments in observational and experimental designs and secondly, very 
recently, children’s use of given arguments to determine informant’s credibility. The following 
paragraphs will give an overview of developmental studies on the acceptance of arguments.  
Observational studies on parenting style have shown that parents use reasons to 
convince their children and that this giving of reasons can be successful (Hoffman, 1970). 
Parents providing arguments to convince children are more successful in promoting, for 
example, altruism or moral reasoning (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994). Moreover, children provide 
reasons of their own (e.g., Perlman & Ross, 2005) and exchange arguments with each other to 
learn about their interests and engage themselves in solving problems (Ram & Ross, 2001). 
These observational studies suggest that children do not blindly accept arguments but may 
evaluate them regarding accepting sound arguments only and rejecting weak arguments.  
Experimental studies have investigated children's argumentative skills more stringently. 
The influence of different arguments has mostly been studied in terms of moral behavior. It was 
observed that children do not indiscriminately accept any argument: they prefer empathic over 
normative arguments (Eisenberg-Berg & Geosheker, 1979) and are sensitive to the description 
of feelings (Kuczynski, 1982). Interestingly, arguments targeting emotions of others were more 
effective than telling children what they themselves would feel when following 
recommondations. This suggests that children can assess their own future emotions and 
realize that some predictions may not completely be true (e.g., „If you share your icecream, you 
will be very happy.“).  
Studies mostly used circularity as a tool to investigate children’s ability to weigh 
arguments. The results demonstrate that children prefer noncircular explanations starting at the 
age of five years and being robust in their preference by the age of 10 years (Baum, Danovitch, 
& Keil, 2008). Mercier and colleagues focused on even younger children (Mercier, Bernard, & 
Clément, 2014). They presented 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children with a series of vignettes in 
which two speakers offered contradictory arguments. Subsequently, children decided where to 
look for a lost pet. In Experiment 1 children were presented with a strong versus a weak 







in Experiment 2 they were asked to choose between the weak argument and no argument. 
Although all age groups endorsed the strong argument, only 4- and 5-year-old children 
endorsed the weak argument over no argument. In a study with similar design 3- to 5-year-old 
children were asked to look for a toy hidden in one out of two boxes (Bernard, Mercier, & 
Clement, 2012). Information on the location of the toy was presented by two speakers, one 
giving the argument using the causal connective term because, whereas the second speaker 
used the phatic term well. Four- and 5-year-old children searched in the location identified by 
the speaker using causal connectives.  
Finally, two other studies investigated whether children use explanation quality as cue to 
selectively trust informants or to revise a perceptual judgment. Corriveau and Kurkul (2014) 
showed that preschoolers extend selective trust formed based on whether informants offer 
strong or weak arguments from one domain to another. Five- and 3-year-old children preferred 
noncircular over circular explanations and extended their evaluation to their inferences about 
the informants’ future credibility. Subsequently, all children learnt novel explanations from the 
informant with higher credibility. For 5-year-old children, this generalization of trust extended to 
word learning. Finally, one study investigated whether 2-year-old children are already sensitive 
to information presented in arguments (Castelain, Bernard, & Mercier, 2018): In a first phase, 
children were asked to name a hybrid picture of animals (e.g., fish versus bird), than received a 
contradicting judgment supported by either a strong argument, a circular argument, or no 
argument, and in the end they were asked for a final judgment. In the second phase with a 
similar procedure the informant never provided any argument for the own position. Finally, in 
the third phase, children repeated what they thought the correct names of the hybrids are in the 
absence of the informant. Results revealed that already at the age of two years children 
endorse labels supported by a strong argument and moreover, generalized their trust granted 
in the more credible informant. In conclusion, these studies suggest that preschoolers are able 











5. Collective decision-making 
5.1. Collective decisions of adults 
Many important decisions are not made by one person acting alone but rather by two or 
more people in form of joint decisions. Social psychology research has a long tradition 
investigating the question of how people aggregate information and whether they do so in 
beneficial ways. Hereby, the focus was set on two aspects of collaborative decision-making: 
Firstly, the functionality of joint decisions, whether groups or dyads of decision-makers can 
outperform individuals by providing more accurate final judgments. Secondly, processes and 
abilities which are necessary to come up with joint decisions based on individuals sharing 
information with each other and weighing it optimally. To this end several studies focused on 
communication and exchange of reliability ratings regarding collective decision-making.  
Studies that compared the accuracy of individual and group decisions have yielded 
somewhat inconsistent results. Experiments implementing a wide range of tasks have 
indicated that cooperative groups performed better than independent individuals in terms of 
decision-making (for review see e.g., Hill, 1982; Hastie, 1986; Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Some 
of the earliest evidence for that was found in the study of abstract problems (Shaw, 1932). 
Group and individual performance of solving the, so called, Tartaglia problem was compared. 
In this task three Cannibals and three Missionaries needed to be moved from one river side 
to the other by one boat that can carry only two people at a time. All Missionaries and one 
Cannibal were able to row. Cannibals were not allowed to outnumber Missionaries except 
when there were no Missionaries present. Results implied that groups, compared to 
individuals, make their first error later within the problem-solving process and produce more 
correct solutions. Group members rejected each other’s incorrect suggestions more often 
than the individual who proposed the suggestion noticed the inaccuracy.  
Further studies used crossword puzzles as problem tasks and showed group 
productivity being superior to individual productivity as a function of task complexity (Shaw & 
Ashton, 1976). Working on easy puzzles the number of groups and individuals who 
successfully solved the problem was proportional. When the puzzle was difficult to be solved, 
however, groups were more successful than individuals, implying that groups pooled their 
resources when no member alone was able to solve the problem. Latest research (e.g., 
Laughlin, Bonner, & Miner, 2002; Laughlin, Zander, Knievel, & Tan, 2003) presented adults 
with letters-to-numbers problems. For this task letters (e.g., A, B, C, D, E, F) were randomly 
assigned to numbers (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) prior to the experiment. Participants were required 
 




to identify this mapping in as few trials as possible. In each trial the problem solver(s) 
proposed an equation in letters (e.g., A + D = D) and received feedback on the correctness 
of this proposal. Groups of three, four, and five people proposed more complex equations 
and needed fewer trials for solving the task compared to the best of an equivalent number of 
individuals (Laughlin, Hatch, Silver, & Boh, 2006). 
However, numerous studies have documented instances where group performance 
was worse than that of the best member. In “social loafing“ (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 
1979) individuals work differently alone than in groups; they make less effort in the presence 
of group members leading to a reduced overall performance. This phenomenon was 
explained by individual’s decreased responsibility for possible failures because no specific 
member within a group of people could be singled out and held directly responsible (Karau & 
Williams, 1993). A further reason for groups to fail was the interdependence of individual 
decisions (Raafat, Chater, & Frith, 2009). “Groupthink” (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998) happens 
in situations in which people do not start making up their own minds prior to group 
discussions and subsequently fail to develop and voice disagreeing opinions. Finally, another 
case of collective failure was described as “hidden profile” paradigm (e.g., Stasser & Titus, 
1985). Group members often fail to effectively pool all information because discussions 
concentrate on information shared by everybody rather than on information that most 
relevantly provides optimal solutions. Thus, groups are biased away from “hidden profiles” 
leading them to under-exploit available information. 
In order to make optimal joint decisions people need to share information held by 
individuals and weigh this information according to it’s reliability. Subsequently, another 
aspect of social psychology research concentrates on communication and it’s interplay with 
metacognitive abilities. People communicate the confidence in their individual judgments, 
however, this process might bear at least two risks: People might be poorly calibrated in 
terms of their metacognitive awareness and confidence might deverge from accuracy or 
might be reduced down to various egocentric biases of communication. When senders 
communicate information they often overestimate the clarity of their messages (Gilovich, 
Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). This is an illusion of transparency or the tendency of people to 
believe their internal states were easily recognized by the addressee. For example, it has 
been shown that liars overestimated the detectability of their lies or people believed that their 
feelings of disgust were more apparent than they were actually in reality. Similarly, listeners 
are affected by egocentric biases. They often interpret the meaning of messages from their 
own (rather than the speaker’s) perspective (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003).  
 




Previous research gives no explanation about why egocentric biases keep up despite 
the recurrence of collective failure. Assumptions were made that people feel obligated to 
treat others equally to oneself even if less qualified or to contribute to the group despite being 
less competent. Following this debate Bahrami and colleagues (Bahrami, Olsen, Bang, 
Roepstorff, Rees, & Frith, 2012) investigated whether providing participants with a non-verbal 
system to share reliability ratings would remove or at least reduce these egocentric biases 
and in turn improve collective decision-making. Participants were asked to solve a visual 
perception task. Firstly, they did so individually and in a second step they combined their 
individual judgments. Depending on the condition participants were allowed to use verbal or 
non-verbal communication to discuss their potential final decision. Participant’s competence 
was manipulated by introducing more or less noise to their individual visual perception. 
Scholars identified a wide gap in competence among decision partners as cause for failure of 
communication: Asymmetric visual sensitivity led partners that could only share their 
confidence non-verbally to perform significantly better than those who had talked to each 
other directly. In contrast, when group members had similar sensitivity and based their 
collective judgment on individual judgment of similar reliability near optimal performance was 
achieved with direct verbal communication. Based on these results the authors concluded 
that shared metacognitive awareness holds at least two aspects of a sensory experience, 
firstly, it’s strength (e.g., how well did I see a mark on a stick) and secondly, it’s reliability 
(e.g., how confident am I about the precise location of the mark on the stick). Both aspects of 
a sensory experience do not need to be consistent since an important role of metacognitive 
awareness may be to substitute missing outcomes in situations where outcome is necessary 
but impossible to establish.  
 
5.2. Cognitive foundations of collective decision-making 
From a developmental point of view it is interesting to look at the abilities necessary to allow 
collective decision-making and the trajectory of these abilities. In order to jointly decide about 
a matter people need to be willing and able to collaborate. Basically, a collective decision is a 
collaborative interaction in which participants share psychological states with one another. A 
phenomenon that refers to such interactions on a cognitive level by functioning as an 
umbrella for relevant socio-cognitive skills is called shared intentionality (e.g., Searle, 1995). 
One of these socio-cognitive skills is joint attention, which was proposed as origin of 
collaboration during development (Kuhn, 2015). Joint attention goes beyond knowing what 
others see or follow their gaze, it is two people that experience the same thing at the time 
 




both knowing that they do so (Tomasello, 1995). This ability is essential to allow collaborative 
activities and cooperative communication.  
Already prior to their first birthday infants are able to recognize that they can share an 
object of attention with another person (Tomasello, & Carpenter, 2007) and are motivated to 
do so (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). The next important prerequisite for optimizing collective 
decisions is the ability to discuss different pieces of evidence that may arise from different 
perspectives of decision partners on the same task. Increasing skills of joint attention allow to 
build up a joint attentional frame that functions as common ground between both decision 
partners to cooperatively exchange information about potential solutions. For example, there 
are two people participating in a visual perceptual task that requires to transfer a mark on a 
stick (20cm in height) as precisely as possible into a picture of the stick. Firstly, individual 
judgments are made and subsequently both participants compare their individual judgments 
and are asked to make a joint decision agreeing on a precise location of the mark on the 
stick. In the moment of a joint decision it is fully understandable for participant A if participant 
B just pointed onto the individual judgment because it is performed in the context of this 
specific decision task that both participants were introduced to and agreed to solve 
collectively. Continuatively, participant B might not convince participant A with the argument 
“we should decide for my judgment, it is the better one” when both participants had the same 
visual access. In contrast, in a situation in which one participant had better visual access 
than the other participant and both are aware of this difference in informational access no 
further explanation is required because of the already established common ground of this 
specific judgment task. 
However, optimal joint decision-making requires more than coordinating two people’s 
attention. Decision partners have to consider reasoning together which is assumed to be 
more complex than joint attention. Literature reviews on developmental aspects so far did not 
clearly indicate how and under what circumstances social interactions affect reasoning. A 
person A sharing experience and knowledge with person B most likely exposes person B to 
new ways of thinking (Levine, Resnick, & Higgins, 1993). It remains unknown, however, to 
what extent and in what manner, this new knowledge is incorporated into person B’s 
thoughts. Person B is likely to become aware that alternative solutions might exist and if 
convinced of it‘s quality person B may revise own individual beliefs or judgments to achieve a 
more optimal collective decision. This implies changes at an epistemic level, thus, changes in 
which person B adopts person A’s beliefs as superior to achieve a good collective 
 




performance. These are changes at the meta-level of what an individual knows about what 
oneself compared to others know. 
Metacognition encompasses both metacognitive knowledge and regulation. The 
former can be seen as part of theory of mind, which refers to the ascription of mental states 
(e.g. intentions, beliefs, and desires) to oneself (metacognitive knowledge) and to other 
people. Metacognitive regulation describes the conscious regulation of one’s cognitions and 
can thus be seen as part of executive functioning which refers to the conscious regulation of 
one’s cognitions, actions, and emotions. Some aspects of metacognitive regulation show 
developmental improvements from childhood to adolescence (Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996). 
Moreover, children’s understanding of their own epistemic states has been reported to fully 
develop in their late childhood; in a reflective/explicit form not even until before school age 
(for review see: Kloo & Rhower, 2012). Specifically, preschoolers are able to assess what 
they know, but have fundamental problems to correctly distinguish own uncertainty or 
ignorance. They have been shown to take a ‘sense of knowing’ for perfect knowledge. While 
the same feeling is described as tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon in adults, they do not commit 
to such judgment as being the correct answer unless supported by evidence. In contrast, 
young children form relevant guesses that seem to subjectively turn into knowledge limiting 
children’s ability to accurately assess their own ignorance. 
A further challenge for preschoolers is the argumentative discourse itself that leads to 
a joint decision, in which people produce and evaluate arguments to optimize their decision 
outcome. Giving and evaluating reasons was described as reasoning in the narrow sense by 
Mercier and colleagues (Mercier & Sperber, 2011) that developed as a social skill to function 
in interpersonal communication. Their “Argumentative Theory of Reasoning“ was motivated 
by the concept of “Epistemic Vigilance” (Sperber et al., 2010). Listeners avoided being 
deceived by mistrusting speakers. In order to overcome such mistrust speakers presented 
good reasons for their point of view and acceptance was based on logic and evidence 
instead of trust. On the other hand, it was emphasized that reasoning is also important within 
cooperative contexts (Tomasello, 2014). Decision partners evaluated individual judgments 
and arguments because they shared the mutual interest to reach the best decision based on 
logic and evidence. In the end the argument quality itself was more important for partners 
than the fact who’s argument they followed.  
In order to give reliable reasons for individual judgments advanced metacognitive 
skills are required because speakers need to firstly, refer to the source of their information 
(where or from whom they received it) and secondly, express how reliable this information 
 




source is (Mahr & Csibra, 2017). Toddlers as young as 18 months produced arguments to 
justify their violations or to argue with their parents (e.g., Perlman & Ross, 2005). By the age 
of three years, children chose between positive and negative reasons as a function of 
desired courses of action or specific beliefs (Dunn & Munn, 1987). However, the question 
then arises to what extent this early production of arguments is appropriate and successful. 
One example for successful production of arguments comes from research on moral norms: 
Children use different arguments depending on the kind of violation (conventional or moral) 
that has been committed (Nucci, 1985). Subsequently, more complex argumentation 
increases the likelihood of successful conflict resolution in children (e.g., Ram & Ross, 2001). 
However, the ability to use meta-talk in order to assess the quality of arguments and/or 
evidence directly has so far been shown convincingly only in older children at around 11 or 
12 years of age (Kuhn, Zillmer, Crowell, & Zavala, 2013).  
 
5.3. Collective decisions of children 
Studies investigating collective decision-making in preschoolers are scarce. During the last 
five years Köymen and Tomasello studied children’s argumentation and meta-talk in dyadic 
interactions. The following paragraph will give an overview about the procedures and results 
of these first studies.  
Firstly, preschoolers are able to jointly reason with peers based on appropriate 
common ground assumptions or warrants (Köymen, Rosenbaum, & Tomasello, 2014). 
Dyads of 3- and 5-year-old children built a toy zoo together, in particular they were asked to 
place toy items onto a cloth with marked walkways, sand-floor, lake areas etc. The toy items 
were either conventional (items regularly found in a zoo, e.g., different kinds of animals, 
cages, visitors) or unconventional (items not seen regularly in a zoo, e.g., washing machine 
or piano). In order to justify where to place specific items children relied on implicit warrants. 
For example, when finding a home for polar bears they only stated the fact “This is ice”, but 
did not share information on habitat conditions of ice bears. On the other hand, placing 
unconventional items children were not able to assume common ground assumptions 
between each other, thus, they more often articulated the warrant explicitly. Children at the 
age of five versus three years more often made explicit warrants, produced justifications, and 
reached mutual agreement. Furthermore, preschoolers also adapted the content of their 
arguments to their partner’s assumed level of informedness (Köymen, Mammen, & 
Tomasello, 2016). Under the experimental condition in which peers learnt about unique 
 




characteristics of a novel animal (e.g., eating rocks) seperately preschoolers referred more 
often to these unusual characteristics to justify recommendations in subsequent joint 
decisions than when both partners together were introduced to the new animal. 
Secondly, preschooler‘s argumentative strategies were sensitive to the situational 
degree of competitiveness (Domberg, Köymen, & Tomasello, 2018). Dyads of 5- and 7-year-
old children were asked to decide jointly where to place specific animals in a zoo scenario. 
They were required to decide on one of two halves of a playing field owned by either child. 
Dyads played two versions of the same game: a cooperative version in which both players 
were rewarded for finding the nicest home for each animal species and a competitive version 
in which only the child gathering most animals on its own half of the zoo was rewarded. 
Children produced arguments at a higher frequency and also more ‘two-sided’ arguments in 
the cooperative compared to the competitive version of the game. In the later version 
children’s arguments showed a bias that was the result of withholding known arguments. 
Thus, cooperative decision-making seemed to provide a more motivating context for children 
to produce arguments than in a competitive situation. 
Thirdly, children from around five years of age were able to jointly reflect on evidence 
to optimize collective decisions (Köymen & Tomasello, 2018). Peer dyads played a feeding 
game in which they were asked to collectively choose the correct kind of food for a new 
animal they met in a familiarization phase prior to the test phase. In the Experiment 1 dyads 
of 5- and 7-year-old children were individually introduced to the animal’s feeding habits, 
however, were presented with conflicting information (e.g., feeding on rocks vs. feeding on 
sand). Moreover, the sources of information differed in reliability between both partners of 
one dyad: Child A received first-hand explanations given by a cartoon version of the new 
animal describing it’s own food preferences. In contrast, child B received indirect evidence 
presented by a cartoon girl who gave information she had heard about this new animal. 
Dyads decided for the food option supported by the most reliable evidence. Moreover 
children, especially at the age of seven years, engaged in various kinds of meta-talk about 
the evidence and its validity. Experiment 2 investigated even younger children which were 
presented with a modified procedure: 3- and 5-year-old children interacted with a puppet who 
tried to convince children to change their minds by producing meta-talk. Five-year-old 
children receiving unreliable information were more likely to change their minds, whereas 
three year old children did not. These results suggest that the ability to reflect on individual 
judgments based on evidence with differing quality emerges in children earliest at the age of 
five years. 
 




6. Aim of this dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to acquire a more detailed understanding of children’s selective 
revision of existing beliefs in response to socially conveyed information. In particularly, the 
focus is set on how children develop the ability to weigh advice as a function of their own and 
the advisor’s state of knowledge, whether advice justification affects advice-taking, and how 
children reach mutual agreements based on collective reasoning about individual judgments 
differing in quality. To this end this dissertations integrates two lines of research: social 
psychological research on advice-taking in adults and developmental research on selective 
social learning in children. 
The first study of this dissertation aimed at analysing children’s (and adults’) selective 
advice-taking as a function of both their own informational status (will they selectively revise 
beliefs more sufficiently under poor epistemic conditions?) and the informational status of 
informants (will they selectively revise beliefs more in response to informants under better 
epistemic conditions?). Based on classical methods used in social psychological research a 
basic JAS set-up in terms of being simple and ecologically valid was implemented. 
Importantly, this task provided children with actual sensory evidence to base their judgments 
on differentiating it from mere guesses, and manipulated both the subject’s own informational 
access as well as that of the advisor. Using different variation of the basic task design Study 
1 investigated children’s competence of selective belief revision and performance limitations 
of this competence due to specific task demands. 
In the second study argumentation as a further aspect of advice-taking in social 
settings is investigated. In daily life advice is most often not received purely as alternative 
judgment of an other individual but rather as proposal justified by relevant facts. Study 2 
explored this aspect of decision-making, in particular, whether preschoolers are sensitive to 
advice justified by arguments differing in quality, and the effect of this justification on 
subsequent advice utilization. Importantly, in the current study two arguments were 
contrasted both containing epistemic information. This required children to weigh arguments 
based on different degrees of epistemic values, opposed to, for example, circular arguments. 
This design allows to investigate children’s skills of argument evaluation and it’s effect on 
social belief revision in a more naturalistic version of argumentation, in which differences in 
argument quality are more detailed and context dependent. 
Finally, the third study focused on social belief revision in the process of collective 
decision-making. Therefore, in dyadic interactions decision partners reasoned about 
 




individual judgments and the evidence they are based on to reach optimal joint decisions. 
The rational of Study 3 firstly investigated children’s ability and willingness to reach mutual 
agreements based on individual judgments differing in quality and secondly identified meta-
argumentative strategies and elements of meta-talk that correlate with the functionality of 




















7. Study 1: Selective social belief revision 
7.1. Introduction 
Recent research has shown that from early development children selectively acquire new 
beliefs on the basis of social information. Evidence exists about children’s early susceptibility 
to normative social influence and indirectly about precursors of selective social belief 
revision. But, so far, young children’s proper selective social belief revision or advice-taking 
remains unknown. The goal of the present study was, thus, to investigate the early 
development of selective social belief revision more directly, systematically and stringently. In 
particular, children’s (and adults’) selective advice-taking was analysed as a function of both: 
their own informational status (will they selectively revise beliefs increasingly when they 
themselves are in poor epistemic conditions?) and the informational status of informants (will 
they selectively revise beliefs increasingly in response to informants who are in better 
epistemic conditions?).  
In Experiment 1, dyads of participants with three contrasting levels of visibility were 
tested: (1) Judge and advisor had both poor visibility (poor-poor). (2) The judge had high and 
the advisor poor visibility (high-poor), and (3) the judge had poor and the advisor high 
visibility (poor-high)1. Past research has shown that children prefer knowledgeable 
informants when learning new information (König & Harries, 2005) and are willing to revise 
guesses following an informant that had better visual access (Whitecomb & Robinson, 2000). 
Therefore, it was anticipated in this experiment that children, just as adults, would accept 
advice more likely from an advisor with better visibility and respectively more sufficient 
information. Furthermore, it was assumed that children would increase accepting advice 
when they themselves are rather poorly than better informed. However, results in this 
research showed that children (unlike adults) adjusted their degree of advice-taking as a 
function of their own informational quality entirely. Experiments 2 and 3, therefore, 
investigated potential explanations for this lack of advice differentiation and suggested that 
under suitable circumstances children are able to adjust their social belief revision selectively 
as a function of both the own and the advisor’s informational access. 
                                                     
1
 In the present design, it was conceptually impossible to implement a high-high condition because the 
advice consisted of random judgments to ensure comparable differences between initial estimates and 
advice in all conditions. While such differences are highly plausible whenever at least one of the two 
judgments is based on poor visibility, the same is not true when both judge and advisor have good 
visibility of the stimulus. Here, participants would expect the advisor to make a similar judgment. 
Frequent violations of this expectation could result in participants losing trust in the advisors’ 
perceptual reliability or the credibility of the experimental set-up. 
 




7.2. Experiment 1 
7.2.1. Method 
7.2.1.1. Participants. Thirty-five adults (age range: 18 - 44 years, M = 24.7 years, 26 
women) and forty 4- to 6-year-old children (age range: 48 - 71 months, M = 59.5 months, 23 
girls) were included in the final sample. Subjects were native German speakers with mixed 
socioeconomic backgrounds. Adults had answered our study announcement on public 
notice-boards. Children were recruited from a database of families who had previously given 
consent to their participation. Six additional children were tested but excluded from the final 
sample due to experimenter error (n = 1), comprehension problems (n = 2) or because they 
were uncooperative (n = 3). Participants were tested individually in the lab. 
7.2.1.2. Material. Participants were presented with a perceptual judgment task in 
which they were to estimate the location of a mark on a stick. Wooden sticks of 20 cm length 
were used. Sticks were placed in a triangular box (edge length of triangle: 57 cm, height: 44 
cm). The box consisted of a clear window side, a blurred window side (window 
measurements: 27.5 cm × 23.5 cm), and an opaque backside (see Fig.1). At the clear 
window, the black mark was easily visible while at the blurred window it was hardly visible. 
Participants made their judgment by indicating on an analogue scale (a picture of the stick of 
the same length) where the mark was. Advice consisted in randomized judgments, ranging 
from one to 200 mm, produced by a random generator and secretly marked on the advisor’s 
scale prior to the test sessions. 
For visibility ratings (how well participants could see the mark), children were 
presented with an eye scale (8 cm × 29 cm) consisting of five eyes of different size. For 
confidence ratings (how confident participants were of their judgments), we presented them 
with a 5-point scale consisting of 5 thumbs ranging from one pointing straight down to one 









Figure 1. Three-sided box with clear and blurred window (a). Colored sticks (b), rating scales 
for visibility (c) and confidence (d). 
7.2.1.3. Design and procedure. The task was presented in JAS format with 
participants taking the role of judges. Advisors were confederates of the experimenter who 
presented the judges with the randomized advice. We used a 2 (age groups) × 3 (conditions) 
mixed factor design, with age groups (children and adults) as between factor and conditions 
(poor-poor, high-poor, and poor-high) as within-subjects factor. All subjects received two 
trials of each condition. Order of conditions was counterbalanced across subjects.  
Every session started with an introduction phase prior to the test phase. In the 
introduction phase, participants were, in a first step, familiarized with the set-up material to 
make sure that they understood the design of the three-sided box, the concept of transferring 
a black mark on a colored stick onto a picture of the stick, and the subjective rating of 
visibility and confidence.  
7.2.1.3.1. Introduction phase. The introduction phase consisted of two steps. In the 
first step, children were introduced to the confidence rating scale. Examples were used to 
illustrate the different points of the confidence scale. The thumb up symbol was introduced 
by presenting a toy frog with the sentence “This is a frog. I am absolutely sure about this.”. 
Point three of the scale - a horizontal thumb - was introduced by presenting a picture of a toy 
hybrid animal consisting of a pig and a fish with the sentences “This is a pig. But it could also 
be a fish. Now, I am not so sure.”. For the thumb down symbol, an undefined soft toy was 
used and presented with the sentence “I do not know what this is. Now, I am not sure at all.”. 
Subsequently, children were asked to show the “absolutely sure – thumb”, the “not so sure – 
 




thumb” and the “not sure at all – thumb”. When they answered incorrectly the introduction of 
the confidence scale and comprehension question was repeated two times. When 
participants failed the comprehension question three times the experimenter moved on. The 
visibility rating scale was introduced in similar ways. The biggest eye was introduced by 
pointing at a toy duck located in a corner of the test room and saying “Now, you see this duck 
really clearly.”. To introduce point three of the scale, a medium size eye, children were 
allowed to put on sun glasses and the experimenter said “Now, you can see the duck not so 
clearly.”. Point one of the scale, the smallest eye, was introduced by asking children to close 
their eye and emphasizing “Now, you do not see the duck at all.”. Children were then asked 
to show the symbol for “seeing clearly”, “seeing not so clearly” and “do not see at all”. If they 
failed to answer these questions correctly, the introduction of the visibility scale was repeated 
two times before the experimenter moved on. For the adult participants (who used a Likert 
scale), a similar familiarization with the confidence and visbility ratings was not necessary. In 
the second step, participants judged one stick through the clear and one stick through the 
blurred window (order of windows counter-balanced). Visibility and confidence ratings were 
requested for each judgment. This step served as manipulation check to ensure the validity 
of our set-up. 
7.2.1.3.2. Test phase. Judge and advisor were each placed at one side of the box (for 
illustration, see Fig. 2). Then, one stimulus was put into the box (in such a way that subjects 
could not observe the placement), and both judge and advisor were asked to make their 
initial judgments. Then, judges were seated at the opaque side of the box, received the scale 
of the advisor in addition to the scale with their own initial judgment, and were asked to make 
their final judgment on a third scale. Judges rated visibility and confidence both for their initial 
and for their final judgment.  
 
 








The dependent measures were as follows: 
 Visibility rating: Children accessed their own visibility for their initial and final judgment 
on a 5-point scale (5 eyes of different size). Adults were asked to rate their visibility 
ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high).  
 Confidence rating: Children accessed their own confidence for their initial and final 
judgment on a 5-point scale (5 thumbs ranging from thumb down to thumb up). Adults 
were asked to rate their confidence ranging from 1 to 5. 
 Deviation from the true value: The deviation from the true value is the distance of the 
mark drawn by the judge from the true location of the mark on the stick (measured in 
cm).  
 Advice-taking (AT): The advice-taking measure is the weight the judge gives the 
advice, defined by Harvey and Fischer (1997) as  
    
                               
                       
     . If the judge fully endorses the advice, AT 
would be 100 %, if the judge equally weighs her judgment and the advice, AT would 
be 50 %, and if she does not consider the advice at all, AT would be 0 %. Other AT 
scores between 0 % - 100 % represent partial shifts from the initial judgment towards 
the advice. In order to control for extreme cases and outliers, AT scores are usually 
truncated. Accordingly, we limited them to 100 % and -100 % (see Schultze, 
Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2017, for a similar approach). 
7.2.2. Results 
7.2.2.1. Preliminary analyses. Analysis of the manipulation check showed that the 
design of the set-up was valid. The participants’ visibility and confidence ratings as well as 
accuracy (indicated by the deviation from the true value) were successfully manipulated by 
watching either through the clear or blurred window. An ANOVA was calculated for repeated 
measures with window (clear or blurred) as within-subjects variable and age group (children 
or adults) as between-subjects factor to analyze whether there were significant differences in 
ratings and accuracy between the two windows. For post-hoc analyses independent and 
paired sample t-tests were used. Participants rated their visibility and confidence in their 
judgment significantly higher behind the clear than behind the blurred window and in fact 
made more accurate judgment behind the clear window (see Fig. 3) 
For visibility and confidence results, the ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of 
quality of the window (visibility: F(1, 76) = 461.39, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.89; confidence: F(1, 76) = 
222.87, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.75) and age group (visibility: F(1, 76) = 7.65, p = .007, ŋp
2 = 0.09; 
confidence: F(1, 76) = 55.82, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.42) and a significant interaction of both factors 
 




(visibility: F(1, 76) = 18.17, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.19; confidence: F(1, 76) = 72.44, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 
0.49). Post-hoc tests revealed that ratings of both children and adults were higher behind the 
clear than behind the blurred window (visibility: children: t(42) = 9.87, p < .001, dz = 1.52; 
adults: t(34) = 46.29, p < .001, dz = 7.94 ; confidence: children: t(42) = 4.16, p < .001, dz = 
0.64, adults: t(34) = 20.38, p < .001, dz = 3.49). Furthermore, children and adults differed in 
their ratings when judging sticks behind the blurred window (visibility: t(48.65) = 4.48, p < 
.001, d = 1.28; confidence: t(56.5) = 10.07, p < .001, d = 2.68) but not behind the clear 
window (visibility: t(56.62) = -1.05, p = .298, d = -0.28; confidence: t(76) = 1.65, p = .104, d = 
0.38). 
For the deviation from the true value, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
quality of the window, F(1, 72) = 86.96, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.55. Post-hoc tests revealed more 
accurate judgments behind the clear window (children: t(39) = -5.88, p < .001, dz = -0.94; 
adults: t(33) = -7.43, p < .001, dz = -1.29) with adults being more precise than children behind 
the clear window (t(43.17) = 3.06, p < .004, d = 0.93) and no difference between children and 
adults behind the blurred window (t(62.31) = 0.47, p = .638, d = 0.12). In sum, these results 
confirm the success of our experimental manipulations. 
 
Figure 3. Children’s and adults‘ subjective visibility (a), confidence (b) and deviation from the 
true value (c) behind the clear and blurred window. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
means. 
 




7.2.2.2. Main analyses. Performance in advice-taking as a function of age groups 
and condition is depicted in Fig. 4. A 3 (condition) × 2 (age groups) ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of condition (F(2, 73) = 21.58, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.23), no main effect of 
age group (F(1, 73) = 1.04, p = .311, ŋp
2 = 0.01) and a significant interaction of both factors 
(F(2, 73) = 5.10, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.06).  
Post-hoc tests revealed that while adults differed (hp < pp < ph) in their advice-taking 
between all three conditions (high-poor vs. poor-poor: t(34) = 5.52, p < .001, dz = 0.95, poor-
poor vs. poor-high: t(34) = -2.84, p = .008, dz = -0.49, and high-poor vs. poor-high: t(34) = -
8.91, p < .001, dz = -1.53) children’s advice-taking differed (hp < pp = ph) only between the 
high-poor compared to the other two conditions (high-poor vs. poor-high: t(39) = -2.06, p = 
.046, dz = -0.33, high-poor vs. poor-poor: t(39) = 2.29, p = .027, dz = 0.37, and poor-poor vs. 
poor-high: t(39) = 0.21, p = .838, dz = 0.03). Contrasting adults’ and children’s performance, 
the main difference in advice-taking was found in the poor-high condition (t(69.70) = -2.72, p 
= .008, d = -0.65). In contrast, children and adults did not significantly differ in the poor-poor 
(t(69.28) = -0.37, p = .710, d = -0.09) and the high-poor conditions (t(57.01) = 1.67, p = .100, 
d = 0.44). 
 
Figure 4. Advice-taking as a function of condition. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
means. 
7.2.2.2.1. Visibility and confidence rating. Participants’ visibility (a) and confidence (b) 
ratings as a function of age groups and condition are depicted in Fig. 5. For both visibilty and 
confidence ratings, the target analysis was a 2 (age group) × 3 (condition) × 2 (judgment: 
initial vs. final) ANOVA. 
 




Visibility rating. The 2 × 3 × 2 ANOVA revealed main effects of condition (F(2, 72) = 
306.06, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.81) and age group (F(1, 72) = 13.20, p = .001, ŋp
2 = 0.15) as well as 
a significant interaction of condition and age group (F(2, 72) = 15.17, p = < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.17). 
Post-hoc tests revealed that while in the high-poor condition children and adults did not differ 
in their initial (t(42.4) = -1.77, p = .083, d = -0.54) or final judgments (t(52.5) = -1.57, p = .123, 
d = -0.43), children rated their visibility for both judgments higher than adults in the poor-poor 
condition (before advice: t(73) = 3.11, p = .002, d = 0.73; after advice: t(72) = 3.92, p < .001, 
d = 0.92) and the poor-high condition (before advice: t(73) = 3.79, p < .001 d = 0.89; after 
advice: t(72) = 4.16, p < .001, d = 0.98). 
There was no signficant effect of judgment (F(1, 72) = 1.61, p = .209, ŋp
2 = 0.02). 
Additionally, no interactions of judgment and age group (F(1, 72) = 1.85, p = .178, ŋp
2 = 0.03), 
condition and judgment (F(2, 72) = 2.86, p = .061, ŋp
2 = 0.04), or condition, judgment, and 
age group (F(2, 72) = 1.20, p = .304, ŋp
2 = 0.02) were found. 
Confidence rating. The 2 × 3 × 2 ANOVA revealed main effects of condition (F(2, 73) 
= 164.31, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.69), judgment (F(1, 73) = 11.85, p = .001, ŋp
2 = 0.14), and age 
group (F(1, 73) = 39.35, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.35), interactions of condition and age group (F(2, 
73) = 37.04, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.34), judgment and age group (F(1, 73) = 6.63, p = .012, ŋp
2 = 
0.08), as well as of condition, judgment, and age group (F(2,73) = 6.83, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.09). 
To follow up on this 3-way interaction, separate 2 (age group) × 2 (judgment: initial vs. 
final) ANOVAs were conducted for each condition. In the high-poor condition, this 2 × 2 
ANOVA revealed no effects of judgment (F(1, 73) = 0.15, p = .700, ŋp
2 = 0.001) or age group 
(F(1, 73) = 0.02, p = .885, ŋp
2 = .001), and no interaction between both factors (F(1, 73) = 
0.36, p = .548, ŋp
2 = .001). In the poor-poor condition, the ANOVA showed a main effect of 
age group (F(1, 73) = 53.78, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.42), but no effect of judgment (F(1, 73) = 0.001, 
p = .955, ŋp
2 = 0.001), and no interaction of both factors (F(1, 73) = 0.72, p = .398, ŋp
2 = 
0.01). In the poor-high condition, the ANOVA showed main effects of judgment (F(1, 73) = 
28.99, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.28) and age group (F(1, 73) = 33.65, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.31) as well as a 
significant interaction of both factors (F(1, 73) = 12.18, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.14). Post-hoc tests 
revealed that this interaction was due to the fact that only adults got significantly more 
confident after getting advice from the clear window (adults: t(34) = 5.43, p < .001, dz = 0.93; 
children: t(39) = 1.57, p = .124, dz = 0.25). 
 





Figure 5. Visibility and confidence ratings before and after advice. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the means. 
7.2.3. Discussion 
The main findings of Experiment 1 included the folllowing: In a judge-advisor experimental 
task designed to be suitable across age groups, adults revised their judgments functionally in 
regard to their own and the advisor’s epistemic status. Furthermore, adults became more 
confident after receiving advice from the clear window when they themselves saw poorly. In 
contrast, children’s advice-taking considered their own epistemic status (the better the child’s 
visual access, the less advice it accepted) but not the advisor’s epistemic status (children did 
not differentiate between well and poorly informed advisors). Children’s confidence ratings of 
their judgments were generally higher than that of adults and, more importantly, were not 
influenced by the quality of the advice. In particular, unlike adults, children did not increase 
their confidence based on the availability of high quality advice under poor epistemic 
circumstances. Thereby, the confidence findings largely mirror those of advice-taking. 
One interpretation of the present results regarding children’s selective social belief 
revision is that 4- to 6-year-old children lack the conceptual competence to revise beliefs as a 
function of advice quality. This interpretation seems to contradict the outcomes of previous 
research on advice-taking in children reporting that children consider their advisor’s expertise 
in a functional manner (Rakoczy et al., 2015). Alternatively, the present findings may not 
reflect competence but rather performance limitations due to extraneous demands of the 
 




present experimental task. In fact, three task characteristics can be determinded that may 
have increased task difficulty relative to the study of Rakoczy et al. (2015). Firstly, advice 
quality varied within the advisor instead of between several advisors. Thus, children needed 
to keep track of both their own and the advisor’s perceptual access to determine how 
valuable the advice was in a given trial. Secondly, in the presented study continuous 
judgments were applied rather than having children select one out of a small set of options. 
Unlike in the case of disjunct options with one correct solution, two continuous judgments 
could be different from each other but equally inaccurate, which might be too challenging for 
children to understand. Finally, the response format allowed for a greater number of revision 
strategies. In the case of a limited set of answers, judges need to choose one, whereas in 
the continuous case, they can choose one judgment, average their initial judgment and the 
advice, or choose from an unlimited number of weighted averages. 
All of these task features might have made it difficult for children to consider advice 
quality in their final judgments, even if they were principally able to selectively revise their 
beliefs in the light of differently accurate advisors. In order to investigate whether such 
performance limitations might potentially explain why children did not consider their advisor’s 
visual access to the stimulus in Experiment 1, two simplifications to the original task were 
introduced: Firstly, a structurally analogous selective social learning task was implemented 
that did not involve any belief revision (Experiment 2). Secondly, the revision task was 
simplified by presenting a categorical instead of a continuous scale to the children 
(Experiment 3). 
 
7.3. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, children were presented with similar material  as in Study 1 except that they 
were not asked to revise existing beliefs, but instead expected to form new ones in response 
to information supplied by other agents with varying epistemic status. This task was, thus, 
structurally analogous to classical selective trust tasks widely used in recent research on 
social-cognitive development (see Harris, 2012), and is similar to the panel-of-experts 
paradigm used in research on adult judgment and decision-making (Mannes, 2009). 
Experiment 2 allows to test children’s ability to infer the quality of advice when this quality 
varies within advisors. 
 
 





7.3.1.1. Participants. Forty 4- to 6-year-old children (age range: 49 - 72 months, M = 
60.1 months, 21 girls) were included in the final sample. Subjects were native German 
speakers with mixed socioeconomic backgrounds. Children were recruited from a database 
of families who had previously given consent to their participation. One additional child lost 
interest in the study from early on and could not be included in the final sample (n = 1). 
Participants were tested individually in the lab. 
7.3.1.2. Material. The same stimuli (box and the colored wooden sticks) as in 
Experiment 1 were used (see, Fig. 1, p. 38).  
7.3.1.3. Design and procedure. The child was presented with two informants 
simultaneously: one with clear visual access and one with poor visual access. While the child 
was sitting at the opaque side of the box, it was first asked “Which of the two informants 
knows better where the line on the stick is? Who would you ask?” (Ask measure). In the 
second part of each trial, both informants handed over their judgment (the scale with the 
mark), the child compared both judgments and was asked to make a final decision about the 
right height of the black mark on a third unused scale (Endorse measure). 
In Experiment 2, children were familiarized with stimuli and box and subsequently 
participated in eight test trials in total. Trials were of two kinds (four trials each). In half of the 
trials, the child was sitting at the opaque side of the box. In the other half of the trials, the 
child was initially sitting behind the blurred window together with the poor informant and was 
asked to closely look at the stick in the box and to identify the color of the stick. For the rest 
of these trials, the child moved to the opaque side. We conducted four trials of each kind, 
and the order of condition was counter-balanced. To avoid preference for one side, 
informants switched position every two trials. Data for Experiment 2 and 3 were collected 
within one test session lasting 30 min. All test sessions were fvideotaped. Children 
participated first in Experiment 3 and afterwards in Experiment 2.   
The dependent measures were as follows: 
 Ask-measure: Children were presented with a forced-choice question whom of the 
two informants they would ask about where to draw the black mark. We calculated 
the percentage of trials in which each child chose the respective informant. 
 Endorse-measure: The mean number of trials (out of eight) for each of three 
categories (high quality informant, low quality informant, and between) was 
calculated. Children’s plotting within 2 cm around the judgment of the high or low 
 




quality informant was coded as choice of this informant, respectively. Judgments in 
the interval between both radii were coded as “between”.  
7.3.2. Results 
Performance in choice between the two informants as a function of informant quality is 
depicted in Fig. 6.  
0.6 % of the trials fall in the “between” category and were not included in our further 
analyses. We calculated a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with position of the child (blurred window, 
backside), measure (ask, endorse) and quality of informant (poor, high) as within factors. We 
found main effects of the two factors measure (F(1, 38) = 7.91, p = .008, ŋp
2 = 0.17) and 
quality of informant (F(1, 38) = 140.20, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.79) and a significant interaction of 
both factors (F(1, 38) = 9.84, p = .003, ŋp
2 = 0.21). In contrast, we did not find a main effect of 
the position of the child (F(1, 38) = 0.35, p = .555, ŋp
2 = 0.01) and no interaction of position of 
the child with measure (F(1, 38) = 0.35, p = .555, ŋp
2 = 0.01) or with quality of the informant 
F(1, 38) = 0.03, p = .863, ŋp
2 = 0.001). 
Post-hoc tests revealed that children chose to ask the informant sitting behind the 
clear window significantly more often (t(38 = 11.62, p < .001, dz = 1.86) and also preferred to 
transfer the black mark of the high quality informant onto their own scale (t(38) = 8.88, p < 
.001, dz = 1.42). Furthermore, children chose to ask the informants sitting behind the clear 
window significantly more often than they did endorse their judgment (t(38) = -3.73, p = .001, 
dz = -0.60) but showed no significant difference between the ask and endorse measurement 
for the low quality informant (t(38) = 1.55, p = .129, dz = 0.25).  
 
Figure 6. Ask and endorse measurement for children’s choice of the high or low quality 
informant. Both kinds of trials (child at the back side and child behind the blurred window) are 
summerized. 
 





In a selective trust version of the current task children, thus, did form new beliefs selectively 
as a function of information quality. This confirms their ability to infer the quality of advice not 
only in situations in which stable differences in expertise between two or more advisors exist, 
but also when advice quality varies within advisors as a situational factor. Thus, children’s 
neglect of the advisor’s visual access when accepting advice in Experiment 1 was most likely 
not based on some principal difficulty in distinguishing between perceptual information of 
varying quality in the present kind of task. Experiment 3 will investigate whether the 
continuous response format or the high number of possible revision strategies inherent to 
continuous belief revision (e.g., choosing one judgment, forming the statistical mean, or 
selecting from an infinite number of weighted averages) made the task in Experiment 1 
overly difficult. 
 
7.4. Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, the decision process was simplified by using categorical rather than 
continuous belief revision. The aim was to investigate whether 4- to 6-year-old children are 
able to revise existing beliefs as a function of their own and the advisor’s epistemic state 
when task demands are reduced in terms of belief revision (compared to Experiment 1). 
7.4.1. Method 
7.4.1.1. Participants. The same forty 4- to 6-year-old children (age range: 49 - 72 
months, M = 60.1 months, 21 girls) as in Experiment 2 were included in the final sample.   
7.4.1.2. Material. In Experiment 3, we used the same box as in Experiment 1 and 2, 
but with new stimuli. Stimuli were five toy animals affixed on a cardboard strip in the order 
fox, pig, rabbit, sheep, and dog. Pictures of the stimuli were used as scales. During test trials, 
one of the five toy animals was marked with a black belt. Children were asked to identify this 
animal on a scale. Advice was randomized and produced by a random generator and 
secretly marked on the advisors’ scale prior to the test sessions. 
7.4.1.3. Design and procedure. Design and procedure were identical to Experiment 
1 with the following exceptions: Firstly, only children were tested. Secondly, the judgments 
required were categorical (which animal has a mark?) rather than continuous (where on the 
stick is the mark?). Thirdly, children did not rate visibility and confidence. 
 




The dependent measure was children’s categorical advice-taking, that is, whether 
they adopted the judgment of the advisor or retained their initial judgment. 
7.4.2. Results  
The proportion of trials in which children engaged in advive-taking as a function of condition 
is depicted in Fig. 7. A Friedman test revealed differences in advice-taking between 
conditions (Χ2 (2) = 34.36, p < .001). Post-hoc Wilcoxon rank tests revealed that children took 
more advice in the poor-high condition than in the other two conditions (poor-poor vs. poor-
high: z = -2.12, p = .034, r = -0.34; poor-high vs. high-poor: z = -4.3, p < .001, r = -0.68), and 
more advice in the poor-poor condition than in the high-poor condition (z = -3.96, p < .001, r 
= -0.63).  
 
Figure 7. 100 % Advice-taking as a function of condition. 
7.4.3. Discussion 
The main finding of Experiment 3 includes that in a judge-advisor task with categorical 
(rather than continuous) belief revision, children did revise their judgments selectively as a 
function of their own and the advisor’s epistemic status. This finding is consistent with the 
idea that children’s apparent inability to consider the advisor’s visual access in Experiment 1, 
might be caused by extraneous demands of the task rather than by a limited competence for 
belief revision. The requirement to make judgments on a continuous scale and then integrate 
two such continuous judgments rather than choosing one answer could cognitively 
overburden children in a way that they no longer consider the quality of advice despite their 
principal abiltiy to do so.  
 




8. Study 2: Argument evaluation in preschoolers 
8.1. Introduction 
Advice-taking research demonstrated judges‘ sensitivity to numerous characteristics of the 
advisor, for example, competence, age, and familiarity. In the classical paradigm used in this 
research, the JAS, judges aggregate their own judgment and an advice. Study 1 showed that 
4- to 6-year-old children, just like adults, are sensitive to their advisor’s state of knowledge 
and are able to weigh that knowledge against their own epistemic status. However, in daily 
life advice is most often given within a social context and supported by arguments. Study 2 
was designed to investigate this aspect of decision-making, in particular, whether 
preschoolers are sensitive to advice justified by arguments differing in quality. Furthermore, 
the effect of the justification on subsequent advice utilization was determined. To this end 
children participated in three experiments. 
In Experiment 1 and 2 of Study 2 the same visual perception task as in Study 1 was 
used. However, advisors supported their judgment reasonably regarding the question why 
they want the final judgment to be consistent with the advice. Children from around age two 
have been shown to be sensitive to argument quality (e.g., Castelai et al., 2018; Mercier, 
2014). However, these studies concentrate on acquisition of new knowledge without the child 
having access to information on its own. The method used in this research is a classical 
selective trust paradigm in which two informants present conflicting information supported by 
different arguments. The effect of own knowledge on the evaluation of arguments has so far 
not been investigated. Furthermore, previous experimental studies mainly used circularity as 
a tool to investigate children’s ability to weigh arguments. A circular argument fails to provide 
any new information about preferences in choosing a specific judgment. This makes it 
impossible  to entanglewhether children are able to weigh arguments based on different 
degrees of epistemic value, because the epistemic value of a circular argument is zero. 
Moreover, epistemic value of contrasted arguments was impaired by different lengths, verbal 
complexity or semantic structures. The current experiments go beyond previous research by 
investigating argument evaluation in the process of belief revision and contrast arguments 
based on epistemic content. Particular focus was placed upon children’s understanding that 
the same argument in different contexts can be good, neutral, or even bad.  
Experiment 3 furthermore investigated whether preschoolers infer a speaker’s future 
credibility based on argumentative skills and whether information by insufficent 
argumentators might even be rejected. Therefore, children were presented with two formats 
 




of a selective trust paradigm: a two-informant and a single-informant version. A single-
informant paradigm allows to contrast two accounts: firstly, whether children just prefer 
information from qualified argumentators but judge differently skilled argumentators as 
generally trustworthy, or secondly, whether children might even actively reject information 
from insufficient argumentators and rather prefer an alternative option. 
 
8.2. Experiment 1 
8.2.1. Method 
8.2.1.1. Participants. Thirty-nine 4- to 6-year-old children (age range: 48 - 71 
months, M = 59.5 months, 22 girls) were included in the final sample. Subjects were native 
German speakers with mixed socioeconomic backgrounds. Children were recruited from a 
database of families who had previously given consent to their participation. Participants 
were tested individually in the lab. 
8.2.1.2. Material. The following material as in Study 1 was used: a three-sided box 
with one clear and one blurred window, colored wooden sticks, and analogue scales (see 
Fig. 1, p. 38). Advice, again, ranged from 1 to 200 mm. Advice was produced by a random 
generator and secretly marked on the advisor’s scale prior to test sessions.  
8.2.1.3. Design. The task was presented in JAS format with participants taking the 
role of judges. Confederates of the experimenter were playing a female puppet in the role of 
the advisor. Advice was presented with or without the argument, “I think it is here because I 
looked through here.” (German: “Ich denke es ist hier, weil ich hier durchgeschaut habe.”). 
Phrasing of the argument stayed consistent across conditions but quality of the argument 
varied as a function of condition (high versus poor visual access of the advisor). We used a 2 
(conditions) × 2 (argumentation) design with conditions (high-poor or poor-high) and 
argumentation (with or without) as within-subjects factors. All subjects received two trials of 
each condition with or without argument, respectively. Order of conditions was 
counterbalanced across subjects. However, the four trials without argument were always 
presented first.  
8.2.1.4. Procedure. Every session started with an introduction phase prior to the test 
phase. In the introduction phase, participants were, in a first step, familiarized with the set-up 
material to make sure that they understood the design of the three-sided box and the 
concept of transferring a black mark on a colored stick onto a picture of the stick. 
 




Additionally, data of the introduction phase were used as manipulation check to ensure that 
children’s visibility was successfully manipulated by watching either through the clear or the 
blurred window. 
8.2.1.4.1. Introduction phase. After entering the test room participants were invited to 
explore the three-sided box. The two windows were indicated and their perceptual quality 
assessed. To familiarize participants with the stimuli, they looked at one stick placed on a 
table and were invited to transfer the black mark as precisely as possible onto a picture of 
the stick. Participants’ understanding of the scale as an identical image of the stimuli was 
ensured. Subsequently, participants judged one stimuli first behind the blurred and second 
behind the clear window. It was illustrated that the two judgments differ in quality.  
8.2.1.4.2. Test phase. Judge and advisor were each placed on a different side of the 
box (for illustration, see Fig. 8). Then, one stick was placed in the box (in such a way that 
subjects could not observe the placement), and both judge and advisor were asked to make 
their initial judgments. After that, judges were seated at the opaque side of the box, received 
the scale of the advisor in addition to their own scale, and were asked to mark their final 
judgment on a third scale. Every two trials judge and advisor switched their starting postions 
(initial judgment behind the clear or blurred window). In the first four trials, only the advice 
was presented while in the second four trials the advice was supported by an argument. All 
test sessions were video recorded and lasted approximately 25 min. 
 
 
Figure 8. Starting positions in the high-poor condition. The child (judge) is sitting behind the 
clear window and the advisor (puppet) is sitting behind the blurred window.  
The dependent measures were as follows: 
 Deviation from the true value: The same measure as in Study 1 (Experiment 1) was 
used. For definition of the measure see p. 40. 
 Advice-taking (AT): The same advice-taking measure as in Study 1 (Experiment 1) 
was used. For definition of the measure see p. 40. 
 





8.2.2.1. Preliminary analyses. Analysis of the manipulation check showed that the 
design of the set-up was valid. The participants’ visibility was successfully manipulated by 
presenting them with a clear and a blurred window. Children’s deviation from the true value 
when sitting at the table, behind the clear, and behind the blurred window are depicted in Fig. 
9. 
An ANOVA for repeated measures with form of visual access (without box, clear or 
blurred window) as within-subjects variable was used to analyze whether there was a 
significant difference in the deviation from the true value between the two windows. The 
deviation from the true value when sitting at the table was included for reasons of 
completeness. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of variation of visual access 
(F(2, 76) = 81,12, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.68). Post hoc paired sample t-tests revealed significant 
differences between all three variations of visual access (without box vs. clear window: t(38) 
= -3.46, p = .001, dz = -0.56; without box vs. blurred window: t(38) = -11,16, p < .001, dz = -
1.80; clear vs. blurred window: t(38) = 7.96, p < .001, dz = 1.29). 
 
Figure 9. Deviation from the true value as a function of form of visual access (without box, 
clear window and blurred window). Error bars indicate standard error of the means. 
8.2.2.2. Main analyses. Performance in advice-taking as a function of condition and 
argumentation is depicted in Fig. 10. A 2 × 2 ANOVA for repeated measures with condition 
(high-poor or poor-high) and argumentation (with or without argument) as within-subjects 
variables was calculated. The ANOVA showed significant main effects of condition (F(1, 37) 
= 38.35, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.51) and argumentation (F(1, 37) = 14.67, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.28) but 
no interaction of both factors (F(1, 37) = 0.17, p = .681, ŋp
2 = 0.01). Post hoc tests revealed a 
significant increase of advice-taking in both conditions when adivce was accompanied by 
 




agumentation (high-poor condition: t(37) = -2.32, p = .026, dz = -0.38; poor-high condition: 
t(38) = -2.71, p = .010, dz = -0.44).  
 
Figure 10. Advice-taking as a function of condition and argumentation. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the means. 
 
8.2.3. Discussion 
The main findings of Experiment 1 were firstly, that children weigh advice, given by a puppet  
without any argument as a function of their own and the advisor’s state of knowledge: They 
accepted advice more likely when the advisor was better informed than themselves and less 
likely when they themselves were better informed. This result confirms findings of Study 1. 
Secondly, supporting advice with an argument increased children’s advice-taking significantly 
compared to situation in which advice was given without justification. However, this increase 
in advice-taking did not vary as a function of argument quality. The advisor who justified the 
initial judgment increased advice-taking similarly regardless of the own good or poor visual 
access. This result is surprising within the available literature because it shows preschooler’s 
competence in argument evaluation (e.g., Mercier et al., 2014). Children’s competence might 
have been diminished by two factors, the perceived quality of the argument and the 
consistency of the advisor. 
Argument quality was manipulated by the informational access of the advisor, while 
phrasing of the argument stayed constant across conditions. Thus, children were able to 
access argument quality only as a function of context (condition). More closely considered, 
phrasing of the argument might have been too neutral in order to be perceived as differing in 
quality between the two conditions: high quality when the advisor had good visual access 
and low quality when the advisor had poor visual access. Children might have interpreted the 
content of the argument “I think it is here because I looked through here” differently between 
 




conditions (which was the idea of the experiment), however, meaningfully in both situations. 
In the poor-high condition children might have been reminded that the advisor had clear 
visibility in a way such as “This is a good advice because I saw it clearly”. In the high-poor 
condition they might have interpreted the same argument as sign of good intention in the 
sense of “This is a good advice, because I tried the best I can”.  
An additional aspect of the experimental design might have made it artificially difficult 
for children to increase advice-taking as a function of argument quality: advice was 
consistantly given by the same person (puppet). Results in literature so far have not shown 
the ability of preschoolers to evaluate argumentative skills detached from the speaker. 
Children might just form an overall impression of one’s argumentative skills without adjusting 
to the informant’s argumenative competence context specifically.  
In order to investigate whether these aspects of the experimental design limited 
children’s ability to evaluate argument quality in Experiment 1, the original task was simplified 
in two ways: Firstly, advisors supported their judgment presenting an argument of increased  
strength and secondly, two different puppets were used under the high-poor and poor-high 
condition. 
 
8.3. Experiment 2 
In this Experiment, therefore, the same perceptual judgment task was used as in Experiment 
1, however, with two modifications. The argument was phrased more precisely by increasing 
the speaker’s commitment of advisors: “I really want us to take this, I am absolutely sure 
because I looked through here”. Under the poor-high condition the increased argument 
strength supported the advice and potentially resulted in increased advice-taking. In contrast, 
under the high-poor condition increased argument strength weakened the advice by 
revealing the advisor’s own poor competence and consequently, making an increase in 
advice-taking irrational. Furthermore, the constistency of the advice source was manipulated 
in that two puppets were introduced and each puppet presented the advice either under the 
high-poor or poor-high condition. 
8.3.1. Method 
8.3.1.1. Participants. Thirty-seven 4- to 6-year-old children (age range: 48 - 71 
months, M = 58.8 months, 20 girls) were included in the final sample. Subjects were native 
German speakers with mixed socioeconomic backgrounds. Children were recruited from a 
 




database of families who had previously given consent to their participation. Participants 
were tested individually in the lab. 
8.3.1.2. Material. The same stimuli (box and the colored wooden sticks) as in 
Experiment 1 were used with the exception that every participant judged only four wooden 
sticks. One half of the participants judged set A (brown, multi-colored, green and black-white) 
and the other half judged set B (purple, black, blue and turquois) of the wooden sticks. 
8.3.1.3. Design. The task was presented in JAS format with participants taking the 
role of judges. Advisors were confederates of the experimenter playing two puppets (A and 
B) who presented the judges with the randomized advice. Advice was presented with the 
argument, “I really want us to take this there. I am absolutely sure because I looked through 
here.”. Phrasing of the argument stayed consistent across conditions, but quality of the 
argument varied as a function of condition (high versus poor visual access of the advisor). 
Advice was given by puppet A in one condition (high-poor) and by puppet B in the other 
condition (poor-high). All subjects received two trials of each condition with argument. Order 
of conditions was counterbalanced across subjects.  
Data of the high-poor and poor-high conditions without argument collected in 
Experiment 1 were reanalyzed using a 2 (conditions) × 2 (argumentation) design with 
conditions (high-poor or poor-high) and argumentation (with or without) as within-subjects 
factors.  
8.3.1.4. Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the following 
exceptions during the test phase: (1) children participated in four trials with argument. (2) The 
argument was phrased, “I really want us to take this there. I am absolutely sure because I 
looked through here.”. (3) The advice accompanied by the argument was presented by 
different puppets in the two conditions. 
8.3.2. Results 
8.3.2.1. Preliminary analyses. Children’s deviation from the true value sitting at the 
table, behind the clear and behind the blurred window are depicted in Fig. 11. Analysis of the 
manipulation check showed that visual access of the participants was manipulated as 
intended. An ANOVA showed a significant main effect of form of visual access (F(2) = 
150.06, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.81). Post hoc paired sample t-tests revealed significant differences 
between all three forms of visual access (without box vs. clear window: t(36) = -2.67, p = 
.011, dz = -0.44; without box vs. blurred window: t(36) = -17.94, p < .001, dz = -2.99; clear vs. 
blurred window: t(36) = 10.67, p < .001, dz = 1.78). 
 





Figure 11. Deviation from the true value as a function of form of visual access (without box, 
clear window and blurred window). Error bars indicate standard error of the means. 
8.3.2.2. Main analyses. Performance in advice-taking as a function of condition and 
argumentation is depicted in Fig. 12. A 2 × 2 ANOVA for repeated measures with condition 
(high-poor or poor-high) and argumentation (with or without argument) as within-subjects 
variables was calculated. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of condition (F(1, 74) 
= 87.97, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.54) and an interaction of condition and argumentation (F(1, 74) = 
4.48, p = .038, ŋp
2 = 0.06). Post hoc tests revealed a significant increase of advice-taking 
when adivce was accompanied by the argument in the poor-high condition only (high-poor 
condition: t(74) = -0.10, p = .922, d = -0.23; poor-high condition: t(74) = -2.46, p = .017, d = -
0.60). 
 
Figure 12. Advice-taking as a function of condition and argumentation. Error bars indicate 









The main finding of Experiment 2 demonstrated that children varied in their degree of advice-
taking as a function of argument quality implemented through high or poor visual access of 
the advisor. An advisor having good visual access and supporting advice with a strong 
argument significantly increased advice-taking by children. In contrast, an advisor having 
poor visual access and supporting advice with an identically phrased argument failed to 
increase advice-taking. Advice-taking remained at the same level as if advice was not 
supported by an argument at all. More importantly, in the current design of the task an 
decrease in advice-taking in the high-poor condition would be irrational. Children looked 
through the clear window to make their initial judgment, thus, the correct solution was already 
revealed. In order to perform negative advice-taking (to change the initial judgment into the 
opposite direction of the advice) children would have to downgrade their initial judgment. The 
question of whether children would actively discount an informant based on lacking 
argumentative skills was investigated in Experiment 3. 
 
8.4. Experiment 3 
The main aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate whether preschooler were able to judge 
wrong argumentation negatively and whether children use argumentative skills of informants 
to make inferences about their future credibility. If so, the question arises how strongly 
lacking skills affect children’s selective trust in informants? And furthermore, do children 
prefer judgments of the informant who had previously provided strong over weak arguments 
or do they even actively discount informants based on previous weak argumentation? 
In order to answer these questions a new decision task was designed following a 
classical selective trust paradigm. Traditionally such paradigms present two informants giving 
conflicting testimony and comparing children’s learning from an accurate versus inaccurate 
speaker. This design has been adopted in the first part of Experiment 3, in which reliability of 
speakers was established in form of strong or weak argumentative skills.  
The next part of Experiment 3 investigated how children judge speaker’s trustworthiness 
based on argumentative skills more in detail. There are two possibilities: children may 
consider both speakers as generally trustworthy but prefer information from the speaker that 
previously provided improved support of their judgment. Alternatively, children may perceive 
a speaker who gave insufficient evidence for own judgments as unreliable such that they 
reject information from this informant. In order to distinguish between these two possible 
 




accounts the same decision task was presented as single-informant design. The first account 
should predict whether children learn from both speakers if they were the only source of 
information available. The second account should predict whether children acquire 
information only from a single accurate informant but reject information from a single 
inaccurate informant. 
8.4.1. Method 
8.4.1.1. Participants. Fouty-one 4- to 6-year-old children (age range: 48 - 71 months, 
M = 59,5 months, 20 girls) were included in the final sample. One additional girl lost interest 
during the familiarization phase and did not participate in the experimental trials. Subjects 
were native German speakers with mixed socioeconomic backgrounds. Children were 
recruited from a database of families who had previously given consent to their participation. 
Participants were tested individually in the lab. 
8.4.1.2. Material. We presented participants with a forced choice design in which they 
were to decide about the color or softness of a hidden object. Six plush toys of 7 cm length 
were used (see Fig. 13, c), two of them were always of the same color (blue, pink or white) 
but different in softness (soft or hard). Toys were placed in a triangular box (edge length of 
triangle: 57 cm, height: 44 cm). The box was a modified version of the material used in 
Experiment 1 and 2. It consisted of a clear window side for seeing (window measurements: 
27.5 cm × 23.5 cm), a side with an opening for feeling (radius of opening: 12 cm, Fig. 13, a) 
and an opaque backside. Little cases were used to move the toys secretly into the triangular 
box. Assistants presenting the two choices were wearing identical t-shirts that differed in 
color, the first assistant was wearing a green and the second a yellow t-shirt. To allow the 
children to visualize choice options and avoid working memory to limit intentional choices, 
presented information and arguments were illustrated using memory cards (see Fig. 13, b): 
The three colors (blue, pink or white) that were used were depicted as filled circle of each 
color, where as the two levels of softness were depicted as pillow for being soft and stones 
for being hard. The modalities “seeing” and “feeling” were visualized using memory cards 
depicting a pair of eyes or a hand. 
 





Figure 13. Three-sided box with opening for feeling (a), memory cards (b) and plush toys (c).  
8.4.1.3. Design. This experiment employed a 2 (informant: accurate vs. inaccurate) × 
2 (modality: visibility vs. touch) within subject design. The order in which the informants 
presented their judgment, on which side each informant was standing when presenting the 
judgment (left or right), and which of the two assistants was playing the accurate or 
inaccurate informant was counter-balanced. All children received three kinds of practice trials 
(modality, box, and ignorance) within the familiarization phase, ten test trials (four 
argumentation trials, four single-informant trials, and two two-informant trials) within the test 
phase, and three explicite judgment questions at the end of the test phase. 
8.4.1.4. Procedure. Participants started with a familiarization to the set-up material. In 
this familiarization phase it was ensured that children knew the three different colors 
requested in the test trials and were able to assign the two levels of softness to the toys. 
Furthermore, children demonstrated their understanding of the toys’ characteristics and the 
modality necessary to assign the characteristics correctly in three kinds of practice trials used 
as manipulation check to verify the validity of the set-up. Subsequently to the familiarization 
phase, children participated in the test phase. Every test session was video recorded and 
lasted approximately 30 min. 
8.4.1.4.1. Introduction phase. In a first step, we introduced toys, memory cards and 
hiding boxes. Children were presented with six toys located on a table und asked to name 
their colors. The three memory cards for the colors blue, pink and white were placed on the 
table and children were asked to classify the six toys into three pairs of different color. 
Children were instructed as follows: the experimenter placed the eye-card on the table and 
said while pointing at the eye-card, “Now look at these toys and put all the blue ones onto the 
blue-color-card.”. The experimenter repeated these instructions for the pink and the white 
 




colored toys. After the children had sorted the toys, it was indicated that two toys of one color 
are not identical but differ in softness: one is soft and the other one is hard. The two memory 
cards for softness, a picture of stones and a picture of a pillow, were placed on the table 
using the following phrasing: “These are stones, they are hard and this is a pillow, it is soft.” 
Subsequently, the experimenter asked the children to sort the toys in terms of softness. The 
hand-card was placed on the table and children were instructed by pointing to “feel the toys 
and put all the hard ones on the stone-card and all the soft ones on the pillow-card”. The first 
step of the familiarization phase was completed by practice trial 1 and 2 (modality trials). In 
practice trial 1, two toys of the same softness but differing in color were hidden in two 
separate small opaque boxes. One of the boxes was secretly selected under the table, put in 
front of the child and the child was asked, “If you want to know the color of the toy in the box, 
do you need to look at it or do you need to feel it?” In practice trial 2, the procedure was 
repeated with two toys of the same color but differing in softness. If a child failed to answer a 
question correctly, the practice trial was repeated once, before the experimenter moved on. 
In a second step, children were introduced to the triangular box, invited to explore the 
box from all sides and asked to identify from which side one can look into the box and from 
which side one can feel something in the box. Subsequently, children participated in the 
practice trials 3 – 6 to control whether they established a causal connection between 
modality and characteristica. At the beginning of each trial children were seated at the 
backside of the box not able to see or feel inside the box. Two toys were presented and one 
was secretly moved into the box. The two toys were either of the same softness and different 
color (trial 3 and 5) or of the same color and different softness (trial 4 and 6). In trial 3 and 4 
(box trials) children were firstly asked for the modality necessary to identify the specific 
characteristic of the hidden toy (seeing or feeling) and, secondly, which side of the box would 
allow for the informational access necessary. After answering these questions, children were 
allowed to approach the announced side of the box and identify the characteristic of the toy. 
In trial 5 and 6 (ignorance trials) children were offered the wrong informational access, for 
example, in the softness trial they were placed at the window side and allowed to look at the 
toy but asked for the softness in form of the forced choice question, “Is it hard, is it soft or do 
you not know?”. If a child failed to answer a question correctly, a practice trial was repeated 
once, before the experimenter moved on. 
The dependent measures were as follows: 
 Modality: Represents the number of trials for each of the two categories: right and 
wrong answer. An answer was coded as “right” when announcing the informative 
 




modality (looking vs. feeling) for the characteristic in question (color vs. softness). The 
“wrong” category included answers that mismatched modality and characteristic. 
 Box: Represents the number of trials for each of the two categories: right and wrong 
answer. Answers announcing the informative side of the box for the characteristic in 
question (window side for color and opening side for softness) were coded as “right” 
and answers announcing the not informative side of the box for the characteristic in 
question (window side for softness and opening side for color) were coded as “wrong” 
answer. 
 Ignorance: Represents the number of trials for each of the two categories: right and 
wrong answer. “I do not know” answers for the forced choice questions were coded 
as “right” other answers were coded as wrong. 
8.4.1.4.2. Test phase. In the beginning of the test phase children were informed that 
they participate in a quiz show and will answer questions about which of two toys was hidden 
in the triangular box. Two girls (one wearing a green and one wearing a yellow t-shirt) will 
join the game to assist. The test phase consisted of three kinds of trials in the following order: 
four argumentation trials, four single-informant trials, and two two-informant trials. The overall 
procedure was identical for all trials (set-up see Fig. 14). Children sat at a table with an 
occluder board in front of them hiding the triangular box. The assistants were placed side by 
side with the child. The experimenter presented two toys. In color-trials the toys were of the 
same softness but differed in color and in softness-trials toys were of the same color but 
differed in softness. Both toys were moved into small boxes and by walking behind the 
occluder board the experimenter announced to “secretly hide one of the toys in the triangular 
box”. Being behind the occluder the experimenter called one (or both) assistant(s) behind the 
occluder. Assistants were instructed to get information from one side of the box. For children 
the instruction was hearable but not visible, therefore, they knew assistants were allowed to 
see or feel inside the box but did not know which of the two had visual or tactile access to the 
toy. Assistents again appeared in front of the occluder and presented their information about 
the characteristic in question. In the end of each trial children answered a forced choice 
question about the two possible answers. The specific procedure of the three kinds of test 
trials was as follows.  
 





Figure 14. Information phase. Obtaining visual and tactile information of both informants, not 
visible for the child. 
In argumentation trials two informants presented conflicting answers accompanied by 
an argument. The rationale of argumentation trials was to investigate children’s 
understanding of arguments differing in quality and to establish one assistant as a high 
quality informant and the other assistant as low quality informant. Two color-trials and two 
softness-trials were conducted. Behind the occluder board assistants were instructed by “you 
go to the window side and you go to the opening side”. The following phrasing was used to 
present conflicting information: “I think it is color/softness, because I looked/felt into the box”. 
Informants used memory cards to illustrate the information presented. Visual information 
stayed present upon the child’s decision. The phrasing of arguments stayed consistent 
across the trials but differed in quality as a function of the characteristic in question. For 
example, the argument “because I looked into the box” was a high quality argument in color-
trials but a disqualifing argument in softness-trials. Informants stayed consistant in argument 
quality across four trials, informant A presented high quality arguments and informant B 
presented disqualifing arguments.  
In single-informant trials children were faced with one informat only. In four trials each 
assistant gave information twice, once in a color-trial and once in a softness-trial. Behind the 
occluder board the single informant was instructed with the sentence “you go to this one side 
of the box”. The information was given, phrased as “I think it is color/softness”, after 
announcing the statement the assistant disappeared behind the occluder. 
 




In two-informant trials two informants presented conflicting answers. Two trials were 
conducted, one color-trial and one softness-trial. Behind the occluder board, assistants were 
instructed by “You go to the window side and you go to the opening side.”. Both assistants 
presented their information phrased as “I think it is color/softness.”. For example, in the color-
trial when a blue and a pink toy were used, one informant stated “I think it is blue.” and the 
second informant stated “I think it is pink.”.  
At the end of the test phase, the assistants left the test room and the experimenter 
asked three explicit judgment questions. Firstly, children were asked “How did the assistant 
in the green t-shirt give reasons for her judgment, good or not so good?”. Secondly, the 
experimenter asked “How did the assistant in the yellow t-shirt give reasons for her 
judgment, good or not so good?”. And finally, children were asked to answered the question 
“Who gave better reasons, the assistant in the green or the one in the yellow t-shirt?”. 
The dependent measures were as follows: 
 Contrast of argument: Represents the number of trials out of two trials in which 
children chose the judgment accompanied by the right or wrong argument. In color-
trials the argument “because I looked into the box” was coded as right argument and 
the argument “because I felt into the box” was coded as wrong argument. In softness-
trials correctness was coded vice versa. 
 Choice of single-informant: Represents the percentage of trials in which children 
responded testimony-consistent and testimony-inconsistent (choice of the other 
alternative, not recommended by the informant). 
 Contrast of informants: Represents the percentage of trials in which children chose 
testimony of the informant previously presenting right or wrong arguments. 
 Explicit judgments of single-informants: Represents the percentage of answers for the 
two categories: “good” and “not so good” for each informant. 
 Contrast of explicit judgments: Represents the percentage of answers favoring the 
informant previously presenting right or wrong arguments. 
8.4.2. Results 
8.4.2.1. Preliminary analyses. Performance in the three kinds of familiarization trials 
is depicted in Fig. 15. Binomial tests were used to compare children’s perfomance with 
chance level (50 %) and revealed that children answered correctly above chance level for all 
three kinds of questions. This manipulation check ensured validity of the experimental set-up. 
Firstly, children correctly chose the right modality (looking or feeling) to figure out about the 
 




characteristic in question (binomial, ps < .001). Secondly, when presented with the triangular 
box, they chose the correct informational access (window or opening) to find out about the 
color or softness of the toy (binomial, ps < .001) and thirdly, acknowledged ignorance about 
the characteristic in question when presented with the wrong informational access above 
chance level (binomial, ps = .002). 
  
Figure 15. Proportion of familiarization questions answered correctly or incorrectly. 
8.4.2.2. Main analyses. 
8.4.2.2.1. Contrast of arguments. Children’s choice of the high or low quality 
argument as a function of modality is depicted in Fig. 16. Paired t-tests revealed that children 
preferred the informant giving a high quality argument compared to the informant giving a low 
quality argument for both characteristics color (t(40) = 5.31, p < .001, dz = 0.84) and softness 
(t(40) = 5.77, p < .001, dz = 0.91). This preference did not differ in degree between both 
characteristics (t(40) = 0.35, p = .728, dz = 0.05). 
 
Figure 16. Mean number of chosen high quality arguments out of two trials (compared to 
choices of the low quality argument) as a function of characteristic. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the means. 
 




8.4.2.2.2. Choice of single-informant. The proportion of testimony-consistent 
responses as a function of characteristic is depicted in Fig.17. The hypothesis was that 
children’s preference for testimony-consistent choices would not differ between modalities for 
the informant previously giving high quality arguments (right informant) and the informant 
previously giving low quality arguments (wrong informant). To examine these two predictions, 
testimony-consistent responses were coded as 1 and testimony-inconsistent responses were 
coded as 0. The proportions of responses across participants were calculated as dependent 
variable. Binomial logistic regressions predicted children’s responses with the predictor 
modality (visibility-color vs. touch-softness). The model predicting testimony-consistent 
choices when informed by the informant previously giving high quality arguments did not 
predict children’s choices (R2 = 0.004, χ2(1) = 0.25, p = .618, ƒ = 0,06). Consistent with the 
hypothesis, children’s willingness to accept the testimony of the right informant did not differ 
between color-trials and softness-trials. In contrast, the model predicting testimony-
consistent choices when informed by the wrong informant did predict children’s choices (R2 = 
0.13, χ2(1) = 8.00, p = .005, ƒ = 0.34). There was a significant effect of modality (b = -1.37, p 
= .007, odds ratio = 0.25, 95 % CI [0.09, 0.68]). However, children’s willingness to accept the 
testimony of the informants previously giving low quality arguments did differ between color-
trials and softness-trials. 
Binomial tests revealed that children responded testimony-consistent about chance 
level (50 %) in color-trials and softness-trials when presented with the right informant (color: 
binomial, ps = .012; softness: binomial, ps = .001). However, children responded testimony-
consistent about chance level (50 %) when presented with the wrong informant in color-trials 
only (binomial, ps < .001). This was not true for softness-trials, here children’s testimony-
consistent responses were at chance level (binomial, ps = 1.000). These results are 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that children reject an informant previously given low quality 
arguments. 
 





Figure 17. Proportions of testimony-consistent responses as a function of informant and 
modality. 
8.4.2.2.3. Contrast of informants. Children’s choices of the right (previously high 
quality argument) and wrong informant (previously low quality argument) as a function of 
characteristic is depicted in Fig. 18. The hypothesis was that children prefer the right 
informant in color- and softness-trials to the same degree. To examine this prediction, 
choices of the right informant were coded as 1 and choices of the wrong informant were 
coded as 0. The proportions of choices across participants were calculated as dependent 
variable. A binomial logistic regression predicted children’s choices with the predictor 
modality (visibility-color vs. touch-softness). The examined models predicted children’s 
choices of the right informant as a function of modality (R2 = 0.09, χ2(1) = 6.04, p = .014, ƒ = 
0.32). There was a significant effect of modality (b = 1.11, p = .016, odds ratio = 3.04, 95 % 
CI [1.23,  7,51]). In contrast to the hypothesis, results of the logistic regression showed that 
children’s preference for the right informant differed between color- and softness-trials. 
Furthermore, the tendency of children to choose the right informant was compared 
with chance (50 %) for each modality. In color-trials children chose the right informant at 
chance level (binomial, ps = .349). In contrast, in softness-trial children preferred the right 
informant more often than chance (binomial, ps = .028).  
 





Figure 18. Preference of the right informant (previously giving the high quality argument) as 
a function of modality. 
8.4.2.2.4. Explicit judgments of single-informants. Explicit judgments as a function of 
informant are depicted in Fig. 19. The hypothesis was that children judge the right informant 
more often as giving good reasons for her testimony while judging the wrong informant as 
giving more often not so good reasons for her testimony. To examine this prediction, “good” 
judgments were coded as 1 and “not so good” judgments were coded as 0. The proportions 
of judgments across participants were calculated as dependent variable. A binomial logistic 
regression predicted children’s judgments with the predictor informant (right vs. wrong 
informant). The examined model predicted children’s judgments as a function of informat (R2 
= 0.08, χ2(1) = 4.74, p = .029, ƒ = 0.29). There was a significant effect of informant (b = -1.07, 
p = .034, odds ratio = 0.34, 95 % CI [0.13, 0.92]). Consistent with the hypothesis, children 
judged the right informant more often as giving “good reasons” for testimony than the wrong 
informant. 
Furthermore, the tendency of children to judge the right informant as giving good 
reasons for her testimony was compared with chance (50 %). Children judged the right 
informant as giving good reasons for her testimony more often than chance level (binomial, 
ps < .001). In contrast, children’s positive judgment of the wrong informant was at chance 
level (binomial, ps = .349). However, children did not judge the wrong informant as giving 
„not so good“ reasons for testimony. 
 





Figure 19. Children’s explicit judgments of informants (informant previously giving high 
quality arguments vs. informant previously giving low quality arguments) as giving “good” or 
“not so good” reasons for their testimonies. 
8.4.2.2.5. Contrast of explicit judgments. Children’s judgments of the right or wrong 
informant when presented in a contrast question are depicted in Fig. 20. Proportions of 
answers were analyzes using a binomial test. Analysis revealed a significant preference to 
judge the right informant (previously giving high quality arguments) for giving better reasons 
for testimony compared to the wrong informant (previously giving low quality arguments). 
 
Figure 20. Proportions of positive judgments (as informant giving better reasons for her 
testimony) as a function of informant (informant previously giving high quality arguments vs. 
informant previously giving low quality arguments). 
8.4.3. Discussion 
As demonstrated in the manipulation check phase participants were able to solve the  
decision task presented in the current paradigm. They distinguished modalities, matched 
them correctly with characteristics of toys and admitted ignorance when presented with the 
 




insufficient perceptual access. The main findings of Experiment 3 were the following: Firstly, 
children did weigh information as a function of argument quality. Arguments phrased similarly 
were endorsed differently as a function of context. Children preferred information on color or 
softness when supported by evidence of the correct modality. For example, they endorsed 
the information “it is a blue toy” when the informant supported own judgments with the 
argument “because I looked into the box” but did not so when information on color was 
supported with the argument “because I felt insight the box”. However, they preferred the 
later argument when asked for the softness of the toy. This result supports the fundamental 
skill of argument evaluation in 4- to 6-year-old children. Argument structure was kept 
constant across conditions leading to the same argument being a weak opposed to a strong 
argument depending on the context of presentation. This supports children’s ability to judge 
arguments based on the epistemic relationship between information and argument instead of 
just blindly following connectives and discourse markers like because or and (Bernard et al., 
2012; Leman, 2002). 
Secondly, in single-informat trials children did not actively reject information from 
speakers previously giving weak arguments. However, to show this kind of response 
behavior in the current design would have required children to reject the only information 
available, since only one informant particpated in these trials and children had no perceptual 
access themselves. Subsequently, children would need to develop a strong negative 
judgment about the weak informant based on own dismatching argumentation in the first four 
trials of the experiment. They would need to transfer this kind of negative evaluation to a 
situation in which this informant did not give an argument at all and was presented without 
contrast or reference point for reliability of the own judgment. In the color trials children chose 
both informants significantly more than 50 % and consistently with testimony. In contrast, in 
the softness trials children preferred the judgment of the previously strong argumentator. 
When faced with the previously weak argumentator children did not prefer given testimony 
over the alternative answer (e.g., the soft toy when the informant recommended the hard 
toy). This result suggests that children might use their argumentative ability as cue for the 
informant’s reliability in some circumstances but not in others. The developing ability might 
also be still fragile and easily masked by performance factors. 
Thirdly, when presented with conflicting testimony of the previously strong versus 
weak argumentator children preferred the accurate informant compared to the inaccurate 
informant, however, only for the characteristic softness. In the color trials children did not 
develop any preference for one or the other speaker. This finding, again, supports different 
response patterns in children as a function of modality: when deciding about the softness of 
 




a hidden object children transferred previously estalished trust based on argumentative 
ability and used it to infer about informants credibility even when speakers did not give 
arguments to support their information. In contrast, with respect to the color of the toys 
children did not develop a preference for either one of the informants. This difference in 
modality is surprising and calls for more research data to disentangle factors and 
mechanisms underlying this gradual trust in formants as function of their argumentative skills. 
Finally, children were significantly more likely to judge the accurate instead of the 
inaccurate informant as having good argumentative skills in the single-informant question. 
Consistent with this answer pattern they judged the accurate informant as the one giving 
“better” reasons for the own testimony versus the inaccurate informant. Thus, children’s 
explicit judgments showed their ability of remembering the informants differently with respect 
to their argument quality and by whom arguments were presented (accurate or inaccurate 
informant). However, children seemed to explicitly avoid judging the inaccurate informant as 
the one giving “not so good” reasons but rather displayed no systematic preference for the 
informant’s argument skills.   
 




9. Study 3: Collective decision-making 
9.1. Introduction 
The aim of Study 3 was to investigate preschooler’s ability to collectively solve a judgment 
task. A tool important for decision-making is reasoning. In it’s narrow sense it was decribed 
as social skill enabling people to produce and evaluate arguments in order to reach joint 
decisions (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Study 2 demonstrated preschooler’s ability to evaluate 
argument quality in two contexts: firstly, in an advice-taking scenario in which children 
aggregated their own judgment with the judgment of the advisor. Results of Experiment 2 
demonstrated that children accepted more advice when the advice was supported by an 
argument and moreover, effectively weighted identically phrased arguments as a function of 
the advisor’s epistemic status. Secondly, in a selective trust scenario in which children did 
not have own access to information.  
However, in social contexts advice-taking situations often do not end with an advisor 
giving a reason for own advice but they rather result in interpersonal dialogs in which 
arguments and counterarguments are being exchanged in a for-and-back fashion. Thus, a 
classical JAS paradigm in which judges make individual decisions by aggregating two 
judgments transformes into a joint decision based on a discussion about various solutions for 
a specific problem. In order to make an optimal collective decision partners need to 
exchange evidence for each others individual judgments and collectively weigh individual 
judgments for their reliability. It is an advanced metacognitive skill to provide a decision 
partner with an evaluation about the reliability of one’s own judgment. In order to base a 
collective decision on evidence it is insufficient to only present the content of one’s individual 
judgment but rather should give information on one’s informational access and confidence in 
the own judgment. Moreover, effective reasoning requires partners to combine this 
information and produce arguments that reliably reflect on the quality of individual judgments. 
To date only a few studies have been investigating whether preschoolers use meta-
argumentative strategies and meta-talk to collectively solve decision tasks. No study so far 
analysed the functionality of meta-talk as  a parameter for decision quality. 
In Study 3, therefore, dyads of preschoolers were presented with the visual 
perception task used in Study 1 and 2, however, this time in an interactive fashion. Dyads 
were asked to solve the problem collectively to reach a correct joint decision.  
 




In particular, four main aspects of preschooler’s collective decision-making were 
investigated:  
(1) The quality of collective decisions: Is the collective decision functional? Are 4- to 6-year-
old children able to collectively decide for the correct judgment? 
(2) The decision style and quality of collective decisions: How do they do it? Does the quality 
of preschooler’s joint decisions vary as a function of decision style? 
(3) The structure of dialogs: Do preschoolers produce meta-talk, including information on 
their individual perceptual access, the reliability of their individual judgments, and 
justifications for specific judgments? 
(4) The quality of collective decision as a function of dialog structure: Do dyads performing 
meta-talk solve the collective decision task more successfully? What content of meta-talk 
might result in more successful joint decision? 
Moreover, following their collective decision in 50 % of all trials dyads were asked to 
give reasons for their final decision. Consequently, a sufficient amount of data was generated 
to investigate whether children’s ability to correctly justify their final decision can predict the 
successfulness of collective decisions. The structure of requested reasons and the quality of 
collective decision as a function of structure of requested reasons were analyzed. 
9.2. Method 
9.2.1. Participants 
Forty adults (age range: 18 - 41 years, M = 23.5 years, 20 women) and forty-two 4- to 6-year-
old children (age range: 48 - 71 months, M = 59.6 months, 26 girls) participated in the study. 
Subjects were native German speakers with mixed socioeconomic backgrounds. Adults had 
answered our study announcement on public notice-boards. Children were recruited from a 
database of families who had previously given consent to their participation. One dyad lost 
interest during the test session and only three trials were included in the analysis. 
 
9.2.2. Material 
The following material as in Study 1 was used: three-sided box with one clear and one 
blurred window, colored wooden sticks, and analogue scales (see Fig. 1, p. 38). 
 
9.2.3. Design and procedure 
In this experiment participants were tested in dyads. For children, members of one dyad did 
not differ more than three months in age. Dyads were presented with a collective choice task: 
 




they were asked to decide collectively for a final judgment based on two individual 
judgments. Individual judgments differed in quality and were made previously by the two 
judges, respectively. There was one condition (high-poor) with one participant making the 
individual judgment behind the clear window and the other judge making the individual 
judgment behind the blurred window. Age group (children and adults) was a between factor 
in the experimental design. 
9.2.3.1. Introduction phase. Every session started with an introduction phase prior to 
the test phase. Participants were introduced individually, one after the other, to the set-up 
material and the visual perception task. After entering the test room participants were invited 
to explore the three-sided box. The two windows were indicated and their perceptual quality 
assessed. All children indicated correctly the quality of both windows. To familiarize 
participants with the stimuli they judged one stick without box. Participants’ understanding of 
the scale as an identical image of the stimuli was ensured. Subsequently, participants judged 
one stimuli first at the blurred and second at the clear window. It was illustrated that the two 
judgments differ in quality.  
9.2.3.2. Test phase. The two judges were each placed on a different side of the box 
(for illustration, see Fig. 21). One stick was put into the box (in such a way that subjects 
could not observe the placement), and both judges were asked to make their initial 
judgments. Then, judges were seated together at the opaque side of the box and both 
windows were occluded. Judges were instructed as follows: “Show each other your individual 
judgments, compare and discuss them to agree on a final collective judgment.”. For children 
we added the phrasing “You are allowed to help each other.”. Judges chose freely who 
marked the collective decision on the final scale. We conducted eight test trials. Every two 
trials participants switched their starting position (the clear or blurred window) where they 
made their individual judgment. After four trials both children answered again the 
manipulation check questions and indicated the window of high versus the one of low visual 
access. In the last four trials of each session we requested reasons from the judges for why 
they chose a specific individual judgment as final judgment. All test sessions were video 
recorded and lasted approximately 35 min. 
 
 





Figure 21. Set-up, starting position of every test trial, when judges made individual 
judgments. 
9.2.3.3. Coding. Firstly, all three judgments (two individual and one final judgment) 
were measured using a ruler on each scale and collected as judgment data. Based on this 
data we calculated the following dependent measures.  
To access the quality of decisions it was coded: 
 Choice of judgment: Represents the number of collective decisions for each of the 
three categories (high quality judgment, low quality judgment, and between). Final 
judgments within 2 cm around the high or low quality judgment were coded, 
respectively. Final judgments in the interval between both radii were coded as 
“between”. If individual judgments were less than 4 cm apart, the final judgment was 
coded as a function of closest distance to the high or the low quality judgment. 
Additionally, final judgments not located between the individual judgments but on one 
side of the high or low quality judgment were coded, respectively. 
 Deviation from the true value: Represents the distance of the marks drawn by the 
judges from the true location of the mark on the stick (measured in mm).  
Next, we coded children’s decision style using video recordings of all test trials and 
calculated the following dependent measures: 
 Form of decision: Represents the number of collective decisions for each of the two 
categories: collective and individual. In collective decisions both children agreed 
verbally or gesturally (e.g., by nodding one’s head or pointing on the individual 
judgment they want to choose) on the final judgment. In individual decisions the 
elided decision partner showed verbally or gesturally signs of disagreement (e.g., 
pointing on the own individual judgment opposed to the judgment plotted as final 
judgment). In children a low number of trials were coded as undefined. In these trials 
 




coders could not clearly identify these criteria (e.g., the head of the child was not 
visible or voices were not hearable on recordings).  
 Plotting of final judgment: Represents the number of final marks that were plotted by 
each of the two judges (judge with high visual access and judge with poor visual 
access). In a low number of trials both judges plotted the final judgment, e.g., judge 1 
draw the line on the third scale and judge 2 retraced the same line again. These trials 
were coded as undefined. 
Finally, conversations between the children and requested reasons were transcribed 
verbatim. A full list of expressions coded for each category is provided in the appendix 
(dialogs: Tab. 1, p. 136, requested reasons: Tab. 1, p. 136). Based on these codings we 
calculated the following dependent measures: 
 Ratings: Represents the number of dialogs including testimony about eyesight, state 
of knowledge, correctness of individual judgments, and level of difficulty. 
 Uncertainty: Represents the number of dialogs including expressions of uncertainty 
about the correctness of individual judgments. 
 Reasons: Represents the number of dialogs in which participants supported their 
individual judgments by reasons. 
 Requested reasons: Represents the number of trials where participants gave reasons 
for each of the four categories: right, wrong, ambiguous, and irrelevant reasons. 
 
9.3. Results 
 9.3.1 Preliminary analyses. 
The deviation from the true value in the three conditions of the familiarization phase (without 
the box, when looking through the clear window or when looking through the blurred window) 
are depicted in Fig. 22. The design of the set-up was valid. The visibility of paticipants was 
successfully manipulated by presenting them with a clear and a blurred window. 
An ANOVA for repeated measures with form of visual access (without box, clear or 
blurred window) as within-subjects variable and age group (children or adults) as between-
subjects factor was used to analyze whether there was a significant difference in the 
deviation from the true value between the two windows. The deviation from the true value 
without the box was included for reasons of completeness. An ANOVA with Greenhouse-
Geisser correction revealed a significant main effect of visual access (F(1.3, 158) = 202.16, p 
 





2 = 0.72), age group (F(1, 79) = 24.93, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.24) and a significant 
interaction of both factors (F(1.3, 158) = 6.95, p < .005, ŋp
2 = 0.08). 
Post hoc paired sample t-tests revealed significant differences between all three 
forms of visual access in children (without box vs. clear window: t(40) = -2.72, p = .010, dz = -
0.43; without box vs. blurred window: t(41) = 16.90, p < .001, dz = 2.64; clear vs. blurred 
window: t(40) = 12.90, p < .001, dz = 2.04) and adults (without box vs. clear window: t(39) = -
2.63, p = .012, dz = -0.42; without box vs. blurred window: t(39) = -8.00, p < .001, dz = -1.28; 
clear vs. blurred window: t(39) = 6.94, p < .001, dz = 1.11). Furthermore, the values from the 
children’s judgments deviated to a higher degree from the true value than the ones from 
adults. That was true for all three forms of visual access (without box: t(58.12) = 3.60, p = 
.003, d = 0.94, clear window: t(66.65) = 3.26, p = .002, d = 0.80, blurred window: t(71.24) = 
3.64, p = .001, d = 0.86). 
 
Figure 22. Deviation from the true value as a function of form of visual access (without box, 
clear window and blurred window) in children and adults. Error bars indicate standard error of 
the means. 
9.3.2. Main analyses. 
9.3.2.1. Number of collective decisions. In children 132 decisions and in adults 121 
decisions were included in the analysis. These decision trials fulfilled the folllowing 
requirements: Firstly, the collective decision process was completed, including all three 
judgments (two individual judgments, one from the clear and one from the blurred window, 
and one collective judgment). Secondly, individual judgments were at least 2 cm apart, to 
ensure that they were perceived as differing and thus an agreement had to be formed. 
Furthermore, trials with a smaller distance of individual judgments were included when the 
individual judgments were at least 1 cm apart and additionally, the final judgment was 
 




located not between the individual judgments but outside of this range and could thus be 
clearly assigned to the high or low quality individual judgment. 
9.3.2.2. Quality of collective decisions. Two measures were used to investigate the 
quality of collective decisions: choice of judgment (whether the judges collectively choose the 
individual judgment of high or low quality) and the deviation from the true value in mm of the 
collective judgment. 
9.3.2.2.1. Choice of judgment. The choice of final judgments is depicted in Fig. 23. 
Only 0.03 % of trials fell in the “between” category and were not included in further analyses. 
The hypothesis was that adults will choose the high quality judgment as final judgment more 
often than children. To examine this prediction, collective choices of the high quality 
judgment were coded as 1 and collective choices of the low quality judgment were coded as 
0. Decision data were analyzed using a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) with a 
binary response term (high quality judgment = 1, low quality judgment = 0) (Bolker et al., 
2009). Age group was entered as fixed effect and dyad identification number was entered as 
random effect given the repeated measures design of the experiment. The proportion of high 
quality judgments as collective choices increased with age (estimate ± SE: 1.01 ± 0.47, t246 = 
2.15, p = .032). Consistent with the hypothesis, adults were more likely to collectively decide 
for the high quality judgment than children. 
 
Figure 23. Choice of the collective judgment as proportions of high and low quality 
judgments in children and adults. 
9.3.2.2.2. Deviation from the true value. The deviation from the true value as a 
function of judgment and age group is depicted in Fig. 24. A 3 (poor quality judgment, high 
quality judgment and collective judgment) × 2 (children and adults) ANOVA for repeated 
measures with Greenhouse-Geisser-correction showed a significant main effect of judgment 
 




(F(1.47, 366.85) = 374.59, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.60), age group (F(1, 250) = 11.56, p = .001, ŋp
2 = 
0.04) and a significant interaction of both factors (F(1.47, 366.85) = 3.94, p = .032, ŋp
2 = 
0.02).  
Post hoc tests revealed a significant higher deviation from the true value in the case 
of the poor quality judgment compared to the high quality judgment (children: t(131) = 16.53, 
p < .001, dz = 1.44; adults: t(119) = 14.49, p < .001, dz = 1.33). However, deviations of the 
children did not differ from deviation of the adults in case of the poor quality judgements 
(t(250) = 0.74, p = .457, d = 0.09) but adults plotted high quality judgments more accurately 
(t(249.89) = 2.54, p = .012, d = 0.32). Children’s collective judgments deviaded significantly 
more from the true value than their individual high quality judgments (t(131) = -4.74, p < .001, 
dz = -0.41) but significantly less than their individual low quality judgments (t(131) = 12.45, p 
< .001, dz = 1.09). Children’s collective judgments deviaded significantly more from the true 
value than adult’s collective judgments (t(155.72) = 5.91, p < .001, d = 0.83), adult’s 
collective judgments were equivalent to their individual high quality judgments (t(119) = -0.73, 
p = .467, dz = -0.07). 
 
Figure 24. Deviation from the true value in mm for the two individual judgments (plotted at 
the clear or blurred window) and the collective judgments in children and adults. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the means. 
9.3.2.3.  Decision style and quality of decision. 
9.3.2.3.1. Form of decision. The form of decision in children and adults is depicted in 
Fig. 25. Only 0.02 % of all trials were coded as undefined in terms of whether the decision 
was collective or individual, these trials were not included in further analyses. It was 
hypothesized that children, in contrast to adults, make a certain number of decisions 
individually instead of collectively. Decisions made collectively were coded as 1 and 
decisions made individually were coded as 0. The proportion of each form of decision across 
 




trials were calculated as dependent variable. Decision data were analyzed using a 
Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) with a binary response term (collective decisions = 
1, individual decisions = 0) (Bolker et al., 2009). Age group was entered as fixed effect and 
dyad identification number was entered as random effect given the repeated measures 
design of the experiment. The proportion of individual decision decreased with age (estimate 
± SE: 3.56 ± 1.13, t246 = 3.22, p = .001). Consistent with the hypothesis, adults were more 
likely to collectively decide for the high quality judgment than children. 
 
Figure 25. Form of decision. Proportion of collective and individual decisions in children and 
adults.  
9.3.2.3.2. Quality of decision as a function of form of decision. Two measures were 
used to investigate the quality of decisions as a function of whether dyads decided 
collectively or whether one judge decided individually. Firstly, the proportion of successful 
decisions (high quality judgment was chosen as final judgment) and secondly, deviation from 
the true value of final judgments as a function of form of decision. 
Proportion of successful decisions. The proportion of successful trials as a function of 
form of decision is depicted in Fig. 26. The following analyses are for children only, since 
adults decided collectively in all trials. The hypothesis was that in children collective and 
individual decisions would differ qualitatively. Decision data were analyzed using a 
Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) with a binary response term (high quality judgment 
= 1, low quality judgment = 0) (Bolker et al., 2009). Form of decision was entered as fixed 
effect and dyad identification number was entered as random effect given the repeated 
measures design of the experiment. The proportion of high quality judgments as collective 
choices was no different in collective compared to individual decisions (estimate ± SE: -0.64 
± 0.52, t126 = -1.21, p = .227). The hypothesis need to be rejected since data indicate that 
 




children are not more or less successful as a function of whether they decided collectively or 
individually. 
 
Figure 26. Proportion of high and low quality judgments as a function of form of decision 
(collective versus individual) in children.  
Deviation from the true value. The deviation from the true value of the final judgment 
as a function of form of decision (collective versus individual) is depicted in Fig. 27. The 
hypothesis was that in children collective and individual decisions would differ in deviation 
from the true value. Data were analysed using a Linear Mixed Model (LMM) given that the 
response variable was a continuous measure and the repeated measures design of the 
experiment. Form of decision was entered as fixed effect and dyad identification number was 
entered as random effect. Form of decision was a binary predictor term (collective = 1, 
individual = 0). Individual decisions deviated significantly more from the true value than 
collective decisions (estimate ± SE: -13.77 ± 0.57, t15,66 = -23,98 p < .001).  
 
Figure 27. Deviation from the true value of the final judgment as a function of form of 
decision (collective versus individual) in children. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
means. 
 




9.3.2.3.3. Plotting of final judgments. The plotting of the final judgments (who of the 
two judges plotted the collective decision) is depicted in Fig. 28. In 0.02 % of all trials both 
judges plotted the same final judgment (e.g. the second child retraced the plotting of the first 
child), these plottings were coded as undefined in terms of who plotted the collective 
judgment and did not include them in our further analyses. Plottings of the judge with high 
visual access were coded as 1 and plottings of the judge with poor visual access were coded 
as 0. Decision data were analyzed using a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) with a 
binary response term (judge with high visual access = 1, judge with poor visual access = 0) 
(Bolker et al., 2009). To analyze whether one of the judges (judge with high or poor visual 
access) dominated in marking the final judgment, we calculated a basic GLMM without 
predictor for children and adults and dyad identification number as random effect given the 
repeated measures design of the experiment. Children did not differ in who of the two judges 
marked the final decision (estimate ± SE: -0.08 ± 0.24, t127 = -0.35, p < .726). In contrast, in 
adults the final decision was more often marked by the judge with high visual access 
compared to the judge with low visual access (estimate ± SE: -2.15 ± 0.43, t118 = -5.05, p < 
.001). To analyze whether the final decision was plotted more often by one of the judges in 
children and adults a GLMM with age group entered as fixed effect was calculated. The 
proportion of final judgments plotted by the judge with high visual access increased with age 
(estimate ± SE: -1.91 ± 0.45, t250 = -4.25, p < .001). 
 
Figure 28. Percentage of trials in which the judge with high compared to the judge with poor 
visual access plotted the final judgment.  
Quality of decision as a function of plotting. Two measures were used to investigate 
the quality of judgments plotted by the judge with high or low informational access: firstly, the 
plotting of each judge (whether a judge plotted the high or low quality judgment, meaning the 
 




own judgment or the judgment of the other judge) and secondly, the deviation from the true 
value of the collective judgment as a function of who plotted the collective judgment. 
Plottings of judges with high or low informational access.  
The number of times judges plotted their own individual judgement as final decision is 
depicted in Fig. 29. The hypotheses were that in children a poor judge, when plotting the 
collective decision, is more often plotting the own individual poor judgment than in adults and 
that plottings of high judges would not differ between children and adults. To examine this 
predictions, plottings of the low quality judgment as final judgment were coded as 1 and 
plottings of the low quality judgment as final judgment were coded as 0. Decision data were 
analyzed using a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) with a binary response term (high 
quality judgment = 1, low quality judgment = 0) (Bolker et al., 2009). Visual access of the 
judge who plotted the final judgment was entered as fixed effect and dyad identification 
number was entered as random effect given the repeated measures design of the 
experiment. In children the proportion of poor judgments as final judgement increased for 
final decisions plotted by the judge with poor visual access compared to final decisions 
plotted by the judge with high visual access (estimate ± SE: 1.12 ± 0.50, t125 = 2.25, p = 
.026). In adults the proportion of poor judgments as final judgement did not increase for final 
decisions plotted by the judge with poor visual access compared to final decisions plotted by 
the judge with high visual access (estimate ± SE: 0.65 ± 0.85, t116 = 0.77, p = .441). 
Consistent with the hypotheses, in children, if the judge who had poor visual access plotted 
the final judgment the own judgment was plotted more often (the judgment of low visual 
access) than when the judge with high visual access plotted the final judgment. This was not 
true for adults. 
 
Figure 29. Proportion of low quality judgments as final judgments as a function of who 
plotted the final judgment (the judge with high or poor visual access).  
 




Deviation from the true value. The deviation from the true value of the final judgment 
as a function of who plotted the judgment is depicted in Fig. 30. The hypothesis was that in 
children final judgments plotted by the judge with poor visual access would deviate more 
from the true value than final judgments plotted by the judge with high visual access. Data 
were analysed using Linear Mixed Models (LMMs) given that the response variable was a 
continuous measure and the repeated measures design of the experiment. The judge who 
plotted the final judgment was entered as fixed effect and dyad identification number was 
entered as random effect. The judge who plotted the final judgment was a binary predictor 
term (judge with high visual access = 1, judge with poor visual access = 0). In children final 
judgments plotted by the judge with poor visual access deviated significantly more from the 
true value than final judgments plotted by the judge with high visual access (estimate ± SE: 
16.18 ± 1.42, t132 = 11.37, p < .001). In adults the deviation from the true value of the final 
judgment did not differ as a function of who plotted the final judgment (estimate ± SE:  -1.85 
± 0.02, t120 = -79.67, p = 1.000). 
 
Figure 30. Deviation from the true value of the final judgment as a function of who plotted the 
final judgment (the judge with high or poor visual access). Error bars indicate standard error 
of the means.  
9.3.2.4.  Structure of dialogs and requested reasons 
9.3.2.4.1. Dialogs. The structure of dialogs is depicted in Fig. 31. It was hypothesized 
that adults incorporate ratings, uncertainty, and reasons more often in there dialogs and 
coded occurrence of a measure as 1 and absence of the measure as 0. Generalized Linear 
Mixed Models (GLMMs) with a binary response term (occurrence of measure = 1, absence of 
measure = 0) (Bolker et al., 2009) were calculated for all three measures. Age group was 
entered as fixed effect and dyad identification number was entered as random effect given 
the repeated measures design of the experiment. All three measures increased with age 
 




(ratings: estimate ± SE: 0.67 ± 0.31, t251 = 2.16, p = .032; uncertainty: estimate ± SE: -3.77 ± 
0.66, t251 = -5.70, p < .001; reasons: estimate ± SE: -1.10 ± 0.54, t251 = -2.04, p = .042). 
Consistent with the hypothesis, dyads of adults discussing their collective decision about the 
final judgment rated the quality of their individual judgments, announced concerns about their 
certainty and gave reasons for chosing a certain individual judgment more often than children 
did.  
 
Figure 31. Dialog structure, including the three measures ratings, uncertainty, and reasons 
in children and adults. 
9.3.2.4.2. Requested reasons. The structure of requested reasons is depicted in Fig. 
32. It was hypothesized that adults justify their individual and collective judgments more often 
with right and ambiguous reasons while children give more wrong and irrelevant reasons. 
The occurrence of each type of reason was coded as 1 and absence of each type of reason 
as 0. Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs) with a binary response term (occurrence of 
measure = 1, absence of measure = 0) (Bolker et al., 2009) were calculated for all four 
measures. Age group was entered as fixed effect and dyad identification number was 
entered as random effect given the repeated measures design of the experiment. Analysis 
revealed that right and ambiguous reasons increased with age (right reasons: estimate ± SE: 
-1.95 ± 0.59, t134 = -3.33, p = ,001) while wrong and irrelevant reasons degreased with age 
(wrong reasons: estimate ± SE: -2.68 ± 1.25, t134 = -2.14, p = .034; irrelevant reasons: 
estimate ± SE: -2.60 ± 0.69, t134 = -3.77, p < .001). In contrast, ambiguous reasons did not 
increase with age (estimate ± SE: 0.16 ± 0.46, t134 = 0.34, p = .735). 
Consistent with the hypothesis, adults justified their decisions using more right 
reasons while children used more wrong and irrelevant reasons. In contrast with the 
hypothesis, children and adults did not differ in their usage of ambiguous reasons. 
 





Figure 32. Proportions of the four types of requested reasons (right, ambiguous, wrong, and 
irrelevant) in children and adults.  
9.3.2.5.  Quality of collective decisions as function of dialog structure and 
requested reasons 
9.3.2.5.1. Dialogs 
Quality of decision as a function of testimony. Two measures were used to investigate 
the quality of collective decisions as a function of testimony. Firstly, the proportion of 
successful decisions (decisions favoring high quality judgments) as outcome of dialogs that 
comprised each dialog parameter or did not comprise the parameter, respectively. As a 
second measure the deviation from the true value of final judgments following dialogs with or 
without dialog parameter was compared. 
Proportions of successful decisions. Proportions of successful decisions are depicted 
in Fig. 33. The hypothesis was that in children, opposed to adults, the usage of certain dialog 
parameters can predict the successfulness of collective decisions. In adults we did not have 
such a prediction since their was no difference in successfulness between trial (adults were 
successful in nearly all trials). Analysis on adult date are presented for the matter of 
completeness. To examine this prediction, collective decisions favoring high quality judgment 
were coded as 1 and collective decisions favoring low quality judgment were coded as 0. 
Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs) with a binary response term (high quality 
judgment = 1, low quality judgment = 0) (Bolker et al., 2009) were calculated for each dialog 
parameter (ratings, uncertainty, and reasons) in children and adults. Occurrence of dialog 
parameters was entered as fixed effect and dyad identification number was entered as 
random effect given the repeated measures design of the experiment. 
 




Ratings. In children the success of the final decision increased as a function of 
whether judges used ratings of their individual judgment throughout the dialog or not 
(estimate ± SE: 1.10 ± 0.49, t130 = 2.25, p = .026). In adults, in contrast, the success of the 
final decision did not increase as a function of whether judges used ratings of their individual 
judgment throughout the dialog or not (estimate ± SE: 0.34 ± 0.69, t119 = 0.50, p = .619).  
 Uncertainty. In children and adults the success of the final decision did not increase 
as a function of whether the judges used expressions of uncertainty about their individual 
judgment throughout the dialog or not (children: estimate ± SE: 0.75 ± 1.30, t130 = 0.57, p = 
.568; adults: estimate ± SE: -0.01 ± 0.65, t119 = -0.02, p = .982). 
 Reasons. In children and adults the success of the final decision did not increase as a 
function of whether judges gave reasons why their individual judgment should be chosen 
throughout the dialog or not (children: estimate ± SE: -0.58 ± 1.13, t130 = -0.52, p = .61; 
adults: estimate ± SE: -0.42 ± 1.01, t119 = -0.41, p = .679).  
In summary, consistent with the hypothesis, successfulness of their collective 
decision differed as a function of dialog structure. Dialogs that included ratings resulted in a 
higher number of successful trials than dialogs without ratings. Ratings of uncertainty and 
given reasons did not correlate with  successfulness.  
 
Figure 33. Proportion of successful trials (high quality judgment as outcome of collective 
decision) with dialogs comprising each dialog parameter (ratings, uncertainty, and reasons) 
or not. 
Deviation from the true value as a function of testimony. The deviation from the true 
value of the final judgment as a function of whether each dialog parameter occurred in the 
dialog or not is depicted in Fig. 34. The hypothesis was that in children, opposed to adults, 
the usage of dialog parameters can predict the accuracy of the final judgment. Linear Mixed 
 




Models (LMMs) for each dialog parameter (ratings, uncertainty, and reasons) were 
calculated.  
Ratings. In children collective judgments deviated significantly less from the true 
value when dyads included ratings of their individual judgments in their collective decision 
processes (estimate ± SE: 9.21 ± 1.68, t132 = 5.48, p = .016). In adults the deviation from the 
value of the collective judgment did not differ as function of ratings (estimate ± SE: 1.23 ± 
0.01, t121 = 260.90, p = 1.000). 
Uncertainty. In children and adults the deviation from the value of the collective 
judgment did not differ as function of uncertainty (children: estimate ± SE: -3.00 ± 0.03, t132 = 
-113.63, p = .131; adults: estimate ± SE:  0.88 ± 0.09, t121 = 10.12, p = .220). 
Reasons. In children and adults the deviation from the value of the collective 
judgment did not differ as function of uncertainty (children:estimate ± SE: -20.31 ± 0.17, t132 = 
-118.22, p = .440; adults: estimate ± SE: 1.39 ± 0.01, t121 = 141.32, p = .985). 
In summary, children dyads increased their accuracy of their final judgment when 
discussing the quality of individual judgments. Rating uncertainty or giving reasons did not 
influence the accuracy of collective decisions in children. But it is notable that only in a few 
trials children gave reasons spontanously. 
 
Figure 34. Deviation from the true value of the collective judgment as a function of whether 
the dialog parameter (ratings, uncertainty, or reasons) occurred in the collective decision 
making dialog. Error bars indicate standard error of the means.  
9.3.2.5.2. Requested reasons. 
Quality of decision as a function of requested reasons. Two measures were used to 
investigate the quality of collective decisions as a function of requested reasons. Firstly, the 
proportion of successful decisions (decisions favoring high quality judgments) as a function 
 




of type of reasons dyads gave to justify their collective judgments was used. As a second 
measure the deviations from the true value for collective decisions as a function of whether a 
certain type of reason was given or not was compared. 
Proportions of successful decisions. Proportions of successful decisions as function 
of type of requested reason are depicted in Fig. 35. The hypothesis was, firstly, that 
collective decisions justified by right and ambiguous reasons are more successful than 
collective decisions not justified by right and ambiguous reasons, and secondly, that 
collective decisions justified by wrong and irrelevant reasons are less successful than 
collective decisions not justified by wrong and irrelevant reasons. To examine these 
predictions, collective decisions of the high quality judgment were coded as 1 and collective 
decisions of the low quality judgment were coded as 0. We calculated Generalized Linear 
Mixed Models (GLMMs) with a binary response term (high quality judgment = 1, low quality 
judgment = 0) (Bolker et al., 2009) for each type of reason (right, ambiguous, wrong, and 
irrelevant) in children and adults. Occurrence of each type of reason was entered as fixed 
effect and dyad identification number was entered as random effect given the repeated 
measures design of the experiment. 
Right reasons. In children and adults the success of the final decision did not increase 
as a function of whether dyads justified their final decisions giving right reasons (children: 
estimate ± SE: 0,89 ± 0.59, t56 = 1,51, p = .138; adults: estimate ± SE: -0.55 ± 0.88, t76 = -
0.62, p = .534).  
Ambiguous reasons. In children the success of the final decision did increase as a 
function of whether dyads justified their final decisions giving ambiguous reasons (estimate ± 
SE: 2.04 ± 0.80, t56 = 2.54, p = .014). In adults the success of the final decision did not 
increase as a function of whether dyads justified their final decisions giving ambiguous 
reasons (estimate ± SE: -0.15 ± 0.76, t76 = -0.19, p = .846).  
Wrong reasons. In children the success of the final decision did decrease as a 
function of whether dyads justified their final decisions giving wrong reasons (estimate ± SE: 
-2.29 ± 0.83, t56 = -2.76, p = .008). In adults the success of the final decision did not increase 
as a function of whether dyads justified their final decisions giving wrong reasons (estimate ± 
SE: -1.38 ± 6.00, t76 = -0.23, p = .818).  
Irrelevant reasons. In children and adults the success of the final decision did not 
increase as a function of whether dyads justified their final decisions giving irrelevant 
 




requested reasons (children: estimate ± SE: 0.18 ± 0.57, t56 = 0.32, p = .753; adults: estimate 
± SE: -1.42 ± 3.01, t76 = -0.47, p =.638).  
In summary, consistent with the hypothesis children’s collective decisions were more 
successful if justified with ambiguous reasons and less successful when justified with wrong 
reasons. In contrast, giving right or irrelevant reasons did not interplay with the 
successfulness of joint decisions. 
 
 
Figure 35. Proportion of success for each type of requested reason (right, ambiguous, 
wrong, irrelevant) as a function of whether each type of reason was given to justify the 
collective judgment or not. 
Deviation from the true value as a function of testimony. The deviation from the true 
value of the final judgment as a function of type of requested reason is depicted in Fig. 36. 
The hypothesis was that in children the accuracy of the collective judgment would differ as a 
function of reasons dyads give if asked to justify their decisions. It was expected that the final 
judgment justified by right and ambiguous reasons deviates less from the true value than the 
final judgment justified by wrong and irrelevant reasons. Linear Mixed Models (LMMs) for 
each type of requested reason (right, ambiguous, wrong, and irrelevant) in children and 
adults was calculated. Analysis revealed no significant difference in the deviation from the 
true value as a function of occurrence of any of the four types of requested reasons in 
children or adults: right requested reasons (children: estimate ± SE:  5.49 ± 3.47, t58 = 1.58, p 
= .134; adults: estimate ± SE: -0.60 ± 2.01, t78 = -0.30, p = .767), ambiguous requested 
reasons (children: estimate ± SE: -1.13 ± 4.45, t58 = -0.25, p = .802; adults: estimate ± SE: 
1.56 ± 1.23, t78 = 1.24, p = .220), wrong requested reasons (children: estimate ± SE: 3.87 ± 
5.13, t58 = 0.75, p = .461; adults: estimate ± SE: 7.00 ± 4.05, t78 = 1.73, p = .101), irrelevant 
 




requested reasons (children: estimate ± SE:  0.53 ± 3.86, t58 = 0.14, p = .892; adults: 
estimate ± SE: -4.39 ± 3.05, t78 = -1.44, p = .160). 
 
Figure 36. Deviation from the true value as a function of type of requested reason. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the means.  
 
9.4. Discussion 
Four aspects of preschooler’s collective decisions were investigated: the quality, the decision 
style and quality, the dialog structure, and the quality as a function of dialog structure. The 
main findings of Study 3 included the following. 
Firstly, dyads of children, similar to adults, preferred the individual judgment made 
behind the clear window as final judgment. The deviations from the true value for the three 
judgments mirrored this preference. In children and adults the collective judgment deviated 
significantly less from the true value than the judgment made behind the blurred window. In 
contrast, the collective judgment did not deviate more from the true value than the judgment 
made behind the clear window. Thus, in most of their joint decisions children decided for the 
high quality judgment. 
Secondly, children, unlike adults, decided individually for a final judgment in a certain 
number of trials. In individual decisions children drew the final judgment without approval of 
their decision partners. In these trials the elided decision partner showed verbally or 
gesturally signs of disagreement (e.g. pointing on the own individual judgment opposed to 
the judgment determined as final judgment). Individual decisions did not differ in their 
proportion of successful trials, however, final judgments based on individual decisions 
deviated significantly more from the true value than in joint decisions. This indicated the 
tendency of judges initially sitting behind the blurred window (“poor judge”) to more often 
overrule their decision partners compared to judges initially sitting behind the clear window 
 




(“high judge”). Furthermore, analysis of who determined the final judgments showed that 
children took turns when drawing the final mark independently of the judge’s starting position. 
In contrast, adult judges initially sitting behind the clear window drew the final judgment in 
around 90 % of all trials. More detailed analysis showed that in children versus adult trials, 
“poor judges” plotted poor judgment more often as final judgment than “high judges”. 
Similarly, in children trials only final judgments plotted by the “poor judge” deviated more 
from the true value than final judgments plotted by the “high judge”.  
Thirdly, dialogs of children and adult dyads included ratings about the visibility of the 
stimulus, the correctness of individual judgments, and the difficulty of the perception task. 
Futhermore, children and adults raised concerns about the reliability of individual judgment 
and gave reasons to justify their proposals of specific judgments. The proportion of trials 
including these dialog parameters was significantly lower with children than with adults. In 
particular, children reflected on their uncertainty and gave reasons for their proposal only in a 
few trials, representing 13 % and 6 %, respectively. When being asked by the experimenter 
to justify their collective decisions children dyads gave more often wrong and irrelevant 
reasons than adults. In contrast, adults gave more often right reasons than children. 
Fourthly, children’s dialogs that included ratings resulted in a higher number of 
successful trials than dialogs without ratings. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
successfulness of children’s collective decisions differs as a function of dialog structure. 
Furthermore, when being asked for reasons children more often justified successful 
decisions with ambiguous reasons and unsuccessful decisions with wrong reasons. 
In summary, results of Study 3 showed that children and their partners who accessed 
information from sources of differing quality trusted the information supported by the strong 
evidence rather than by the weak evidence in their joint decisions. Thus, 4- to 6-year-old 
children were able to reach the ‘‘correct” joint decisions and endorse high quality information 
contradicting their initial judgment when their initial judgment resulted from a less reliable 
perceptual access.  
An interesting question arose as to how children managed to decide successfully? 
Children seemed to be able to intuitively reflect on the quality of, at least, their own 
informational access. In around 50 % of the trials they explicitly informed their decision 
partner about this informational status by rating their visibility or the difficulty of the task. 
However, children’s understanding of the causal relationship between the quality of the visual 
access and the subsequent quality of individual judgments showed to be still fragile in 4- to 
 




6-year-old children. This finding is consistent with previous research suggesting limits in 
preschooler’s ability to access their own ignorance (Kuhn, 2001). They seemed to 
subjectively turn a feeling of knowing into knowledge limiting their ability to grade certainty 
effectively (Kloo & Rhower, 2012). 
In the current experiment correct joint decision may have resulted from two scenarios: 
firstly, both decision partners held accurate evaluation of their own knowledge (the “poor 
judge” was aware of the low quality of their own individual judgment and the “high judge” was 
aware of the high quality of their own judgment) or secondly the “high judge” was more 
dominant within the decision process and did more of the interactive work than the “poor 
judge”. However, in trials where the “poor judge” was confident in own knowledge and not 
willing to revise individual poor judgment, “high judges” were not able to use meta-talk and 
argumentative strategies. Thus, they failed to make the evidence supporting their high quality 
judgments and the rationality of choosing this judgment transparent to their decision 
partners. Therefore, they were not successful in convincing them to collectively decide for the 
better judgment. The solely rating of visibility and task demands did not proof strongly 
enough as argument to convince a confident “poor judge”. More promising seemed the use 
of meta-talk to illustrate a causal connection between the degree of visibility and the 
subsequent quality of the proposed judgment. Based on this understanding argumentative 
strategies can be used to justify a specific choice of judgment and cause agreement about a 
correct joint decision. This in return can then be based on evidence as a means to optimize 
decision outcomes. 
In conversations with peers children spontaneously gave reasons to justify their 
proposals only in a few trials. However, children’s requested reasons (when asked by the 
experimenter) mirrored limits in their ability to reflect on the quality of individual judgments. 
Decisions justified by ambiguous reasons were more often decisions that resulted in the 
better judgment than decisions not justified by this type of reasons. Reasons were coded as 
ambiguous when they transferred the correct message about why the high quality judgment 
was chosen, for example, „because this judgment is the right one“ or „because I know it 
better“. However, ambiguous reasons (opposed to right reasons) did not clarify the causal 
connection between the visual access and the quality of judgments, for example, „mine is 
better, because I saw better“ or „mine is worse, because I was sitting behind the blurred 
window“. Decisions justified by wrong reasons were more often unsuccessful than decisions 
not justified by wrong reasons. Reasons were coded as „wrong“ when children reflected 
incorrectly on their visual access, for example, when a „poor judge“ claimed to have sufficient 
 




visual access. It seemed that only the wish to know the answer or the limited ability to identify 
their poor judgment as relevant guess (since they had visual access, but a poor one) turned 
subjectively into perfect knowledge. However, this claim could not be justified by arguments 
based on logic or evidence which might have led to the apparently “second best approach”, 
namely to claim to have the better evidence. These findings are consistent with research 
showing children’s understanding of their own epistemic states to be fully developed late in 








10. General discussion  
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate the development of socially induced individual 
and collective belief revision in young children. In order to do so an interdisciplinary approach 
was used and four seperate lines of research were combined: studies on advice-taking in 
social psychology, on the ontogeny of selective social learning (selective trust), on 
argumentation, and on collective judgment formation. In particular, in a first step a method 
classically used in social psychology research was adapted and a judge-advisor-system 
suitable for 4- to 6-year-old children designed to subsequently investigate: (1) preschoolers’ 
advice-taking as a function of their own and the advisor’s state of knowledge, (2) 
preschoolers’ ability to evaluate arguments and their subsequent advice utilization as a 
function of argument quality, and (3) preschoolers’ collective decision-making as a function of 
dialog structure and argumentative strategies. 
In the first study participants solved a perceptual judgment task, received advice, and 
subsequently made final decisions. The informational access (perceptual quality) of 
participants and advisor was experimentally manipulated. Adults revised their judgments 
systematically as a function of both their own and the advisors’ informational access while 
children based their adjustments only on their own informational access. Two follow-up 
experiments suggested, however, that this pattern of results in children reflected 
performance rather than competence limitations: In suitably modified tasks, children did 
consider both their own information and that of the advisor in their selective social belief 
revision. These results will be discussed with focus on limiting performance factors and 
developmental trajectories. 
Study 2 included three experiments. In Experiment 1 and 2 the same visual 
perception task as in Study 1 was used. However, advisors supported their judgment by 
giving a reason for why they recommend the final judgment to be consistent with the advice. 
Children were sensitive to arguments and took more advice when accompanied by 
arguments. However, they varied in their degree of advice-taking as a function of argument 
quality only if cues of argument quality were unambiguous. Experiment 3 went one step 
further and investigated whether preschoolers infer a speaker’s future credibility based on 
the argumentative skills and whether information by poor argumentators would even be 
rejected. For this purpose a newly designed decision task was developed and presented in 
two different formats of a selective trust paradigm: a two-informant and a single-informant 
version. Children weighed new information as a function of argument quality and endorsed 
identically phrased arguments as a function of context. These findings supported children’s 
 




ability to judge arguments based on the epistemic relationship between information and 
argument. However, children did not actively reject information from speakers previously 
providing weak arguments. Study 2 will be discussed in terms of factors that might have 
increased task demands for children and the use of arguments to determine informant 
credibility. 
Finally, Study 3 presented dyads of children with a visual perception task. Children 
started solving the task individually and subsequently compared these individual judgments 
finally to be integrated into a collective judgment. Importantly, judge’s informational access 
was manipulated resulting in individual judgments differing in reliability. Children’s joint 
decisions were analyzed for functionality. Furthermore, children’s conversations leading to 
the collective decision were coded and children were additionally asked to justify their 
collective judgments. Children’s joint decision-making was functional. Dyads of children, 
similar to adults, generally preferred the individual judgment with higher reliability as the 
collective judgment. In contrast to adults, however, children performed a number of failed 
joint decisions, deciding for the individual judgment marked at the blurred window. During 
their decision-making children engaged in various kinds of meta-talk including ratings about 
their own visual access and their individual difficulty to solve the decision task. Furthermore, 
however to a lesser degree, children communicated the confidence in their individual 
judgments and provided their decision partner with reasons to justify the correctness of a 
specific joint decision. Moreover, dialogs that included specific parameters led to a higher 
number of successful decisions. These results suggested that preschoolers were able to 
engage in collaborative decision-making successfully. However, the ability to reflect on the 
process by stepping back and jointly examining the evidence still remained fragile in 4- to 6-
year-old children. Findings of Study 3 will be discussed in terms of limits in metacognitive 








11. Selective social belief revision 
Study 1, which investigated ontogenetic roots of social belief revision (advice-taking), was 
motivated by two lines of research: social psychological research on advice-taking in adults 
(for reviews see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006) and developmental research on selective social 
learning in children (for reviews see Harris, 2012). Work in social psychology has shown that 
adults take advice selectively as a function of the advisor’s relevant attributes (e.g., 
competence, reliability, etc.). However, although systematically revising beliefs mainly in 
response to competent rather than incompetent advisers adults did not use advice in 
optimally rational ways. In particularly, adults overweighted their own initial judgments and in 
relation underweighted advice - a phenomenon called egocentric advice discounting (e.g., 
Yaniv, 2004). Several accounts have been put forward to explain such discounting behavior 
in adults, for example, “privacy of thoughts” (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) or the “mere 
ownership effect” (Beggan, 1992). However, so far there is no general agreement about one 
mechanism underlying EAD. By investigating the developmental roots of social belief revision 
it might be explained how and why adult judges fall short of perfect rationality. 
Developmental research, however, focused on selective learning of new information. From 
these studies it is known that children learn new words and facts similar to adults heeding 
advice and they prefer informants as a function of several attributes such as knowledgability, 
confidence or reliability. In contrast, the capacity to coordinate advices of others with own 
judgments and to take advice as a function of epistemic status was investigated in children in 
only one previous study (Rakoczy et al., 2015). The rationale of Study 1 was, thus, to 
investigate the early development of selective social belief revision systematically. 
 
11.1. Belief revision as a function of epistemic status 
In Study 1 participants were given a visual perception task in the format of a judge-advisor 
system (JAS) that was suitable for both adults and children. In this paradigm, subjects made 
an initial judgment, then heard about an advisor’s judgment, and lastly were asked to make 
their final judgment – allowing the parametric calculation of the degree to which subjects take 
the advice into account. In different conditions, the quality of the subject’s and the advisor’s 
perceptual access was manipulated by having them look through clear or blurred windows. 
The results of Experiment 1 were the following: adults engaged in selective advice-
taking consistent with previous research: they took into account both their own informational 
access (revising their initial judgments more when they themselves saw poorly) as well as 
 




the advisors’ (revising their initial judgments more in response to advisors with better visual 
access). Children, in contrast, only revised their beliefs selectively as a function of their own 
informational access, but did not seem to differentiate according to the advisor’s information 
access.  
This finding seems to contradict previous research on advice-taking in children 
showing that children placed stronger weight on more competent advisors (Rakoczy et al., 
2015). Consequently, two additional experiments were conducted to investigate whether the 
failure of children to consider their advisor’s visual access in Experiment 1 reflected true 
limitations in young children’s competence of selective belief revision or demonstrated  
performance limitations due to specific demands of the current task. Comparing the current 
task to that used by Rakcozy et al. (2015), three charactersitics were identified that may have 
made the task in Experiment 1 cognitively too demanding for children. Firstly, participants 
had to keep track of both their own and another agent’s perceptual access, which varied 
across trials. Secondly, they made continuous judgments rather than choosing one out of a 
small set of responses. Thirdly, they could choose from a wide range of revision strategies in 
response to the advisor’s judgment.  
Experiment 2 and 3 tested for children’s performance by removing some of these 
complexities. Experiment 2 addressed the question whether children may not have 
differentiated between good and poor advice because advice quality varied within the advisor 
and across trials. Therefore, children were faced with a very similar task which, however, 
required belief formation rather than belief revision. Subjects were confronted with two 
informants who had different perceptual access (one looked through the clear, the other 
through the blurred window) and were asked to choose between them. Children now had 
little difficulty in choosing the agent with the better informational access, even though it 
varied within advisors such as in Experiment 1. Thus, Experiment 2 demonstrated the abiltiy 
of young children to track the quality of advice by considering relevant situational factors. 
Experiment 3 addressed the question whether the continuous response format and the 
subsequent requirement to integrate two continuous judgments may have made the task in 
Experiment 1 so difficult that children were no longer willing or able to track the advisor’s 
visual access or to consider it when making their final judgments. Accordingly, children were 
faced with a very similar task only differing in that the belief revision required was categorical 
rather than continuous. Results revealed that children now revised their judgments in a 
functional manner, heeding advice more often when they themselves saw poorly, and also 
when the advisor saw more clearly. Thus, children in Experiment 3 behaved qualitatively 
 




similar to the adults in Experiment 1, and the way they selectively heeded advice also 
mirrored results of previous research on advice-taking in young children (Rakoczy et al., 
2015). 
In summary, these results suggest that young children are capable, in principle, of 
selective social advice-taking, revising their beliefs quite sensibly as a function of their own 
and the informants’ perceptual access. This capacity, however, seems still fragile and easily 
becomes masked by performance factors.  
 
11.2. Methodical considerations and limiting performance factors 
Children’s performance in Experiment 1 might have been limited by the pragmatic structure 
and demands of the task. The JAS, by its nature, involves repeated requests of a 
participants’ judgment within the same task. Children might have unsystematically revised 
their judgments on pragmatic ground simply because they thought the repeated question 
implied that their first answer was wrong. Indeed, previous research suggested that children 
tended to revise judgments when being asked repeatedly (Siegal et al., 1988). In addition, 
the task in Experiment 1 may have been too difficult for children since they needed to take 
into account and consider a lot of background knowledge about conditions for visual 
perception and its relation to information and knowledge. Recent theoretical and empirical 
work suggested that sophisticated selective learning builds on and presupposes specific 
background knowledge (Hermes et al., 2018a; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). 
Another limiting factor might have been the fact that, at any time, subjects in 
Experiment 1 were only confronted with one single advisor. The lack of contrast to another 
informant perhaps promoted to indiscriminately take into account this only advice 
independently of its quality. This seems plausible considering existing research: Most studies 
that documented competence for selective trust have confronted children with two informants 
differing in their quality of information. Contrarily to studies with only one informant, children 
often had difficulties in overcoming uncritical trust even if informants were obviously 
unreliable or incompetent (Jaswal et al., 2010; Vanderbilt et al., 2011; 2014; for critical 
discussion see Jaswal & Kondrad; 2016). 
As a consequence, this demand to selectively suppress or modulate naïve trust 
towards the advisor (depending on epistemic position) may have posed too high demands on 
children’s executive function. Related research suggested that any tasks that required the 
coordination of diverging perspectives, in particular those in which one of these perspectives 
 




pertains to one’s own current beliefs, were demanding in terms of executive function (Fizke 
et al., 2014; Rakoczy, 2010). In line with this, previous research found that the ability to 
overcome indiscriminate trust towards single informants builds on the development of 
executive function (Jaswal et al., 2014). Similar research suggested that children both had 
sophisticated rational and less sophisticated heuristic strategies for social learning in their 
cognitive repertoire in parallel; and used the former if the executive and other demands of the 
tasks allowed, but reverted to the latter otherwise (Hermes et al., 2018b). Similar aspects 
may have played a role in the current Experiment 1: Due to overwhelming task complexity 
(presenting a continuous measure in combination with general demands of the task), children 
may have followed simplier heuristics such as “If you see clearly, take little advice; if you see 
poorly, take more advice”.  
In summary, the present findings, thus, showed that young children were capable, in 
principle, of selective social belief revision or advice-taking: Under the right circumstances, 
they were capable of revising their judgments more sufficient when their own initial 
information was of poor quality, and more often in response to an advisor whose 
informational access was better. These findings go beyond previous studies on selective 
social learning in two crucial ways: they suggest that children do not only selectively acquire 
new beliefs from others, but also engage in selective belief revision – a more complex and 
demanding epistemic practice. In addition they suggest that children do so in contexts in 
which their initial judgments reflect proper beliefs (of varying certainty) rather than mere 
guesses. Future studies might investigate more in detail under which circumstances this 
fragile early competence becomes realized, or remains masked by performance factors.  
 
11.3. Developmental trajectories of selective advice-taking 
Interesting questions for future research can be posed about the trajectories and the 
underlying motors, of the development from these early basic forms of selective advice-
taking to fully-fledged, and more sophisticated adult forms of social belief-revision. For 
example, do children simply become more accurate and epistemically sensitive over time, or 
are there qualitative developmental leaps? One particularly interesting aspect in this context 
is whether there seemingly paradoxical developmental patterns exist such that social belief-
revision, in some sense, worsens over developmental time. From other research in social 
psychology it is known that adults weighted advice in a selective and systematic but not fully 
rational fashion (for reviews, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Feng & Mac George, 2006; 
 




Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). In particular, adult advice-taking is limited by the fact that subjects 
weighted others’ advice less than optimal; a phenomenon known as egocentric advice 
discounting (EAD, Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004).  
From a cognitive point of view, it is not fully understood what the basis of EAD in 
adults is. And from a developmental point of view, it remains unclear how these limits of 
advice-taking develop. Broadly, two courses of development are possible: Firstly, and in line 
with naïve intuition, children may become more rational and less egocentric over time 
(following the general trend of declining egocentrism). Secondly, and much more counter-
intuitively, the reverse may be true: in a sort of developmental paradox, children may actually 
start out more rational than adults and decline their rationality over development time. This 
possibility agrees with an exciting idea recently discussed in cognitive and comparative 
psychology. According to this idea, animals are sometimes more rational than humans 
because they lack some of the experience it needs to develop less-than-fully-rational 
heuristics (Stanovich, 2013).  
Analogous patterns may apply to the development of advice-taking: The cognitive 
foundations of EAD may be complex and thus require protracted development. One 
promising account in the advice-taking literature – the so-called “privacy of thoughts” 
approach - explains EAD in terms of metacognitive processes. The basic claim describes 
that adults prefer to stick with their own judgment because they have more insight into their 
own reasons compared to those of the advisor (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Another account 
proposes the mere ownership effect (Beggan, 1992) as mechanism underlying EAD. 
According to this, adults see opinions as intellectual property, with increased subjective value 
of one’s own ideas (Abelson & Prentice, 1989). Advice might thus be perceived as devaluing 
one’s own ideas and discounted as a consequence. From a developmenal point of view, it is 
known that both metacognitive abilities (Kloo & Rohwer, 2012) and a basic notion of 
intellectual property (Shaw et al, 2012) develop in protracted fashion. If these accounts were 
right, the development of advice-taking may indeed reveal more complex and seemingly 
paradoxical patterns. Systematic future research that implement comparable paradigms in 
various age-groups is needed to test for conclusive  developmental patterns.  
 
 




12. Argument evaluation in preschoolers 
Study 2 investigated the impact of the justification of advice on judge’s decisions regarding 
advice acceptance. As supported by findings of Study 1, 4- to 6-year-old children preferred 
advice as a function of the advisor’s competence and weighted this competence against their 
own epistemic status. In real life situations, however, advice-taking is more complex than 
aggregating two judgments only. Advice is often given in the form of interpersonal 
communication and supported by arguments. Discounting of advice was explained by judges 
having limited access to advisor’s reasons for their proposals (Yaniv, 2004). This led to the 
hypothesis that making their state of knowledge more salient to judges would increase rates 
of advice-taking.  
The account of epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010) describes successful 
decision makers as vigilant listeners weighing information and proposed justification as a 
function of quality. Following this argumentation advice-taking would not increase only by the 
presence of justification alone. Accurate reasoning may result in some arguments to increase 
advice-taking while others might be ignored or even have a decreasing effect. Irrational 
arguments could be interpreted not just as limited argumentative skills but rather as limited 
reasoning skills. Thus, expose an advisor as not understanding the logical structure of task 
demands and subsequently devaluate their advice for specific tasks or in general. In social 
psychology research adults have been proven to weigh advice for it‘s quality and evaluate 
arguments for their strength to present conclusive evidence. Subsequently, one would 
assume that an argument presented to support a specific piece of advice is processed for its 
strength of evidence just like other cues in the advice-taking context are processed to assess 
the quality of the advice (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). So far the effects of advice justification 
on advice-taking in children has not been studied. The rationale of Study 2 was, thus, to 
investigate in children firstly, whether advice with supportive arguments is followed more than 
without advice justification. Secondly, whether the degree of advice-taking is influenced by 
the quality of arguments, and thirdly, whether an informant disqualifies by demonstrating 
insufficient argumentation skills leading children to even discount the informant’s credibility in 









12.1. Advice-taking as a function of argument quality 
In Experiment 1 and 2 children participated in the same visual perception task as in Study 1. 
In a JAS paradigm praticipants started with an initial judgment about the location of a black 
marking on a colored wooden stick, they then were presented with an advisor’s judgment, 
and subsequently were asked to make their final judgment. The measurement of these three 
judgments allowed advice-taking, meaning the weight of judges giving advice, which is being 
calculated based on an equation introduced by Harvey and Fischer (1997). Using a within 
subject design two independent variables were manipulated: firstly, the informational access 
of the judge and advisor and secondly, the support of advice by arguments. Under different 
conditions, advice was offered with or without the justification by an argument. Arguments 
were phrased identically but manipulated in quality by having the advisor look through a clear 
or blurred window. In Experiment 1 advice was supported with the argument “I think it is here 
because I looked through here.” while in Experiment 2 the argument “I really want us to take 
this, I am absolutely sure because I looked through here.” was used. In Experiment 3 a new 
decision task was designed following a classical selective trust paradigm and presented in 
two formats: a single-informant design and a two-informant design. 
The results of Experiment 1 were the following: firstly, children engaged in selective 
advice-taking consistent with findings of Study 1. They were sensitive to their own and the 
advisor’s state of knowledge, revising their initial judgments more when the advisor was 
better informed and less when they themselves were better informed. Secondly, when advice 
was justified by an argument children followed the advice significantly more than when 
advice was unjustified. However, there was no significant difference in the increase of advice 
utilization as a function of argument quality. Advice justification increased advice-taking 
similarly in both conditions: when the advisor was seeing clearly or poorly. The results of 
Experiment 1 are both similar and different from findings of previous studies on advice-taking 
and argumentation.  
Similarly to the current experiment, one study on advice justification in adults (Tzioti et 
al., 2014) reported judges to significantly update their opinion more towards the direction of 
the advice compared to a situation of no advice justification (control group). Developmental 
work on argument evaluation showed preschoolers from around four years of age to favour 
new information supported by an argument over unsupported information (Mercier et al., 
2014). Moreover, 4- to 5-year-old children, just like adults, are sensitive to the presence of 
connectives. If only one out of two informants used because to link the own argument to the 
statement, participants preferred choices that contained because (Bernard et al., 2012). In 
 




contrast, findings of Experiment 1 differed from evaluation behavior shown in adults. 
Participants in a decision task in JAS format followed justifications as the best fit various test 
conditions: A similar argument increased advice-taking when offered by a competent advisor, 
whereas it decreased when offered by an inexperienced advisor. Thus, weights that decision 
makers attached to the justified advice agreed to what one would expect to be most effective 
in terms of the advice situation. Furthermore, previous findings on preschooler’s argument 
evaluation showed that children placed more weight on information supported by strong 
versus weak arguments (e.g., Castelain et al., 2018; Mercier et al., 2014). 
Due to the fact that outcomes of Experiment 1 seemed to contradict previous 
research two additional experiments were designed. The aim of these studies was to 
investigate whether the failure of children at the age of four to six years to distinguish 
between argument quality as a function of visual access of the advisor resulted from limited 
argumentative skills or whether it was due to the specific design of Experiment 1. Two 
characteristics may have been responsible in this respect: the perceived quality of argument 
and the consistency of the advisor. Firstly, phrasing of the argument in Experiment 1 might 
have been too neutral to be judged as weak argument in the high-poor condition and was, 
therefore, rather interpreted by children in a reasonable fashion (as a supporting argument). 
Secondly, advice was given by the same advisor across conditions. Children might not 
experience problems to form an overall impression of one’s argumentative skills, however, 
they may do have difficulties adjusting the argumenative competence of an advisor as a 
function of condition. Furthermore, based on the design of the current task, decreasing 
advice-taking in the high-poor condition would not have been functional to optimize the 
accuracy of the final judgment. Children started by judging the stimulus at the clear window 
and making their initial judgment already based on optimal information access. In order to 
perform negative advice-taking – to change the initial judgment into the opposite direction of 
the advice – would have demanded children to change their initial judgment to the worse. 
Experiment 2 and 3 tested for children’s performance by removing some of these difficulties.  
Experiment 2 investigated whether phrasing the argument more clearly would allow 
children to reflect more effectively on the quality of the argument as a function of condition. 
Accordingly, argument strength was increased by enhancing the speaker’s commitment for 
the own advice. In the high-poor condition this means the advisor increased confidence in 
the advice although judging the stimulus by looking through a blurred window. This 
questioned the ability of the advisor to correctly calibrate the evidence the advice is based 
on. Consequently, one would expect less difficulties to distingiush argument quality between 
 




the two conditions. Additionally, children were confronted with two different advisors, i.e. one 
acting in the poor-high condition and the other in the high-poor condition.  
As a result of this, children distinguished between conditions clearly. An advisor with 
high visual access and justification of the own advice by a new argument led children to 
increase their advice-taking significantly more than without advice justification. In contrast, 
children ignored an advice generated from the advisor at the blurred window although 
justified with an identical argument. In Experiment 2 children were able to evaluate 
arguments as a function of quality and subsequently utilized advice functionally. Thus, results 
of Experiment 1 can not be explained purely by a general inability of children to inhibit a bias 
to trust other’s testimony (Jaswal, Croft, Setia & Cole, 2010; Jaswal, Pérez‐ Edgar, Kondrad, 
Palmquist, Cole & Cole, 2014) or cognitive limits to process false testimony. Previous 
research often explained children’s trust in inaccurate informants by the fact that they would 
not yet be sensitive enough to the concept that someone might deceive them, become 
confused about the communicative intent of inaccurate informants (Heyman, 2014; Mascaro 
& Morin, 2014), or might not yet be able to evaluate other’s claims based on evidence (Sobel 
& Kushnir, 2013).  
Experiment 3 addressed three questions: firstly, whether children prefer new 
information justified by strong versus weak arguments. Secondly, whether children discount 
unskilled argumentators, and thirdly, whether children use argumentative skills as cue to infer 
an informant’s reliability in the future. Accordingly, a new decision task in the form of a 
classical selective trust paradigm was designed. The task was presented to children in a 
single- and two-informant design. Children preferred information supported by strong 
arguments compared to weak arguments. This finding confirmed findings of Experiment 1. 
Moreover, Experiment 3 extended these findings by firstly, using a new decision task and 
secondly, by speaking on the selection of new information without children having 
informational access themselves. However, participants did not go one step further and 
discounted an informant previously lacking argumentative skills by actively rejecting the 
judgment. Furthermore, results indicated that preschoolers determined the informant’s 
credibility based on the quality of explanations. 
Overall results revealed that children from around four years of age were capable of 
evaluating fundamental arguments as well as preferring strong over weak arguments in 
situations of new information learning and belief revising. This capacity, however, might not 
have been fully observable in Experiment 1 and 3. Both experimental designs might have 
imposed difficulties on children and masked their true competence on a performance level.  
 




12.2. Methodical considerations and limiting performance factors 
One factor that might have increased task demands in Experiment 1 was phrasing of the 
argument. Ambigous phrasing might have made it more difficult for children to distinguish the 
strong from the weak argument as a function of their advisor’s visual access. As a result 
children judged the explanation “I think it is here because I looked through here” as a strong 
argument in both situations when the advisor saw clearly or poorly. Argument quality was 
implemented based on the advisor’s epistemic status to allow presenting identical wording of 
an argument either in form of a sound or absurd judgment justification as a function of 
context. Previous research has shown children’s sensitivity to the length of explanations 
(Corriveau & Kurkul, 2014), argument structure (Leman, 2002), and usage of connectives 
(Bernard et al., 2012). This sensitivity might have distracted children in their performance to 
judge arguments by epistemic content. Instead, they might have lost track due to complex 
structures of sentences or got misled by the signalling effect of connectives like because. 
However, the aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate children’s ability to select for arguments 
as a function of epistemic content. The ambiguity of the argument might have affected 
children’s reasoning on argument quality in several ways. 
Firstly, children might have increased their advice-taking in the high-poor condition 
because they interpreted the advisor’s explanation in a rational way like, “This is good 
advice, because I have very good eyes.” or as sign of good intentions in the sense of “This is 
good advice, because I tried the best I can.”. Both, competence and good intentions are 
charateristics of advisors known to have an increasing effect on advice utilization (Bonaccio 
& Dalal, 2006). Moreover, the principle of charity (e.g., Wilson, 1959; Davidson, 1984) 
describes listeners as being motivated to interpret speaker's statements in the most rational 
way possible and, in the case of arguments, considering the most benevolent interpretation. 
The principle may be invoked to make sense of a speaker's explanations, especially when 
one is unsure of the precise meaning. In the current task the precise meaning in a way to be 
understood by children and to be used as basis for subsequent advice utilization was the 
epistemic value of the argument; i.e. evidence the advisor grounded the judgment on. Thus, 
children might have believed that the advisor had a good reason for the judgment, even 
though this reason was not clearly pronounced by the advisor. 
Secondly, lacking clear interpretibility of argument quality in Experiment 1 children 
might have used other heuristics that did not fit well with basic skills of argumentation, such 
as reviewing arguments for their epistemic content. The advisor giving a reason for own 
judgment might have been interpreted as a mark of dominance. Regarding children the 
 




ambiguous argument “because I looked through here” under the high-poor condition seemed 
similar to other expressions, such as ‘‘because I say so’’ and ‘‘that’s the way it is’’, often 
offered to children by adults or other dominant individuals (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994). 
Children might not have interpreted the expression as weak argument but rather as simple 
restatement of the advisor’s position used by the advisor to remind the child of their authority. 
A recent experiment suggested that 3- to 5-year-old children used dominance relations in 
their selection of testimony (Bernard et al., 2014). One cue applied by children to infer 
dominance was decisional power in the form of an informant repeatedly imposing one’s own 
goals onto others. Ambiguous arguments could, therefore, affect advice-taking through an 
indirect route - by indicating the dominance of the speaker, which in turn would then 
influence the evaluation of argument justifying the advice. Alternatively, children could 
attempt to be polite or to ingratiate with the informant (Jaswal & Kondrad, 2016). Several 
recent studies suggested that children sometimes endorsed information from previously 
inaccurate speakers to pursuit social rather than epistemic goals, including a desire to belong 
(Song, Over, & Carpenter, 2015), maintain positive relationships (Hartup, 1989), and be liked 
(Fawcett & Liszkowski, 2012). 
One further factor may have made the task in Experiment 1 cognitively demanding for 
the children. Advice and advice justifications was given by only one advisor across all 
conditions. Previous research so far has not investigated the circumstances under which 
children may use argumentative skills as cue to infer informant reliability and which task 
demands might cause difficulties for children to contrast arguments as a function of epistemic 
content. Research that applied a single-informant paradigm to study selective trust, however, 
appears to provide evidence of children’s limited ability or willingness to distinguish accurate 
from inaccurate informants in such specific test situations (Kim et al., 2017; Vanderbilt et al., 
2014). When children’s ability to evaluate other’s argumentative skills were not fully 
developed at the age of four to six years it perhaps became too demanding to judge 
arguments presented by the same advisor to be strong versus weak as a function of 
condition. In contrast, it might become easier for children to distinguish between argument 










12.3. Argumentative skills as cue for selective learning and future credibility  
In Experiment 3 preschoolers showed a preference for strong versus weak explanations 
when learning new information. This finding is consistent with previous research indicating 
that from around three years of age children possess basic skills of argument evaluation and 
use these skills to selectively learn from testimony of others (Mercier et al., 2014). In 
classical selective trust paradigm different degrees of reliability of informants become  
estabilshed via labelling of objects – one informant is labelling the object with correct names 
whereas the other informant uses incorrect names. The current Experiment showed that 
preschoolers were able to proccess not only single words to access the quality of informants 
but used complete causal subclauses to judge others competences based on their 
utterances (for similar findings see Corriveau & Kurkul, 2014). Children did not develop their 
preference for the more accurate informant just depending on the target word because, since 
both the strong and the weak argument were introduced using this causal connective. 
Moreover, the accuracy of the argument was not determined by different reasons. The strong 
as well as the weak argument were phrased identically but differt in quality as a function of 
the situation in which they were presented to justify testimony. Additionally, previous 
research used circularity to establish weak arguments. A circular argument does not present 
any new information, but instead is mostly a pure repetition of the informant’s judgment (e.g., 
„I want us to take this one, because I want this.“). Thus, children may succeed by applying 
the simple heuristic to evaluate various arguments only for new informational content without 
the varification of its quality. The current experiment most likely for the first time in research 
contrasted two arguments that both contained epistemic information and thus demanded 
children to weigh arguments based on different degrees of epistemic values without setting 
the epistemic value of one argument to equal zero.  
Furthermore, it was examined whether preschoolers use argumentative skills of 
informants as cue to infer credibility of testimony in subsequent tasks. In Part 2 and 3 of 
Experiment 3 informants gave testimony without justification, firstly, presented as single-
informant paradigm and secondly presented as two-informant paradigm. The single-
informant-paradigm (part 2) aimed at investigating whether children actively reject 
information from an informant previously presenting weak arguments. When being presented 
with both informants at the same time (two-informant paradigm, part 3) children selectively 
endorsed the claims about softness of the informant who had previously used strong 
explanations. This finding is in accordance with children explicitly judging this informant as 
“better” in the contrast judgment question. Experiment 3 supported the children’s ability not 
 




only to monitor explanations for quality but also to use this information to make judgments 
about an informant’s future credibility, however, surprisingly this was true only regarding the 
modality touch. It seems that preschoolers can use the monitoring of explanation quality as 
strategy to selectively learn from informants but only in certain situations and under certain 
conditions. This indicates that children’s ability to monitor explanations for quality seems still 
fragile at the age of four to six years. Future research might explore developmental 
sequences of the cues used for explanation monitoring and reveal whether younger children 
are more limited in their use of multiple strategies to selectively endorse information. 
Furthermore, reasons should be examined systematically why children’s information-seeking 
behavior might differ across various modalities of perception within the same task design. 
 
12.4. Discounting of poor argumentators 
Children did not actively reject information from an informant previously given weak 
arguments. In a single-informant paradigm where children choose between testimony of the 
informant and an alternative solution they did not selectively endorse the alternative. This 
finding is in agreement with research on children’s monitoring of single-word utterances as a 
function of the number of informants. In a learning context in which children were faced with 
conflicting testimony from two informants they relied on the prior reliability of the informants 
and selectively preferred to trust the more reliable source versus the less reliable one (e.g., 
Koenig & Harris, 2005). In tasks in which children were faced with testimony from a single 
informant and not having prior knowledge or proof of the informant’s testimony (e.g., to see 
or touch a stimulus themselves) they generally trusted the single informant regardless of the 
informant’s past accuracy (e.g., Kim et al., 2017; Vanderbilt et al., 2014). The current 
experiment extended this knowledge by showing that children were willing to endorse 
information even though the informant presented entirely inaccurate explanations, which 
might be perceived as stronger signals of inaccuracy than just single false labels.  
Children’s performance on the explicit contrast-judgment questions suggested that 
they did not forget about this informant’s weak arguments, since children explicitly judged the 
high-quality informant as the one giving the “better reasons”. However, similarly to the single-
testimony endorsement-task, children did not judge the weak argumentator as someone 
providing “not so good reasons”. Children’s general hesitation to, firstly, reject novel 
information from unreliable sources and secondly, explicitly judge informants as unreliable 
implied that preschoolers may have a natural aversion to perceive a source of information 
 




negatively. Thus, Experiment 3 contributed to the discussion of two conflicting accounts that 
might explain why children selectively endorse testimony of accurate informants in a situation 
where two contrasting sources are pitted against each other: Do they prefer the accurate 
informant or do they reject the inaccurate informant? The current results showed the 
tendency of children to consider both accurate and inaccurate informants as generally 
trustworthy rather than seeing inaccurate informants as being absolutely unreliable; hence, 
they have been willing to learn from the inaccurate informant if the informant was the only 
source of information available.  
Another question was why children might hesitate to explicitly judge an informant 
negatively or to actively reject testimony from speakers with a history of inaccuracy. One 
possible explanation is that children used different strategies as a function of number of 
informants (one-informant paradigm versus two-informant paradigm). According to the dual-
process account of selective trust (Hermes et al., 2018) children’s reasoning about testimony 
involves two qualitatively different processes: Type I processes, which operate fast and yield 
heuristic default judgments, and Type II processes, which are relatively slow and yield 
rational judgments based on inferences. Specifically, Type I heuristics may be overwritten by 
the more sophisticated Type II rationalizations, especially when the heuristics provide no 
conclusive solutions to the existing problem. Thus, in the single-informant task of Experiment 
3, children may have applied a general trust heuristic (e.g., Jaswal et al., 2010) such that 
they generally trusted social information regardless of the informant’s history. However, when 
confronted with multiple competing informants, the general trust heuristic no longer worked 
and children may have engaged in Type II inferences based on informants’ history of 
reliability to evaluate and respond to testimony.  
It is also possible that children avoided to reject testimony from speakers with a 
history of inaccuracy because their judgment was part of a broader tendency to view people 
in a positive light (e.g., Boseovski, 2010; Lockhart, Chang & Story, 2002) For example, 
children required less behavioral evidence to make positive attributions versus negative 
attributions (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). Children may be reluctant to view people negatively in 
the absence of very strong evidence. A related possibility is that children have learned about 
the usual accuracy of people’s testimony. Consequently, their default assumption was to 
accept what they hear in the absence of explicit alternatives. 
 
 




13. Collective decision-making 
The goal of Study 3 was to investigate preschooler’s decision-making in an interactive 
scenario. The final study of this dissertation builds upon findings of Study 1 and 2 that 
revealed the following: Firstly, presented with a classical JAS paradigm 4- to 6-years-old 
children revised their perceptual judgments selectively as a function of their own and an 
advisor’s epistemic status. Secondly, children were sensitive to arguments and revised 
beliefs more sufficiently when advice was justifed by explanations. However, when 
arguments were not instantly phrased soundly enough they were not weighted effectively. 
Study 3 finally gave children the opportunity to inquire more information in order to eliminate 
ambiguities and to discuss the quality of evidence supporting specific judgments in form of 
an interpersonal communication. Such social interactions, as proposed by Mercier (2016) are 
ideal situations to unfold reasoning capabilities in full measure because participants have the 
possibility to produce and to evaluate each other’s arguments. In particular, in dialogs of 
conflict challanging each others argumentations leads to an increase in cognitive efforts and 
produces the best outcomes: during back and forth argumentation and 
counterargumentation, weak arguments are rejected and good ones finally convince the 
decision partners.  
Successful argumentation between decision partners results from effective meta-talk 
that allows to assess the quality of arguments and/or evidence directly. In order to implement 
effective argument strategies one has to illustrate own reflection about the quality of own 
judgment based on informational access and  confidence in the own judgment. This leads to 
the hypothesis that dyads engaging in more advanced meta-talk and producing stronger 
arguments achieve a higher number of successful joint decisions. However, so far no studies 
seem to have been investigating the functionality of meta-talk as a parameter for decision 
quality. The rational of Study 3, thus, was to analyze the successfulness of preschooler’s 
collective decisions-making, the dialogs leading to joint decisions, and the effectiveness of 
meta-talk strategies.  
 
13.1. Collective decision-making in children and adults 
In Study 3 children and adults were presented with the same visual perception task already 
used in Study 1 and 2 except that dyads of subjects solved the task jointly. In the described 
design dyad members firstly solved the task individually, secondly they compared and 
discussed their individual judgments, and thirdly they jointly decided for a final judgment. The 
 




quality of individual judgments was manipulated by restricting dyad members to either high or 
low visual access regarding the stimulus. In dialogs conflicting judgments needed to be 
proven jointly for supporting evidence and accordingly be integrated to reach the best 
possible decision outcome, finally allowing to analyze the quality of joint decisions, the 
communicative dialog this decisions were based on, and a possible causal interplay of these 
two factors. 
The main findings of Study 3 included the following: Firstly, collective decisions 
favoured the high quality judgment. In 92 % of all decisions adults favored the judgment 
based on high visual access. In tasks involving children, partners mainly agreed on the 
judgment supported by the strong evidence. Judges originally sitting behind the clear window 
were able to present their better judgment successfully and judges behind the blurred 
window seemed to be willing and able to endorse this contradicting judgment even without 
the possibility to validate it’s quality directly. However, in 20 % of collective decision-makings 
children failed to choose the better judgment. Unsuccessful decisions were unlikely to result 
from limited understanding of their partner’s quality of visual access, since several 
manipulations check parameters validated a full comprehension of the experimental design 
for all participants. 
Secondly, analysis of the dialog structure in children and adults revealed that both 
informed their decision partners about their own visual access or the difficulty of the 
perception task. Additionally, in 50 % of dialogs adults shared ratings of subjective 
confidence with the decision partner. Previous research suggested that the functional role of 
such shared metacognition is to provide information on the strength of an individual’s opinion 
and it’s reliability based on situational evidence (Bahrami et al., 2012). Moreover, in a certain 
number of trials adults linked the quality of judgments with the perceptual evidence they 
resulted from by giving reasons for their evaluation of individual judgments (e.g., “My 
judgment is of higher quality because I had clear visual access.”). In contrast to adults, 
children included significantly less ratings of visual access, subjective confidence, and 
explanations for judgment proposals. In particular, children reflected on their uncertainty and 
gave reasons for proposals only in a few dialogs (13 % and 6 %). Being asked for reasons 
supporting joint decisions adults expressed more often right reasons to justify final judgments 
than children while children presented more wrong and irrelevant reasons than adults .  
Finally, decision processes in children that included sharing the quality of each other’s 
perceptual access more often resulted in successful collective decisions. This finding 
supports a potential interplay of meta-talk strategies and effective decision-making of dyads, 
 




however, the occurance of further dialog parameters (e.g., sharing of confidence ratings) did 
not result in differing degrees of successfulness. Furthermore, children justified successful 
decisions more often with ambiguous reasons while unsuccessful decisions were more often 
justified by wrong reasons. 
 
13.2. Successful collective decisions in children 
In 80 % of joint decisions dyads of children were able to reliably settle on the judgment with 
the best supporting evidence. Children were presented with a complex task requiring to 
mentally map two perspectives of the same stimulus in parallel. These two perspectives, 
firstly, were formed by different dyad members (child A or child B), secondly they held 
opposite degrees of informational access and accordingly strengths of evidence, and thirdly, 
thus, resulted in judgments differing in quality. The success rate of joint decisions suggested 
that preschoolers can engage in collaborative reasoning successfully even under such 
demanding test conditions. Children were able and willing to collaborate in order to solve a 
schematic version of a numerical task. This goes beyond previous studies on collective 
decision-making presenting children at this age with rather engaging playful scenarios like 
building a zoo together. Much research has demonstrated that there are important 
differences in how children think and communicate about animals and artifacts (Rakison & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2001; Brandone & Gelman, 2013). A zoo-setting may have been an 
especially facilitative context for children to collaborate and find nice homes for animals. 
Animals are living creatures that may fast catch children’s attention and are easier to relate 
to. In contrast, transfering a mark on a stick onto a picture of the stick seemed to be a more 
theoretical, less exciting task that demanded higher concentration and motivation to engage 
into a joint reasoning process.  
Reasoning with a peer to make a joint decision involves making a proposal and 
justifying it with relevant facts based on common ground assumptions. Children participated 
in the task equipped with skills of joint attention allowing dyad members to build up a joint 
attentional frame that included joint assumptions such as: “Somewhere on the stick is a 
mark.”, “We jointly decide where the mark is located.”, or “When you look at the stick you can 
see the mark.”. The establishment of a joint attentional frame allows decision partners to 
cooperatively exchange information and accordingly form judgments jointly about potential 
solutions and their quality. Judges who initially sat behind the blurred window were 
introduced to an alternative solution by their partners and willing to incorporate their partner’s 
 




perspective into a joint judgment of higher quality by reaching a mutual agreement. 
Accordingly, “poor judges” were willing to revise their own prior judgment as soon as it was 
acquired based on an unreliable informational access and they then accepted the alternative 
proposed by their peer. This implies changes at an epistemic level (knowing what oneself 
knows compared to what others know), in which „poor judges“ adopt the „high judge’s“ 
beliefs as superior to achieve a good collective performance.  
However, the question remains why dyads failed to reach the correct joint decision in 
20 % of cases. Phenomena discussed in social psychology to explain collective failure are 
difficult to apply in the current design. “Social loafing” decribes collective situations in which 
individuals invest less effort in the presence of others leading to reduced overall group 
performance. Shared responsibility for possible failures and accordingly, the lack of holding a 
specific member directly responsible was indicated as explanation (Karau & Williams, 1993). 
This mechanism, however, can not explain unsuccesful joint decisions in the current 
experiment because all judgments (individual and joint ones) were precisely documented for 
the dyad and both participants left little room for sharing the responsibility of wrong joint 
decisions. The dyad member who would have led the group to the wrong decision easily 
could have been identified. This feature of the experimental design was also implemented to 
avoid motivation loss of individuals participating in group performances (Williams, Harkins, & 
Latané, 1981).  
“Groupthink” (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998) is another case of collective failure and was 
explained by interdependence of individual decisions (Raafat,  Chater, & Frith, 2009). When 
individuals are not given the opportunity to make their own decisions privately, they 
subsequently fail to express disagreeing opinions. This phenomenon cannot account for 
failed decisions in the current experiment because individual decisions were always in the 
first place made privately and independently.  
Finally, the “hidden profile” paradigm (e.g., Stasser & Titus, 1985) is another 
extensively studied case of collective failure. This happens in situations in which one 
individual holds unshared but highly relevant information to reach optimal outcomes. In the 
current experiment dyads were actually composed of members with dissimilar knowledge 
profiles; one member having clear visual access to the stimulus and another having 
restricted visual access. However, the difference in participants’ informational access was 
not exclusive but common knowledge because both dyad members were introduced to the 
set-up during an extensive familiarization phase and even remembered within test sessions 
by participating in manipulation check procedures. 
 




The exact kind of mechanism that may have caused children dyads to fail significantly 
more often than adult dyads need to be investigated more in detail in future studies. One 
possibility to be addressed for further explanations might be the influence of interpersonal 
competition between dyad members. Although individuals were not differentially rewarded for 
their decisions and there was no incentive for competition it can not fully be ruled out that 
children from time to time fell back to a more egocentric form of thinking. In return 
competitive rather than cooperative decision strategies might have been activated, combined 
with a still fragile understanding of the causal relationship between the quality of the visual 
access and the subsequent quality of individual judgments. Consequently, dyads may not 
have been willing or able to decide for the judgment with the best supporting evidence. 
 
13.3. Structure of dialogs leading to collective decisions 
Both, children and adults explicitly briefed their decision partners about the own informational 
status using ratings of visibility or task difficulty in 40 % or 60 % of trials, respectively. 
Participants announced their subjective state of knowledge, although this evaluation could 
have been assumed by the other dyad member. This is true because it was part of the 
dyad’s situational common ground and did not need to be explicitly stated, since both 
partners were introduced to the clear and blurred window situation. Such testimony perhaps 
did not result from the limited ability of participants to tailor conversation based on the 
knowledge state of their dialog partner or the common ground knowledge that they shared 
with each other. Some children dyads even explained the whole test scenario by providing 
information about which person is sitting where, the location of the clear and blurred 
windows, the degree to which each person has visual access, and so forth. This kind of 
testimony may have served to demonstrate agreement between subjective evaluations and 
the expected objective evaluation of informational access. Thus, functioned to show 
commitment to the situational common ground and willingness to reach joint decisions based 
on rational evaluation of individual judgments. Moreover, these evaluations of member’s 
visual ability might be used as everyday expressions of certainty. A testimony such as “I did 
not see well” might be used alternating or as a substitute for verbal evaluations of judgment 
reliability. Previous studies undertaking linguistic analysis of the conversations that led to 
collective solutions of visual tasks showed that adults used expressions of the verb „be sure“ 
and „seeing“ interchangeably and tended to align with each other's confidence expressions 
(Bahrami et al., 2012; Fusaroli et al., 2012). For example, if one started the conversation with 
‘I did not see anything’, the other person would most likely respond with some expression 
 




using ‘see’. This might especially be true for 4- to 6-year-old children  whose ability to clearly 
distinguish different markers of unreliability, such as limited knowledge access and 
expressions of uncertainty, is still fragile. 
On the other hand, in their testimony children used signal words of uncertainty such 
as “maybe”, “not sure” or “might, could, should” scarcely accounting for only 13 % of all trials. 
Children might have referred to their visual access only because it was perhaps easier for 
them to simply state visibility rather than in a more complex context reflecting on the 
subsequent quality of the judgment. Precise evaluations of confidence would require 
participants to actively introspect about their perceptual experience and then indicate their 
internal, metacognitive estimate of the reliability of their judgment. This is a costly cognitive 
task that requires allocation of top-down attention and therefore it’s implementation would 
neither be automatic nor free of costs (Corallo, Sackur, Dehaene, & Sigman, 2008).  
Adults on the other hand expressed significantly more uncertainty than children. 
These evaluations seemed not to be conform with the quality of their individual judgments. 
Judges initially sitting behind the clear window regularly presented their high quality, 
individual judgment accompanied with markers of uncertainty. Such behavior might be a 
strategy to demonstrate willingness to work collaboratively and value their partner’s 
contribution to a successful joint decision rather than demonstrating uncertainty about the 
quality of a judgment drawn behind the clear window. This observation agrees with concepts 
discussed in the framework of the Politeness theory, originally proposed by Brown and 
Levinson (1987). It is argued that every member of a society has a face, which is defined as 
one’s public self-image. A positive labeled face means the desire of people to be appreciated 
or approved of by other members of a society. Contradicting testimony can potentially carry 
the risk to cause other group members to lose their face. In order to minimize this risk 
speakers tend to use politeness strategies, for example, linguistic politeness. Furthermore, 
dyad members were instructed by the experimenter to solve the task collectively and thus, 
might have felt socially obligated to treat decision partners equally. 
Joint decisions did not result from argumentative discourses between dyad members 
in the current study. Decision partners did not discuss individual judgments in a back-and-
forth-fashion by exchanging arguments and counterarguments. This finding might be caused 
by the overall design of the task. Both dyad members were extensively introduced to the two 
qualities of visual access the individual judgments were based on and could easily determine 
the distribution of informational access between both partners in every test trial. In this 
respect a simple strategy such as always deciding for the judgment drawn behind the clear 
 




window would have been fully successful. However, participants were instructed by the 
experimenter to compare their individual judgment, discuss it, and jointly decide for a final 
judgment. That brought up the question why participants hardly gave reasons spontaneously.  
On one side this is surprising since the possibility to engage in discussions was 
proposed to increase reasoning efforts for providing convincing arguments and support own 
positions or challenge positions of dialog partners (Mercier, 2012). On the other side live, 
real-time discourse is a sophisticated interaction between different perspectives or opinions, 
which especially applies to 4- to 6-year-old children. At each moment one was either 
speaking or processing what the other person said to potentially criticize the opponent’s 
statement. Moreover, several egocentric biases of communication were identified that may 
have impaired decision outcomes resulting from verbal dialogs (e.g., overestimation of 
transparency according to Gilovich et al. (1998). Considering how cognitively demanding and 
error-prone it is to produce a reasonable argument based on common ground assumptions it 
seems more feasible (or even rational) to simply disambiguate informational access and 
enter argumentative discourses only if essential for successful joint decisions. Both, children 
and adults were similar in not producing a high number of arguments spontaneously. 
However, when invited by the experimenter to present arguments to justify joint decisions for 
specific judgments, adults expressed significantly more right reasons than children who 
expressed more often wrong and irrelevant reasons. This supports the conclusion that 
children’s understanding of the causal relationship between the quality of the visual access 
and the subsequent quality of individual judgments is still fragile at the age of four to six 
years. 
 
13.4. Success as a function of meta-talk and argumentative strategies 
Adults decided successfully regarding joint decisions in 92 % of trials, thus, communicative 
strategies that might have led to more or less successful joint decision were not identified in 
the current experiment. 
Children dyads unlike adults differed in the successfulness of their joint decisions as a 
function of meta-talk strategies. Dialogs that included ratings of individual visual access, 
correctness of individual judgments, or the difficulty of the task more often resulted in 
successful joint decisions than dialogs lacking these parameters. This testimony might have 
functioned to remind each other of the difference in visual access between decision partners 
and to demonstrate each other’s commitment to this situational common ground. These 
 




simpler meta-talk strategies proofed successful in cases where they fell on fertile ground, 
namely that dyad partners intuitively reflected correctly on the quality of their own judgments 
and “poor judges” were accordingly willing to revise their individual poor judgment. In 
contrast, in situations where “poor judges” were confident in own knowledge and not willing 
to revise their individual poor judgment the more advanced meta-talk strategies might have 
been necessary to increase the success rate of joint decisions. Such strategies may reflect 
on the situational evidence to clarify why the individual judgment of the “high judge” is 
preferable and would constitute the best possible outcome of joint decisions. However, the 
ability to reflect on the process by stepping back to jointly examine the evidence was 
proposed to emerge only during school years (Kuhn et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the ability to correctly justify joint decisions was found to interplay with 
the success of joint decisions. Decisions justified by wrong reasons were more often 
unsuccessful than decisions not justified by wrong reasons. Reasons were coded as „wrong“ 
if children reflected incorrectly on their visual access, for example, if a „poor judge“ claimed 
to have better visual access. It seemed that in this cases the „poor judges“ lacked the ability 
to identify their poor judgment as relevant guess opposed to correct knowledge based on 
adequate informational access. This interpretation would be consistent with research 
showing children’s understanding of their own epistemic states to fully develop late in their 
childhood, in a reflective/explicit form even not before school age (Kloo & Rhower, 2012). 
However, further research using multiple decision tasks is necessary to disentangle limited 
competences and potential confining performance factors in 4- to 6-year-old children. 
Decisions justified by ambiguous reasons were more often taken by the better 
judgment than decisions not justified by this type of reasons. Reasons were coded as 
ambiguous if they transferred the correct message why the high quality judgment was 
chosen (e.g., „because this judgment is right one“) and, thus, showed the ability to at least 
intuitively reflect on the quality of individual judgments. Moreover, children presented right 
reasons in around 50 % of trials that referred to the quality of visual access an individual 
judgment was based on, for example, „because I saw better“. Right reasons, however, did 
not correlate with correct joint decisions. Surprisingly, collective decisions favouring the high 
quality judgment were not significantly more often given to justify decision success versus 
failure. Even stronger arguments could have been phrased by refering to the reliability of the 
source of information (looking through a clear opposed to looking through a blurred window), 
and accordingly emphasising this fact as supporting evidence for specific individual 
judgments, for example, „Mine is better, because I saw better.“. Giving reasons that reflect 
 




intiutive knowledge but lack the precision of explicitely refering to situational facts as 
supporting evidence might be the first trajectory step in the development of advanced skills to 
engage in complex argumentative discourses. However, the current study is to my 
knowledge the first one that investigated potential correlations between the structure of 
children’s discussions and the functionality of resulting joint decisions. Many questions still 
remain open and future research will need to uncover more systematically how skills of 
argumentative discourse and meta-talk strategies become more solid over subsequent 
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Study 3 - Coding scheme  
Table 1. Coding scheme of dialogs and requested reasons. 
  Category English (translation) German 
Ratings 





to see sehen¹ 
 
State of knowledge 
  
  
to know wissen² 
  
Correctness of 
individual judgments³     
    that one is right das stimmt 
    I did it right ich habe es richtig gemacht 
    mine is the right one meins ist richtig 
    it belongs there da gehört es hin 
    here was it really hier war es wirklich 
  Level of difficulty     
    this is hard das ist schwer 
    this is mean das ist fies 
Uncertainty       
    maybe vielleicht 
    might/could/should/would könnte/sollte/müsste/wäre 
    possibly eventuell 
    to believe glauben 
    probably wahrscheinlich 
    to assume vermuten 
    no idea keine Ahnung 
    to guess geraten 






    actually eigentlich 
    approximately ungefähr 
    my feeling was vom Gefühl 
    presumably vermutlich 
    somehow irgendwie 
(Requested)4 
Reasons       
  Right     
    to see sehen5 
  Ambiguous6     
    because I know better weil ich es besser weiß 
    because it belongs there weil es dahin gehört 
    because mine was right weil meins richtig ist 
  Wrong     
    to see sehen7 
  Irrelevant     
    because I want it  weil ich das möchte 
 
1
 Positive and negative forms of the verb were coded as well as self-referred and other-referred forms: 
I see, I see not, you see, you see not. 
2
 Positive and negative forms of the verb were coded as well as self-referred and other-referred forms: 
I know, I do not know, you know, you do not know. 
3
 Only expressions with the judgment as subject in the sentence were coded as well as positive and 
negative forms, and self-referred and other-referred forms: e.g. mine (for my judgment) is right/wrong, 
mine is not right/wrong, yours (for your judgment) is right/wrong, yours is not right/wrong. 
4 
The coding scheme of Reasons and Requested reasons was identical, however, Reasons were 
presented in the result section Dialogs as overall category, summarizing all four single categories. 
5 
Reasons including the verb “to see” were coded, only. Positive and negative forms of the verb were 
coded as well as self-referred and other-referred forms, but only if the given reason was right from the 
perspective of the judges’ visual access. If the judge, previously sitting behind the clear window, used 






window) did not see the mark”. Accordingly, from the perspective of the judge from the blurred 
window: “because, I did not see well” or “because, she (the judge from the clear window) saw better”. 
6
 Reasons that were basically right (meant the right explanation) but did not include “seeing”, e.g. did 
not precisely say why the judge “know better”. The missing explanation here was: “because she saw 
better”. 
7 
Reasons including the verb “to see” were coded, only. Positive and negative forms of the verb were 
coded as well as self-referred and other-referred forms, but only if the given reason was wrong from 
the perspective of the judges’ visual access. If the judge, previously sitting behind the clear window, 
used expressions like “because, I did not see well” or “because, she (the judge from the blurred 
window) saw better”. Accordingly, from the perspective of the judge from the blurred window: 
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